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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION
1 - Theory, practice, communities, and
the meaning of photographic imagery
One of the common notions about the photographic
medium is that it produces images which often have a
proof-like status. However, a series of problems are
raised as soon as we consider what are the processes which
legitimize the "truthfulness" of photography.
It is true that photography is usually accepted as
legal or scientific "proof" because of the optical and
chemical processes peculiar to the medium (the
point-to-point "correspondence" between the image and the
depicted object), but this is not always the case for, in
other situations, the acceptance of the proof-like status
of a photograph is instead largely context-dependent. This
is particularly evident in the media environment where
photographical and electronic imagery in general derives
its status of proof largely from the authority of the
media themselves, even though paradoxically media
develop their own authority (at least initially) also from
the shared belief about the inherent "scientific"
truthfulness of the medium.
This suggest that at least in a broader social
context the proof-like status of photographic imagery
does not derive from theory only but rather from the
interaction between the theory and the practice (s) of the
communities which use (and/or are used by) the medium.
More precisely, certain practices are initially justified
by the theory (which is imported from another community),
but then develop their own contexts of justification in
which references to the initial theory (if present at all)
are difficultly explicable.
This complex interaction can be better (if not
only) grasped in the context of specific communities which
use the medium for specific purposes. This because, in
general, the transmission of justificatory (and often
myth-like) arguments for the proof-like status of
photographic images reaches a community from another wider
one to which the former is both culturally and
economically related. As suggested by Sekula's analysis of
the meaning-making processes which operate around and
within photographic archives , the meaning of such
imagery derives from an almost entirely bureaucratic
("normal") process, whose justification is only indirectly
theory-related. In such a context, the
"theory"
of the
medium is not important as such, but rather as an instance
of the overall "rationality" entailed by the structure and
organization of the communities which make use of that
medium.
My concern here is to approach this interaction
between the theory and the practice of a medium from an
historical point of view, extending the field of the
inquiry to the development of theories of vision and
geometrical optics, and to their relation with the design
and use of optical instruments as well as with the
evaluation of their reports.
I will both follow the development of the notion
of demonstration as produced within an axiomatic deductive
system and the development of pre-geometrical theories of
vision, showing their final merging into geometrical
optics which is the backbone of both modern theories of
visual perception and physical optics,
which ultimately is an important component of the theory
through which modern media are designed and "proved".
By doing so, I will show that historically we do
not find a theory which stands aside the practice of the
use of optical instruments, which
"explains" them and give
the necessary tools for the evaluation of the instrumental
reports. What we find, instead, is that the use of an
instrument mediates the development of a theory which then
mediates both the further development of the instrument
and the evaluations of its reports. Following Feyerabend's
thesis , we can say that theory does not only move out
of a practice, but it actually remains such . This because
the difference between theory and practice is of structure
and not of kind.
From here we get to the notion that the instrument
is not just a simple extension of the senses, but rather
an active tool, like a machine which does not observe the
world for us but rather produces observational reports
which we are taught how to read once we belong to that
community. In other terms, the world we perceive through
an instrument or a medium is not an "extended" world but
an artificial one, and the range of practices which
develop around the use (and the development) of the
instrument play an important role in separating
artificiality from arbitrariness . Borrowing Kuhn's
terminology, I would say that the instruments play
3
sometime the role of the exemplar
I believe that the camera obscura worked as the
basic exemplar for the theories of geometrical
4
optics . In fact the understanding of the behavior of
the light rays passing through the pinnhole and forming
the image on the opposite plane, was crucial to the
development of the awareness of the processes of image
formation within the eye which would then bring to both
Kepler's development of the concept of retinal image and
of the lenses' optical behavior. The non-arbitrariness of
the exemplar was guaranteed by a wide range of uses within
astronomy and land survey of optical
instruments primarily the camera obscura itself and
the dioptra which both rely on the use of pinnholes.
2 - Instruments and exemplars
Evidently the problem is the analysis of the
dynamics of the interaction of theory and practice.
Feyerabend states that "reason and practice are
not two different kinds of entities but parts of a single
dialectical process." He exposes quite clearly the
limitations of traditional approaches to the philosophy of
science which rely on a mythified (and mystified) notion
of rationality, and shows the relevance of
non-intellectual factors as well as political issues to
such dialectical process. However the participants to that
process are better described than the structure of their
interactions.
Kuhn's notion of exemplar could be a better tool
for describing some of the dynamics which develop between
theory and practice. He introduced such a notion to
precise one of the meanings of the term paradigm he had
widely used in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
7
, trying to show how actively the professional
training within a specific scientific community (tacitly)
supplies content to a series of operations which are
generally supposed to be purely syntactical. One of his
examples is the development of analogies with succesfully
solved problems in a "comparable" field of research which
justify the adaptation of a more general law to a new
case. For instance Galileo:
..found that a ball rolling down an incline
acquires just enough velocity to return it to the
same vertical height on a second incline of any
slope, and he learned to see that experimental
situations as like the pendulum with a point-mass
for a bob. Huygens then solved the problem of the
center of the center of oscillation of a physical
pendulum by imagining that the extended body of
the latter was composed of Galilean point-pendula ,
the bonds between which could be instantaneously
released at any point in the swing.
Each of these "translation" are not just
syntactical transformation, but they entail the addition
of a specific empirical content. Evidence of this problem
can be found in the fact that students often cannot "see"
the application from the formalism theycan read, but they
need to be supplied of that kind of knowledge through
training in problem-solving. The solution of problems is
what
"points" to the proper analogies that allow for the
application of the formalism. Kuhn's hypothesis is that
such a training produces something like a
gestalt-modif ication so that the processing of stimuli
into data is "programmed" in a way that the criterion of
g
similarity suggested by the exemplar is tacitly
introduced in the student gestalt.
Kuhn's emphasis on the fact that the empirical
content of each generalization of a formalism is different
an not "derived" syntactically from the first case of such
generalization ("Empirical content must enter formalized
theories from the top as well as the bottom" ) also
suggests an interesting approach to the relationship
between theory and practice during the evaluation of
instrumental reports. These considerations seem to confirm
that instruments are not just "extensions" of our
perception even though we usually say that we
"see"
through an electronic microscope or that we "see" an
electron in a cloud chamber.
Hanson has exposed a series of differences
between "to see" and "to see as" in connection with
different problems, instruments, and contexts of
discovery, while Kuhn has pointed to the fact that:
We do not see electrons, but rather their
tracks or else bubbles of vapor in a cloud
chamber. We do not see electric currents at all,
but rather the-needle of an ammeter or
galvanometer .
The process which allows us to bridge the gap
between our "natural" perception, and the "extended" one
is not just the precise knowledge of the "syntax" of the
instrument which produces the report, but also a specific
kind of training of the same kind considered before.
With these considerations, Kuhn describes the role
of the tacit knowledge of the community as entailed by the
professional practice and how and where it interacts with
the "theory". However his primary concern in these
arguments is to clarify the concept of paradigm as the
structure of the cognitive identity of the scientific
community, and therefore the practice and the theory which
are shown to interact are internal to the community-
External influences are certainly not excluded,
nevertheless they need to be mediated by the paradigm.
This attitude evidently refers to Kuhn's necessity of
offering a satisfactory articulation of the relativism
introduced by the admission of the role of practice within
the scientific enterprise. In fact he treats the
scientific community as a body and by studying its
anatomy, physiology, and psychology tries to account for
its behavior, which is the production of science. The
"evolutionary"
connotation of the relationship between
theory and practice is particularly evident in the
"Postcript 1969" where he says that:
In many environments a group that could not
tell wolves from dogs could not endure. Nor would
a group of nuclear physicists today survive as
scientists if unable to recognize the tracks of
alpha particles and electrons.
In a sense the notion of salience of a similarity
and the capability of "seeing" it is teleologically
related to the professional survival of the community, in
fact in "Metaphor in Science" he says that:
Only through the multiplicity of such exposures
can the student acquire what other authors. .. refer
to as the feature space and the knowledge of
salience required to link language to the
world
Evidently the "multiplicity of those exposures"
and the related notion of salience derives from a
professional training of the kind considered earlier.
However, the study of the exemplars adopted by a
community especially in a context of full
institutionalization of science may reveal something
about the presence of interests which are also related to
a practice. A.Pickering has proposed a model of
interaction between interests and exemplars, where he
suggests that:
An "interest", then is a particular
constructive cognitive orientation towards the
field of discourse. As a shorthand description one
can refer to an exemplar being so constructed that
it "intersects with the interests" of some
particular group or groups.
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But Kuhn's model can be useful also for a
structured analysis of the results of external influences
on the community, primarily by studying the "importation"
of exemplars which have been originated outside the
community, either in other scientific groups, or from the
practices of other professionals who are not engaged in
scientific activity.
This is my concern here, also because, by dealing
with a period in which the scientific activity is largely
pre-paradigmatic , the notion of "community" is so loose
that practically everything is (by default) external to
it. However, this set of problems is of particular
relevance also for the historigraphical practice, because,
to be able to evaluate the potential relevance of the
study of exemplars for the understanding of the
interactions between theory and practice, or between
external influences and internal orientations and
committments of a scientific community, it is necessary to
develop some kind of historically-grounded hypothesis
about how such a relationship may have developed in time.
We can detect a pattern of
"exemplars-exchange"
among communities also within contemporary science, where
those exemplars do not stand just as successful solutions
of typical problem of a scientific community, but their
relevance is extended also to a much wider set of social
11
communities. I believe that a significant example is
offered by the adoption of the "computational metaphor" as
an exemplar for the neo-formed community of Cognitive
Sciences. Evidently the computer has a double (and doubly
succesful ) status: as a structure of computational
procedures (like a Turing machine) it is an exemplar for
the theory of computability ; and, as an actual computer,
it is an exemplar of a specific kind of solution of
problems of information management which has an evident
social and political connotation. The two aspects are
probably inseparable especially once we consider the
teleological dynamics of the community's fund-raising.
Beside the economical implication of the choice of
an exemplar over another which can develop only in a
social context characterized by the presence of a
scientifically-informed technology we see that the
"world"
of the scientist has always been historical and
not natural, for it is conceived as the domain of the
theories and the practices of that period.
For instance we find that Aristotle thought that
speed varied in proportion to the ratio of force to
resistance (and that this created difficulties if the
motion took place in the vacuum ), but he was also
living in an environment in which (with the exception of
arrows) most of the movements were quite slow and
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with quite a friction. His "experiments" are often
"performed" by fishermen hauling boats on the shore (which
shows quite clearly why he was talking of force and
resistance and their ratio). His unit of force is "man"
and his notion of speed was evidently thought in terms of
the duration of the hauling task. To think of the absence
of resistance in a world constituted by practices like
this, it was not an abstraction but a dream.
I am not particularly convinced by the theses
about the craft-origin of many of the theories developed
in the early phases of the scientific revolution, but what
seems to be out of question is that a new set of practices
presented the scientist with a different world in which
certain theories could be thinkable and their exemplars
could be seen . For instance we find Galileo saying that:
SIMP. I would like to hear your reason for
putting the projectiles of fire arms, i.e., those
using powder, in a different class from the
projectiles employed in bows, slings, and
crossbows, on the ground of their not being
equally subject to change and resistance to the
air .
SALV. I am led to this view by the excessive
and, so to speak, supernatural violence with
which such projectiles are launched; for, indeed,
it appears to me that without exaggeration one
might say that the speed of a ball fired either
from a musket, or from a piece of ordnance is
supernatural .
The term "supernatural" in Galileo does not have
any magical connotation. He simply means that such a speed
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cannot be obtained with "natural" means, for he believes
such a speed to be superior to the terminal velocity of
free-falling bodies in air.
This seems to be a literal example of the
"supernaturality" (i.e. historicity) of the scientist's
physical world.
It is also a common notion that Galileo's
mechanics was less "intuitive" than Aristotle's, but what
was less "intuitive" were also the phenomena he had to
face and which were produced by a technological (and
socio-political) practice.
The introduction of fire-arms did not extend the
range of observable phenomena; it created them (and not
others), with a process analogous to the "historicization
of
nature"
which Marx indicated by saying that:
The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees,
was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago
transplanted by commerce into our zone, and
therefore only by_ this action of a definite
society in a definite age it has become "sensuous
certainty"
. . .
This pattern of examples suggests that phenomena
are to an important extent a product of the practice of a
community which (in the beginning) is society itself. The
same cannot be easily said about scientific theories. In
fact, it is quite difficult (especially in an historical
period in which the scientific community is not fully
14
structured) to trace the relationship between the
development of scientific theories and other practices, as
evidentiated by the controversial results of Zilsel's
20
work . This because the relationship between
scientific theories and other practices does not occur
according to a fixed pattern, for also such a pattern
develops (unlinearly) in time.
We cannot think of the role of the "computational
metaphor" for the Cognitive Sciences as commensurable with
the role of the "hauling metaphor" for Aristotle's
physics, or with the influence of the development of
fire-arms on Galileo's dynamics. These contributions of
external practices on the development of scientific
theories are much different once we evaluate them in their
proper context, which is, by considering what was the
structure of the scientific community and its position in
society at that time. In fact it is such a structure that
mediates external contributions and internal components
around the concept of relevance and salience .
Consequently a science is
"mature"
not only because
somebody can lay down its specific axioms, but also
because its community is fully structured. Geometrical
optics is a good example of this process. Euclid developed
it on an axiomatic base, but it was then articulated by
scientists belonging to different communities (astronomy,
15
astrology, medicine) which held different paradigms and
were trained with different problems and exemplars (though
still about vision). This produced often incommensurable
readings and articulations of those axioms.
However, by "community" I do not mean a
citadel-like object, something which isolates the
scientists from the outer context. What I mean is that the
interactions between the inside and the outside are
mediated not in terms of individual interests,
orientations, but precisely in terms of relevance,
salience, and ultimately of professional survival (or
expansion) of the whole community -
As a sketchy summary of the relationship between
instruments and exemplars, we can consider instruments to
be among that range of results of practices (not
necessarily scientific) which contributes to the
production of new range of phenomena (and not the
extension of old ones). An instrument can become an
exemplar (being "translated" in the theory and integrated
into the practice of the community) if it offers a
"relevant"
analogy with the problems contemplated by the
program of the community. The notion of
"relevance" is not
a fixed one but changes together with the structure and
the social role of the community-
16
3 - Structure and method
Most of these considerations have their
translation in terms of historiographical problems.
Paradigms are useful tools for the historical analysis of
the activity of a community (from an internal point of
view), even though they can easily introduce the
misleading notion of "normal" history, by propagating
among historical evidences what the historian supposes the
paradigm to have been. However, in dealing with the
historical period up 200 AD, the possibilty to identify
anything more than paradigm-sketches is probably
unrealistic, primarily because of the scarce articulation
of scientific communities. In Greece the only science
which was probably practiced within a community-like
structure was medicine. Its social relevance made its
practitioners to become professionals who often organized
themselves in guild-like structures. Greek Astronomy was
also professionally practiced, but the "circular motion
paradigm" that is sometimes attributed to it, covers
several important discontinuities, the most important
being the shift from a quasi-qualitative attitute before
Hipparchus to a systematic and quantitative one in the
Hellenistic period.
The identification of a paradigm for the theories
17
of vision is an hopeless task because those theories were
developed within (and in connection with) a range of
different professional practices and schools of thought.
As Lindberg puts it:
We do not know all the motivations that
underlie these earliest Greek discussions, but it
seems clear that blindness and eye disease
stimulated medical thought on the subject of
vision and gave birth to the scienc of
ophtalmology ; that an interest in epistemology and
psychology led philosophers to examine mankind's
most noble and dependable sense, the sense of
vision, and to analyze its functioning in physical
terms; and that the artist's concern for
scenography and the astronomer's concern for
accurate celestail observations induced
mathematicians to formulate a mathematical theory
of perspective.
The materials presented here cover Lindberg 's
synopsis even though they are articulated according to a
different methodological attitude.
The development of geometrical optics has been
approached here from two quite different but converging
points of view. The development of pre-geometrical
theories of vision has been treated with an
"internalist"
attitude; looking for certain recurrent problems with the
different solution offered by the different authors and
trying to identify paradigm sketches.
Instead with an
"externalist"
approach I have
tried to trace some of the aspects of the interaction
between scientific theories and professional practices in
18
this early period. In fact, the history of geometrical
optics offers the possibility to trace the development of
the notion of demonstration as entailed by euclidean
geometry in one of its first applications to the
explanation of a physical, physiological, and
psychological process. The point is of particular interest
because it refers to the process of development of formal
reasoning out of the interaction of a number of practices
and concerns within a changing landscape of social
conditions.
Among the various components of the social
context, I have tried to point at certain issues which
pertain to the development of institutionalized scientific
communities and to the subsequent structure of programs of
research.
Unfortunately, the limited period of time
(weighted in terms of "density" of scientific activity)
considered here made possible only to indicate certain
pattern which were going to be more visible only later.
19
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1 A.Sekula, "Photography Between Labour and Capital", in:
L.Shedden, Mining Photographs and Other Pictures , Halifax,
Nova Scotia, 1983, pp. 193-202.
2 P.Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society , London, 1978,
p. 26, "...the difference between 'reason' and something
'unreasonable' that must be formed by it or can be used to
put it in its place arose from turning structural differen
ces of practices into differences of kind What is called
'reason' and 'practice' are therefore two different types of
practice . . .
"
.
3 Kuhn introduced the notion of exemplar in his "Postscript
1969" in the 1970 edition of his The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions , pp. 174-210, and in his "Second Thoughts on
Paradigms", in F.Suppe ed. The Structure of Scientific The-
ries , Urbana, 111., 1974, reprinted in T.S.Kuhn, The Essen
tial Tension , Chicago, 1977.
4 A detailed survey of the study of pinhole images and its
relevance for the development of the theory of the retinal
image has been carried out by D.C. Lindberg in a series of
essays reprinted in D.C. Lindberg , Studies in the History of
Medieval Optics , London, 1983.
5 The same camera obscura was used for astronomical observat
ions, especially for eclipes. Alhazen has left a detailed
description of such a practice.
6 P.Feyrabend, op. cit. , p. 25.
7 T.S.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Chicago,
1962, enlarged and revised edition, Chicago, 1970.
8 T.S.Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms", in T.S.Kuhn, The
Essential Tension , Chicago, 1977, p. 305.
9 'Tacit' here does not mean 'secretive' or anything like that
because the practices Kuhn is talking about are perfectly ex
plicit. Instead it means that such a knowledge cannot be "seen"
by looking at the formalisms.
10 T.S.Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms", p. 300.
11 N.R.Hanson, "An Anatomy of Discovery", in The Journal of
Philosophy , Vol.LXIV, No. 11, June 8, 1967, pp. 321-352.
12 T.S.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , p. 196.
13 T.S.Kuhn, ibid. , p. 195-6.
14 T.S.Kuhn, "Metaphor in Science", in A.Ortony ed., Metaphor
& Thought , Cambridge, 1979, p. 413.
15 A.Pickering, "Interests and Analogies", in B.Barnes and D.
Edge eds., Science in Context , Cambridge, Mass., 1982, pp.
125-146.
16 For a very brief but clear analysis of
Aristotles'
study
of local motion see S.Toulmin and J.Goodfield, The Fabric of
the Heavens , New York, 1961, pp. 93-112 and 210-227.
20
17 The problems of the observation of fast moving body was a
crucial problem primarily because of the lack of a precise
instrument of time reconing. A.Koyre' in Metaphysics and
Measurement , London, 1968, pp. 89-117, has shown that also
Galileo and his immediate successors relied on preconceived
ideas when evaluating the results of their experiments, be
cause of their large margin of indetermination .
18 G.Galilei, Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences , trans.
by H.Crew and A.De Salvio, London, 1914, p. 255.
19 K.Marx, The German Ideology , in The Marx-Engels Reader ,
Second ed., ed. R.C.Tucker, New York, 1978, p. 170.
20 E.Zilsel, "The Origins of William Gilbert's Scientific Me
thod", in Journal of the History of Ideas , Vol.2, No.l,
January, 1941, pp. 1-32.
21 D.C . Lindberg , Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler ,
Chicago, 1976, p.l.
21
Chapter 2 - OBSERVATION AND PROOF
BEFORE THE GREEKS
1 - Introduction
Before considering Euclids's development of
geometrical optics in the hellenistic period, we need some
background in the earlier theories and practical
applications of geometry and optics in astronomy, land
surveying, and chartography . This because the application
of a geometrical model to vision was most probably
initiated not from the philosophical speculations about
the process of cognition through vision, but rather from a
concern in the formal justification of observational
reports by treating them accordingly to the method and
propositions of Euclid Elements. By tracing the uses and
the contexts in which optical observations were initially
performed and utilized without much formal concern about
their theoretical status, we may develop some
understanding of the intellectual and social change which
stimulated the development of Euclid's Optics and his
concerns about
"proving"
vision.
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The pattern of transmission of early mathematical,
geometrical, and astronomical knowledge from the Middle
East to Greece is still unclear, and not all the reports
we have about the trips of Thales, Democritus, Plato, and
Eudoxus to Egypt to learn astronomy and geometry from the
astronomers/priests at Heliopolis are believed to be
accurate. Nevertheless, it is clear that the early
development of geometry took place in Egypt and Babylon
where an agrarian economy essentially based on a very
extensive and state-controlled system of irrigation
developed a complex system of land registration. The
geometry of the land surveyior and the arithmetics of the
scribe probably constituted the early tools of the
astronomer .
We do not have detailed information about the
instruments used for those observations , but it is
reasonable to assume that they did not go under relevant
developments before the hellenistic period. One of the
first surveying handbooks of the Greek world is the
Metrica by Hero of Alexandria (250? A.D.) whose dioptra
(an improvement of an already existing device) was one of
the most sophisticated but scarcely used surveying
devices. The major source of information about
astronomical instruments is Ptolemy (857-165? A.D.), who
2
describes some of them in his Almagest and
23
Planishaerium , where he also refers to
Hipparchus ' (180-125BC ) "horoscopic instrument", suggesting
3
that he already knew the astrolabe . We do not have
information about previous instruments specifically
designed for astronomical purposes, and it is probable
that they were basically similar to the ones of the
surveyors. Moreover the determination of the orientation
of a specific plot of land requires some astronomical
knowledge which suggests that in the beginning the
astronomer and the surveyor shared not only the same
instruments but also similar notions. In any case the
later development of optical instruments for astronomy did
not introduce radical modifications in the sighting
components, but it rather tended to develop the
computational aspects of those instruments, so that a
single observation of a celestial body could produce
4
automatically a wider range of information . There is
no evidence of a theory of geometrical optics before the
Hellenistic period, even though all these instruments were
evidently constructed and employed under the tacit
assumption that something was putting the viewer in
"touch" with the viewed object along a straight line.
2 - Egypt
24
Egyptian astronomy made scarce use of geometry,
and beside the development of an accurate calendar did
not achieve particularly significant results.
The positions of the stars were plotted on a grid
so to work as a night clock: the "meridians" indicated the
hours, while the parallels gave the stars' elevation. It
is quite probable that their "latitude" and "longitude"
were not derived from angular measurements, but rather
from subjective evaluations of direct observations.
R.A.Parker has reconstructed the procedure of astronomical
observations followed by the early Egyptian astronomers
as :
On a suitable viewing platform, probably a
temple roof, two men would sit facing one another
on a north south line. The northernmost would hold
a sighting instrument like a plumb bob before him
and would call out the hour when a star had
reached either a meridian or one of the lines
before or after as sighted against the target
figure .
After 1500 B.C. the water-clock largely replaced
astronomical observations which continued to be performed
almost for calendarial purposes only.
The emphasis on the accuracy of the calendar and
the much lesser concern with a full and precise
stars'
cataloguing (like the ones later developed by Hipparchus
and Ptolemy) can be explained by considering the context
in which the Egyptian astronomers were operating.
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Egyptian cosmology offered a picture of the
heavens and the gods which strongly confirmed the actual
structure of the Empire. The two sides of the picture were
connected through the god-like figure of the king. An
accurate calendar was therefore necessary to synchronize
heavenly and earthly life at recurrent dates of particular
importance for the social life, such as the annual flood
of the Nile . Egyptian religious and political
7
behavior was developed around the concept of maat
which entailed the concepts of both natural and legal
order. The orderly configuration of the heavens was
matched both by the highly articulated
politico-bureaucratic structure of the Egyptian state and
by the seasonal regularities of nature. The king-god is
the keeper of maat . His role is to maintain the
teleological order of nature, society, and the heavens.
It is not accidental that the new pharaoh was
enthroned on the first day of the year and that this event
was considered (and depicted) as a new creation, as a new
useful re-ordering of the whole world according to maat .
By encoding this order as displayed by the course of
heavens and of seasonal phenomena, the calendar becomes
also an expression of maat and it is consequently
associated to the figure and role of the king. The
relationship between the pharaohs, the natural phenomena,
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the celestial order and the "good life" is evident in this
fragment of a hymn for the new king's accession to the
throne :
Be gay of heart, the entire land, for the goodly
times have come! A lord has been given to all
lands!.... The waters stand and are not dried
up, and the Nile carries a high [flood]. [Now] the
days are long, nights have hours, and the moons
come regularly. The gods are at rest and happy of
heart, agd people live [in] laughter and
wonder! .
This passage emphasizes the importance of order,
both in society and in the sky. Order is meant to be a
periodic recurrence of events, and the periodic repetition
of phenomena suggests the presence of a constant cause.
When phenomena recur eternally such as the movement of
the heavens the cause needs also to be eternal, which is,
ontologically justified. As a result kingship is natural
in the same way the sun rises naturally each day-
Analogously, the notion of the heavens as an
organism is mirrored by the structure of the state.
Everybody has its specific role which is also the basis of
both his individual and social identity as well as of the
form of his cognitive approach to natural phenomena. As
Max Weber puts it:
"every individual is bound to the function
assigned to him within the social system; and
therefore every individual is in principle
unfr e."
or:
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"In general, the individual in Egypt was from
early times a tool of pharaonic power; he and his
property wgre no more that entries in a
cadaster.
"
Then, if the heavenly organism is alive, it means
that it has an individual will, which implies that it
cannot be analyzed but rather is understood (or
sympathetically comprehended ) through a dialogue with it.
If the Nile does not rise, it is because it does not want
to, which means that it needs to be interrogated about the
reasons of its behavior throgh the mediation of oracles.
This attitude was probably transferred into astronomical
investigations, because if a planet has its own will the
study of its movements trying to understand the pattern of
its orbit would result in a limitation of that planet's
(or that god's) will.
However, to limit our attention to the
consideration that mythopoeic thought did not allow
planetary motion to be observed with scientific attitude
but only in terms of dialogue, tends to underestimate both
the loaded connotation of this dialogue and the identity
of the dialoguants. A socially relevant activity such as
astronomy cannot be considered per se , but rather in its
relationship with the social context through which the
astronomers derive their "identity". Going back to Weber's
remarks, we can argue that if individuals assume an
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identity in terms of their social role, it follows that
their work also the intellectual one assumes the status
of a procedure. Both individuals and their work share the
same characteristic of being typical . This is also
partially confirmed by the absence in Egypt (and Babylon)
of the notion of authorship in scientific and
technological achievements, which instead in a much
different social context was going to be recognized in
the Greek world.
We can expect that the "form" of the questions
posed by Egyptian astronomers to be probably
incommensurable with the one of later astronomers, and
that this incommensurability cannot be attributed only to
the fact they were
"ancient"
and mythopoeic, but it rather
needs to be referred to the different role of astronomy
and astronomers within those societies.
The intellectual behavior of Egyptian astronomers
cannot simply explained in terms of mythical and religiuos
reverence toward celestial bodies, for we cannot easily
understand the real content of the religiosity of
technical astronomers. These kind of explanations are
usually introduced by whiggish historians of science who
first de-contextualize religious, mythological, or
astrological concerns to re-introduce them later as
blinding eyeglasses to explain the slow-downs and detours
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from the linear progress of western science. We can rather
think of a professional mentality which incorporates,
mediates and supports religious components which otherways
could not probably survive the demistif icatory impact of
routine-like activities. To maintain an explanatory value,
religious concerns needs to become part of a professional
ritual. In a social context in which religion and
cosmology are not fundamental for the justification of the
political structure of the state, the role of the
astronomers'
community is much different as well as the
content of its paradigm. In fact we find Plato
who referring to Anaxagoras says that:
...those who study these objects in
astronomy and the other necessary allied arts
become atheists through observing-as they
suppose-that all things come into being by
necessary forces and not by the mental energy of
the will aiming at the fulfillment of good.
A more reasonable explanation of the attitude of
Egyptian astronomers can be found in their training.
The intricate bureaucratic structure of the
Egyptian Empire required the systematic use of written
records in most of its activities. This brought into
existence a numerous class of scribes who were trained on
textbook-papyri which presented and solved
"typical"
problems. R.Gillings tells us that most of these papyri
end as: "The manner of reckoning it", or "Manner of working
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out", or "These are the correct and proper procedings",
and "That is how you do it". In Babylon, which is
characterized by a social and political context which
shows several similarities with the Egyptian empire, we
find the same concerns for bureaucracy and we also find
specific evidences of the scribes being trained on
clay-tablets-textbooks presenting typical solutions for
typical problems. Interestingly enough the Babylonian
textbooks were ending with what Neugebauer translate
12
as:"this is the procedure" , which is strikingly
close to Gillings' findings. These endings are
functionallly equivalent of the "Q.E.D" or "Q.E.F" as
found at the end of the propositions of Euclid's Elements
The difference is that the function of the
deductive demonstration is here performed by the official
authority which issued the textbook defining both the
socially-teleologically relevant problems and their form
of solution. Therefore, the reason for the absence of the
notion of proof was a social one. Consequently the
difference between problem-solving procedure and formal
explanation which has been often used as a criticism to
the unscientific intellectual attitute of ancient
civilizations is the product of an a-historical
translation of the problem.
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However, the fact that these scribes were hired by
the same authority which issued the standard, cannot be
trivially taken to imply that they followed certain
procedures under an economic pressure only. I believe the
situation was quite more complex. The textbook is a sort
of "social contract" and the scribes by "subscribing" it
were also receiving a role-related identity. The same
cosmological myths were not ingredients of an oral
culture, but they were instead taught and actually
compiled at scribal schools. They were an important
component of the ideological formation of the scribe and
not of the peasant-serf whose political consensus was of
no relevance.
To understand the importance of the opportunity of
a career as a scribe we need to remember that the notions
of citizenship and legal identity in antiquity were
drastically different from our contemporary ones. For
instance a usual from of
"identity"
was entailed by the
concept of idia which:
was based on the principle that every
individual must have an official domicile; that
is, he must be officially entered on the rolls of
a community and hence be responsible for helping
that community meet its assigne labour duties. He
who did not have a domicile therefore had his
property confiscated, and he and his
family^became
directly subject to pharaonic authorities.
In other terms, idia is identity as a servant.
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Scribes were reaching a much better social and legal
status, special privileges, and their job was often
inheritable by other members of the family, as shown by
this fragment:
Put writing in thy heart, so that thou mayest
protect thine own person from any [kind of] labour
and be a respected official.", and "..the scribe,
however, he is the one who directs the work of
everybody [else]. He pays out taxes.by writing, so
that he has no [real] obligations.
It is very probable that land surveyors were
scribes who went through a further training. Some
astronomers were priests, which means that they too had a
specific training and a strong community awareness. The
development noted by M.Rostovtzef f of professional
organizations, which begun under the pharaohs and reached
their full importance in the hellenistic period probably
contributed to the consolidation of this group
15
identity . Because of a much different social and
economical context that we will briefly consider later,
both the structure and contents of Greek education was
radically different. For instance, the "scribe
culture"
1 cz
was fully developed only in the hellenistic period
Going back to consider what it meant to be a
surveyor in ancient Egypt, we need to remember that the
same notion of maat which legitimized the king's authority
and his role as keeper of natural and social order was
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also applied to any social object related to the king.
For instance, land was virtually under the king's
authority and protection (at least in the New Kingdom) and
(with the exception of the estates owned by the temples)
it was cultivated for the king by serf-like peasants. The
social context casted a religious significance on the
property of land (by far the most important kind of
property) for we find fragments of prayer like:
Cursed is he, that removeth his neighbour's
land mark. Amen.
We also know that votive stones called "kudurus"
18
were placed as land-marks in Babylon where we also
find records of disputes about land boundaries and
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inheritance divisions since Hammurabi . It is in fact
from a letter of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BC . ) that we get to
know of the early legal role of the surveyor in this kind
of law suits. This was later developed by Roman
jurisprudence to the point that the surveyor assumed
20
sometime the double role of technician and judge
As it can be expected, Egypt developed a central
cadaster and system of land and men registration early
during the Old Kingdom which was the core of a complex
21
system of taxation and distribution of public
charges. The importance of the cadaster and consequently
of the
surveyors'
work was particularly stressed by the
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crucial role of irrigation and of the mapping of the
responsabilities of its management.
But Egyptian civil law was poorly articulated for
it was evidently comprehended by maat . Consequently the
notion of legal proof in land-related law suits was
evidently an arbitrary. In general:
..the manner in which justice was administred
made it inevitable that eventually the prevailing
rule would be "no men without a master."
Analogous to what we have seen in the case of
astronomical investigations, in this case there is also no
need for proof because its function is replaced by
confirmation through authority. Together with proof, also
the notion of responsability tends to dissolve. Once the
surveyor performed the measurement accordingly to the
procedure he has been trained on, he had "done his job"
respecting the
"ritual"
of the profession. He was not
responsible for the production of a proof. As in the case
of the astronomer also the surveyor performs typical
observations not of objects but rather of
socially connoted items .
The lack of interest for the notion of proof is
evidently related to a particular social attitude about
causality. In fact, the scarce articulation of civil law
implies the scarce awareness of the concept of legal
35
causality, which in turn does not stimulate the
development of the notion of proof as related to the
output of socially relevant technical activities such as
land measurement. On the other hand, the role of the
astronomer and his training as a member of a community
prevents him to pose untypical questions. This would have
meant to extend the language of his community so to be
able to articulate criteria of causality and proof which
could be accepted by a wider (or rather different)
community which instead did not exist in that society-
They were short of audience which could have actually made
use of those developments. This because, as Weber puts it:
Even in the oldest extant documents we can see
that while there were privileged classes in Egypt,
there were no juridically free communities
equivalent to the Greek polis or kome .
Here I am not suggesting the equivalence between
the concept of proof in law and in the physical sciences,
but rather that they both are thinkable (and
actually thought ) only in specific historical stages of
social emancipation. If the emancipation from the
mythopoeic thought implies the progressive development of
the awareness of the mediative character of the cognitive
process, viz. of cognitive identity, this is also
paralleled by the establishment of a social and legal
identity- To get to the point where proofs are needed in a
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choice-making context, it is necessary to have already
developed the notion of choice, and to be able to
recognize it as such. In other terms, the notion of proof
can exist only together with the one of choice, and with a
community which can hold that choice. This in turn
requires the social corpus to be articulated in
communities with a legal status that allows them the
possibility of holding different choices. Evidently this
was not the case with ancient Egypt.
As a result of this scarce development of the
notion of proof and legal responsability , it is not
surprising that we do not find any interest about the
assumptions and the processes implied by the act of taking
a measurement with and optical instrument. In a sense the
instrument too does not have an identity (a "syntax") yet.
The concept of light does not go beyond its usual
metaphysical connotations such as "good", "keeper of
life", etc., and we do not find any trace of inquiries
about the process of vision among the few medical
papyruses. Geometrical notions of angle and line are still
conceived in terms of dimensions of actual objects.
The concept of proof as a result of a deductive
inference such as the one entailed by Euclidean geometry,
was not developed only because of the scarce abstractness
of geometry, but also because of the multiple approach to
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causality which was peculiar of ancient egyptian thought.
In such a form of thought, the causes of a process are
referred to a number of different agents. Each of them
"contributes" to the overall causation, but these
contributes are very often at odds with each other. This
lack of coherence in causal explanations is found not only
in the approach to natural phenomena but it is also
reflected in the scarce awareness of causal ordering in
the structure of the state. The bureaucratic chaos typical
of the administration of the Egyptian empire shows that
responsabilities were incoherently distributed among
ever-conflicting roles without much awareness of the
problem. Frequent conflicts were not "explained" by
tracing responsibilities, but they were rather adaptively
and paternalistically solved or supressed. In turn, the
administrative chaos also reflects the scarce articulation
of civil law, suggesting again that causality and proof
have their roots in both intellectual and social
emancipation .
3 - Babylon
In Babylon too the cosmological myths played an
important role in the justification of the structure of
the state. As T.Jacobsen puts it:
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The only truly sovereign state, indipendent of
all external control, is the state which the
universe itself constitutes, the state governed by
the assembly of the gods. This state, moreover, is
the state which dominates the territory
of Mesopotamia; the gods own the land, the big
estates, in the country- Lastly, since man was
created especially for the benefit of the gods,
his purpose is to serve the gods.
In this context the secular rulers are nominally
only
"governors"
and need to receive the orders from the
gods. From here the systematic practice of divination and
astrology. Here we do not find any concept equivalent to
the Egyptian maat , on the contrary dramatic contrasts
take place in the heavens and are tragically projected on
the hearth in the form of wars, invasions, and storms.
Therefore the messages that the gods send to men are not
expected to
be of univocal interpretation for they represent a state
of continuous tension and danger. This introduced the need
for a sort of statistical inference based on the omina
previously observed so to be able to evaluate the present
message. This concern is reflected in the systematic
keeping of astronomical and calendarial records.
25
Neugebauer has found that in early tablets these
records are often kept on more columns inclusive of
calendarial dates, astronomical records, relevant events
and omina. But Wiseman notes that the concern for
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records to be used for astrological prediction is much
wider, for we also find that dates of all public events,
accessions, deaths, mutinies, famines and plagues, height
of the rivers' level, wars, battles, religious ceremonies,
royal decrees, prices, and other pertinent facts were
recorded by Babylonian scribes.
The need for predictions was a political issue
because cosmological patterns were also related to
meteorological conditions and therefore to the height of
the rivers which was the most important "entry" of
Mesopotamian economy. We need now to consider how this
highly bureaucratized and record-oriented social context
influenced the development of geometry and of the
investigation of natural phenomena.
Babylonian arithmetical geometry shows the same
"empirical"
approach to the analysis of space found in
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ancient Egypt , however the notion of
"empirical"
needs some further qualification.
It is true that we find clay tablets with
mathematical texts for the training of scribe where an
area is arithmetically added to a distance, but we also
find that most of the sample problems are developed around
the same initial numerical values, as to point to the fact
that the procedure and not the result is the issue. With
this peculiar choice of data, they try to show that these
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are not
"real"
problems but "abstract" procedures .
To understand this contradictory features we need to put
them in context. For instance the apparent "concreteness"
and shown by the addition of an area to a lenght becomes
"abstractness"
once we consider it whitin its proper
system of classification. For instance J. Goody while
studying the relationship between Babylonian and Egyptian
commercial records and the related form of thought, has
noted that:
Quality tends to suffer a further reduction to
quantity when items with very different material
properties are equated as contributions or as
taxes and then totalled up by means of a set of
common units. In Egypt, writes Wolley, "All taxes
were paid in kind and stored in the royal
magazines; it is illuminating to find that all the
goods thus brought in, grain, cattle, wine, linen,
are invoiced indiscriminately as "labour"; in
other words, they are put on precisely the same
basis as the corvee whereby Pharaoh's serfs, the
people of Egypt, were called to build a pyramid or
to clean out a canal."
Therefore "area" and "length" did not have an
"Euclidean identity" but they where rather two items
gathered under the heading "property", and therefore they
were
"coherently"
added together. The scribe did not need
to "prove" anything , but only to respect the form of
classification and the procedures of his profession.
These considerations suggest that the notion of
abstractness may take different forms by picking up
41
different "exemplars" offered by the specific historical
and social context in which the emancipation from
mythopoeic thought takes place; in a similar fashion to
what E.Durkheim and M.Mauss noticed about primitive
. . _. . , 30classification in language-
But in the results of Babylonian astronomers we
can also find other connections between the social context
and the "form" of explanation of astronomical phenomena.
One of these can be found in the use of the sexagesimal
notation which being developed for the bureaucratic
administration of the Babylonian Empire reflected its
"ideology". It is in fact probable that the Babylonians
developed few general arithmetic procedures and then
applied them practically to all the problems of social
relevance by changing the parameters of the "program". For
instance Neugebauer says that lists of coefficients have
been identified where we can find:
...coefficients needed for
"bricks"
of which
there existed many types of specific dimensions,
then coefficients for "walls", for "asphalt", for
a "triangle", for a "segment of a circle", for
"copper", "silver", "gold", and other metals, for
a "cargo boat", for "barley", etc. Then we find
coefficients for the "diagonal", fq^
"inheritance", for "cut
reed"
etc.
This coefficients correspond to a form of
classification which defines what are the socially
relevant items to be identified and eventually processed.
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In this list geometry is treated as a set of parameters
for a standardized arithmetical procedure. To divide a
field or to divide an inheritance was "syntactically" the
same process (also because fields were generally divided
up during the distribution of inheritances).
Two of the components of the "Babylonian paradigm"
seem to be delineated: on one hand we have all sorts of
records, and on the other hand we find arithmetic as the
standard procedure for the management of those records. It
is quite probable that arithmetic together with a
powerful positional notation was a quite more efficient
tool than geometry for the solution of the problems faced
within that context.
The quantitative and "non-demonstrative" character
of Babylonian astronomy is not only related to the need of
precise predictions about the positions of heavenly
bodies, but it can also be partially seen as the result of
a "record-gestalt" . In fact J. Goody suggests that the very
notion of systematic prediction may have developed out of
the use of lists:
The lists in the Ugarit tables record
tributes and other types of receipt, as well as
outgoing payments. Other lists indicate not past
income or outgoing payments, but future ones
e.g. quotas and rations, what people should pay and
should receive; such prospective lists constitute
plans or programmes , rather than simple records,
though thetwo are not to be kept altogether
distinct.
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He then also suggest that the representation of
the management of a property in list form:
not only provides a record of a transaction
(and hence the possibility of a debt) or of and
estate at a particular time, it also institutes a
more formalized way of conceiving that transaction
or that property.
Once we realize the social importance of
astronomical predictions in Babylon, it is not
unreasonable to think that the planets' positions were
considered as resources to be recorded and arithmetically
processed in lists. In a sense, Babylonian astronomers
were "astronomical bookeepers" and the ephemerides were
part of the national "budget".
Moreover the list-gestalt could fit quite
naturally the
astronomers' mental framework because the
phenomena they were dealing with could not be grasped with
few random observations, but only by looking at a long
list of systematically arranged astronomical records. The
ephemerides are not just the result of the astronomers
work, but also his major tool, and the notion of
explanation takes the form of a relationship among records
in the language currently available, which is arithmetic.
We do not have specific information about the
training of the Babylonian astronomers, but from the
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analysis of some scribal textbooks we can understand that
the list-gestalt was deeply rooted into its education.
Goody for instance suggests that scribes were trained to
develop any sort of arrangements of items under different
kinds of headings by working on lists and arrays. The
total uselessness of many of those headings suggest that
again the emphasis was on the process and not on the
specific problem.
There is another consideration which points to the
influence of the social context on the form assumed by the
notion of "explanation".
Kuhn says that to Christian thought the Copernican
Revolution meant "to break the continuous chain of created
34being."
, similarly, a cosmological theory with
qualitative components in Babylon would have probably
meant a drastic revision of the cosmological myths which
were the grounds on which society was politically
structured. In this context the
astronomers'
community
shares most of the political paradigm; therefore a
paradigm shift would probably mean a really revolutionary
change. A quantitative approach based only on computation
of former records was instead acceptable precisely because
it was not proposing at least officially qualitative
hypotheses that may have contradicted the cosmological
my th s .
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With this premises, the so-called System B zig-zag
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function for the prediction of planetary positions
does not seem to be a lesser form of "explanation" than
the a-priori assumption about the circular motion of the
heavens which Ptolemaic astronomy employed primarily to
perform computations and compile ephemerides
Beside the more inquisitive attitude and the more
accurate results, we see that the work of Babylonian
astronomers is still typified by their social function, in
fact, even though that society allowed and actually needed
the development of astronomy, it strongly influenced the
form of the approach to the problem. Astronomy was still
expected to produce role-related results; it still was an
"official"
procedure and it is not casual that the
available ephemerides are all signed by the
scribe-compiler/computer, and have been excavated in
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places which are thought to be official archives
At this point it may be interesting to develop
some comparative analysis between cosmological myths,
socio-political contexts, and the notions of proof and
causality in Egypt and Babylon.
The different role and results of astronomy in
Babylon may be also related to the different content of
the cosmological myths and in particular to the fact that
it did not contemplate any concept equivalent to the
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Egyptian maat .The reason why no cosmological order is
contemplated there may be referred to the history of the
civilizations which populated at different times that
area. If the concept of maat was developed in Egypt it is
also because that country could be actually presented as
isolated from the rest of the world and therefore endowed
of a perennial order. Egyptian cosmological myths stress
the geographical closure of the country limited on one
side by the sea and on the other three sides by desert.
Non-Egyptian people are non-human and the cosmos is
exactly that portion of sky above Egypt. Myths generally
work till when they are not inescapably challenged, and
the concept of maat was made safe also by the scarce and
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controlled contacts with the outside
The geographical area around Babylon instead did
not offer any natural defense, and invasions of foreign
peoples happened quite frequently- The cosmological myth
could not talk about perennial order but rather about
perennial conflict and uncertainty- The myth needed to be
more
"elastic" if it did not want to break under the
challenge of other cultures.
Evidently the exposure to foreign world views is
not a sufficient condition for the development of a more
conscious investigation of natural phenomena. In fact the
implications of these "messages" need to be read, which
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means that there needs to be an enough emancipated
language to allow this translation. Nevertheless a
continuous interaction with different peoples because of
commerce and the absence of centralized political
structure, replaced instead by a pattern of small local
powers, contributed to the much different world view of
the Greeks.
In a context where the political, economical, and
geographical situation does not allow for an authoritative
isolation, decisions need to be taken out of agreement
rather than ontologically entailed by the procedure.
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by O.Neugebauer, to divide an inheritance or a field was a
formally equivalent problem. M.Clagett,in his Greek Science
in Antiquity , New York, 1955, p. 30, notes that Babylonian
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thing like "1 1" instead of "101").This suggests that they
were thinking of numbers as marks for a set of things and
could not abstract the concept of number from the concept
of quantity no quantity, no mark. This tells something
about their "concrete" attitude about geometry. In the same
way a number is a quantity, a geometrical figure is a set
dimensions, i.e. the set of the measures of the edges of the
figure. To think of an abstract geometrical figure would
probably mean to think of nothing.
However, even though the lack of "generalization" in Babylo
nian arithmetical geometry is a matter of fact, the relation
ship of this evidence with the mythopeic form of though needs
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context-free notion of abstraction which then generally ends
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two. It is like to suggest that it is possible to make pre
dictions through a generic "grinding" of astronomical obser
vations, as if numbers and observations spoke by themselves.
But Neugebauer is clear about the fact that we do not have
any information about the considerations that allowed for the
development of the System B and that anyway Babylonian astro
nomers were aware of certain causal relationships between the
motions of different planets. In fact, if a forecast shows a
reasonable agreement with the phenomena, it means that the
process which produced it represents a reasonably accurate
causal nexus between the items represented by the terms of
the computation.
Moreover the accuracy of the ephemerides show a pattern
which means that Babylonian astronomers were refining their
grasp of causal relationship between the observational re
ports.
37 O.Neugebauer, ibid. , pp. 54-70.
38 Foreign trade was generally managed by the Pharaoh and
concentrated in few coastal cities. Merchants were not
generally allowed into the country. In earlier periods the
Pharaoh was sending the army in foreign countries to gather
the necessary raw materials which were then distributed
through a network of state-owned warehouse .The distribution
of seeds and any other kind of items from these warehouse
stressed the paternalistic role of the king and confirmed
the belief in maat.
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Chapter 3 - GEOMETRY AND REMOTE SENSING
1 - observation and the
measurement of distance
Greek mythology was no less articulated that the
Egyptian or the Babylonian, but its role was not as
important as it was in those countries. Even in the period
of the Achaean kings the political organization was too
fragmented to need legitimization through cosmological
myths. We can get a sense of the deep differences between
these two kinds of political context by comparing the
content of the Enuma Elish with Hesiod's Theogony
2
Greek cosmological myths still attributed
religious importance on stars and planets, but the early
introduction of the four elements (fire, air, water,
earth) as original and orderly components of the cosmos
allowed the development of a non strictly religious
approach to astronomy. Moreover Greek economy was largely
3
based on exchange and the many contacts with other
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civilizations made them aware of the cultural relativity
of myths as it was clearly stated by Xenophanes as:
Mortals consider that the gods are begotten as
they are, and have clothes and voices and figures
like theirs. The Ethiopians make their gods black
and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue
eyes and red hair. Yes, and if oxen and horses or
lions had hands, and could paint with their hands,
and produce works of art as men do, horses would
paint the god| with shapes like horses, and oxen
like oxen ....
Much later, Aristotle in the Politics made a
similar point:
All men say that the gods have a king because
they themselves either are or were formerly under
the rule of a king: for they imagine not only the
forms of the gods,,-but also their ways of life to
be like their own.
Xenophanes and Aristotle's attitudes were not
anti-religious, but they rather acknowledged certain
processes of projection of human experience into the
domain of religion and myth, and ultimately suggested the
existence of a real, non-anthropomorphic god. This
criticism of anthropomorphism helped for the transition
from person-like cosmological principles to element-like
ones, allowing for a wider methodological perspective in
the study of natural phenomena.
However, in this new context natural philosophy
was not a topic of political relevance and in fact with
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the exception of medicine it held a marginal position
untill the development of the schools of Plato and
Aristotle .
Greek philosophy developed around the dialectic of
the changing and the unchanging, the one and the many, in
which the apparent chaotic , orderless and everchanging
earthly phenomena were contrasted by the stillness and
incorruptibility of the heavens. This pattern was also
incorporated in Plato's very influential theory of ideas
as well as in his cosmology. Aristotle adopted the same
basic model but attempted a more fruitful mediation
between the two polarities by introducing the notion of
causality in his multi-sphere universe hierarchically
ordered in terms of degree of movement and corruptibility.
As Koyre ' puts it:
Heavens and earth are two different things.
This is why mathematical astronomy is possible,
but mathematical physics aren't.
In this context the all process of vision was
forced in an ambiguous situation. Questions like "what is
light about?", or "what is the nature of the visual
ray?"
or "how are we able in the sublunar sphere to perceive
the heavenly
one?"
could not be easily answered for they
all refered to a theoretically problematical mediation
between those two spheres. This explains why Plato
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developed a metaphysics of light as we can find it in the
Timaeus .
The difficulties became sharper with the
development of geometrical optics in which the duality
between the abstract geometrical model of vision and its
physical aspects needed to be mediated with a space that
was far from homogeneous and isotrophic as the Euclidean
9
one .
Since the Presocratics , observations through
optical instruments were employed for a number of
different disciplines, but differently from Egyptian and
Babylonian practices they were often analyzed with
geometrical methods. Among Diels'
g
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker we find that
"[Thales (624ca-546ca BC ) ] described and
determined the position of constellation of the
Auriga, used by the Phoenicians to steer their
ships.", and that:
"Eudemus, in his History of Geometry [now
lost] credited Thales for this theorem because the
method by which he is supposed to have measured
the distance ofQships at sea requires the use of
this theorem." (fig3).
The fragments suggest that the first application
of remote sensing by means of geometrical interpretation
of observational reports was developed out of the interest
in navigational problem. At this point to observe does not
mean just to point to an object, but rather to relate
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geometrically that observation with others, so to derive
information about size, distance, and position which would
not have been directly available.
It is the early recognition of what Kepler would
later call the "triangulum distantiae mensorium" (the
triangle which measures the distance) which he
incorporated in his theory of the retinal image. The
content of Thales theorem was later introduced in the 4th
axiom of Euclid's Optics as "Things seen under a larger
angle appear larger, under a smaller angle appear smaller,
and under equal angles appear
equal."
Other fragments suggest that Thales himself
applied this theorem to a range of problems involving
measurement at distance:
"Thales of Miletus succeded in measuring the
height of the pyramids by measuring the shadow in
the moment when it has the same lenght of the body
that projects it.", and
"Once you placed a pole at the limit of the
shadow projected by the pyramid and, by the fact
that the sun rays reach them [the pyramid and the
pole] and form two triangles, you [Nilossenus to
Thales] demonstrated that the pyramid and the pole
bear each other the same proportion as their
shadows
do."
Proclus claims that there was no proper
demostration for this theorem before Euclid developed one
and included it in his Elements , which suggests
that even though the geometrical articulation of visual
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measurements was already available its acceptance was
based on common sense rather than on a formal
demonstration .
12
As noted by W.F.Theisen , Thales method is
not only articulated into a theorem in Euclid's Elements ,
but it is practically re-presented in his Optics in a
series of propositions about remote sensing. In fact,
Prop. 19 is about "How to determine a given height when the
sun is shining", and Prop. 21 deals with "How to measure a
given
lenght" by optical means.
Other fragments confirm that Thales was also
concerned with the study of astronomy as well as of its
applications to the solution of practical problems of
sailing techniques and for the improvement of the
calendar. In fact:
"Following the tradition, Thales was the first
among the Greeks to engage in the study of
physical problems it is reported that he did
not leave any written text except the so-called
Nautical Astrology.", and that
"with few [geometrical?] lines he discovered
great things such as the length of the
seasons , the obliquous pattern of
constellations.... the annual return of the
sun. .
"
Thales was credited of the first prediction of an
eclipse, but other Presocratics also shared Thales
interest in astronomical studies. We find that his
immediate follower and perhaps student Anaximander:
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"Discovered the
Sparta, in an oppor
shadows. ... to indi
He also built [wate
that "The first [ge
Herathostenes, were
fellow-citizen of T
the first made a wo
"Anaximander was fi
size and dista
Eudemus. . . "
nee [
gnomon and placed it at
tune site for the study of the
cate solstices and equinoxes.
r] clocks.", and we also find
ographers] after Homer, says
two: Anaximander, friend ans
hales, and Eucateus of Miletus;
rld-map..", and that
rst to find the ratio between
of planets] as referred by
In fact it was Anaximander who first proposed a
"mechanical"
astronomical system constituted of rings of
fire surrounded by some kind of haze which made them
invisible. Fire flows out only in few spots, which we
perceive as stars or planets. He also gave figures for the
mutual distance of these 3 rings of fire. Their diameters
were respectively 9, 18, and 25 times the earth's
diameter. The number "3" shows up too often to make it
beliavable that Anaximander calculated those distances
from observations.
This is probably the first instance of the problem
of the determination of astronomical distances. Because of
the difficulties in finding the third point of reference
(which instead was easily found for measurements on the
earth as shown by Thales' example) it became one of the
crucial problems of technical astronomy- This explains why
many authors who dealt with geometrical theories of vision
(Ptolemy, Alhazen, Kepler) were also professional
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astronomers interested in the "triangulum distantiae
mensorium"
.
It has been suggested that Babylonian astronomers
were trimming down observations to fit the predictions
suggested by their arithmetical interpolations, and that
they tended to compute rather than observe. These attitude
is easily found also in the work of the Greek astronomers
up to Ptolemy (and even later ). In the same way
Anaximander was pythagorically
"seeing" distances in terms
of multiples of 3, since Plato astronomers were seeing
orbits in terms of combinations of circles and evaluating
observations accordingly. Recently, after an analysis of
Ptolemy's treatment of errors R.R.Newton has drastically
claimed that:
All of his observations that Ptolemy uses in
the Syntaxis are fraudulent, so far as we can test
them. Many of the observations that he attributes
to other astronomers are also frauds. . .Thus
Ptolemy is not the greatest astronomer of
antiquity, but he is something still more unsual:
he is thefimost successful fraud in the history of
science .
Here we begin to encounter the problematic
distinction between "to see" and "to see as", and as we
will consider soon this applies not only to the
"what"
but also to the "how" of vision. This because the various
theories of vision developed by Greek philosophers were
directly connected with their theories of knowledge. They
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tried to explain how we get to see what we should see.
The list of fragments considered before suggests
the use of observations with instruments for technical
astronomy, calendarial studies, time reckoning,
astrological predictions, geography, and the development
of sailing techniques, however, it does not say much about
the social concerns beyond these investigations as well as
about their actual articulation.
It is quite probable that the development of
sailing techniques was relevant for Greek economy and that
this interest may have supported the application of
geometry to the determination of the ship's position at
sea, however, many other activities which involved optical
measurements were of much less importance both to the
economy and the political life of the Greek world. For
instance geography had mostly a speculative interest to
the early Greeks for we do not have traces of the
systematic development of official archives with
geographical and anagraphical data about territory and
population. Such structures which were typical of the
eastern empires were totally useless in a fragmented
political configuration like the Greek. It is only much
later that we find Strabo ( 63?BC-21?AD ) praising the
relevance of geography for military purposes, but his
audience (and sponsors) were the Romans.
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Land survey was not a major activity because the
Greek political structure did not need the mapping of
manpower, land, and animals as in Egypt or Babylon, and
the form of taxation did not require the development of a
precise cadaster.
Astrology was not practiced to justify a precise
political structure as in Egypt or Babylon, but rather for
personal horoscopes or meteorological forecasts for
agriculture. The Greeks did not seem to have much concern
with the precision of the calendar either. In fact
17 18
Thucydides criticized and Aristophanes made
fun of the way the calendar was managed by Athens'
authorities. The revival of the interest in astronomy and
the important achievements of Eudoxus and Callippus took
place in the 4th century probably also in connection with
a stronger and generalized interest in astrology.
This limited interest in astronomy is also
reflected by the scarce development of optical
18
instruments. Moreover Herodotus claims that even the
few ones available the gnomom and the sundial had been
imported from the East. With these premises it is even
problematic to understand on what basis Eudoxus was able
to achieve his results later in the 4th century. In fact
astronomy can develop only out of systematic observations
which implies the presence of a program of research which
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can hardly develop without some kind of
institutionalization of science.
Greek astronomy instead did not have either a
reliable set of records or a precise program because the
first "mechanical" astronomical system early proposed by
Anaximander did not allow for a workable articulation. It
20
has been suggested that possibly some astronomical
records from the East became available to the Greek
astronomers around 350 BC and that Plato's belief in the
geometrical structure of the cosmos allowed for the
beginning of a program for astronomy- In the Republic he
claims that:
...in astronomy, as in geometry, we should
employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we
would approach the subject in the right way and so
make the natural gift of reason to be of any real
use. That... is a work,inf initely beyond our
present astronomers.
This program was taken over by Eudoxus and
Callippus who both were Plato's students or associates at
the Academy.
To Plato geometry is an innate component of human
soul, a reflection of the geometrical structure of the
cosmos. On the contrary geometry and in particular
deductive thought have a earthly history. For instance,
Euclid's deductive method is a direct product of
Aristotle's method of reasoning whose roots can be traced
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back to the historical development of the methods of
correct (o convincing) reasoning within philosophy and
politics.
It is now important to follow this historical
process and its influences on the development of theories
of vision.
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Chapter 4 - IMAGERY AND VISUAL EVIDENCE
IN EARLY GREEK THOUGHT
1 - Introduction
After this outline of the development of methods
of measurement at distance, we need to consider what "to
see"
meant to the Greeks and how this concept developed
along with their philosophy. We will then trace how
geometry, after having been accepted as a model for
measurement and description of physical entities, was also
adopted for the analysis of the process of vision.
However, the whole process cannot be understood only as a
result of the successful development of geometry- It is
also the previous articulation of theories of knowledge
that allowed Euclid to focus on the geometrical
description of the behavior of light, without putting much
effort in the study of cognitive and psychological aspects
of vision.
The early Greek philosophers, instead, had to face
a wide range of different problems at the same time. Their
theories of vision were directly connected with their
hypotheses about knowledge and cosmology and,
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consequently, they also reflect the historical development
of the differentiation between the individual and the
environment, between reality and representation.
The understanding of the articulation of the
concepts of analogy and proof is fundamental for tracing
the development of geometrical optics. In fact by
preceding
Archimedes' work on statics by few
decades geometrical optics is the first instance of
analogy between a precise geometrical model and a physical
process. The adoption of a geometrical analogy shows that
the model is no more thought of as a "thing" but as a
modular system whose properties are abstract enough to be
encoded in a set of rules which define the range of
coherent transformations allowed for that model. The
development of the notion of proof is also related to this
process.
2 - Vision as exposure
The Iliad and Odyssey show that the Greeks in
Homer's time like the Egyptians and the Babylonians
before them went through a stage of mythopoeic thought.
However, the emancipation from it took a form quite
different from the ones considered earlier, and that form
can be regarded as the origin of western thought.
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As we can expect, the cognitive relationship
between man and environment is not initially thought in
terms of an internal reflection on the objects produced by
perception, but rather as a dialogue based on affinity.
This affinity is not like the fitness between the nature
of an external stimulus and its receptor, but it is closer
to the notion of sympathy as we find in magic. As noticed
by Snell , in this early period which corresponds to
the epic literature, "reality" is still seen through the
myth. Then the myth progressively became a source of
similes, and these similes then develop into analogies
which consituted the basis for logical thought.
Snell has shown that Homer uses several verbs to
describe what in English language is denoted by "to
2
see"
. Perception is thought of as a "dialogue", and
in fact the language of this period contains verbs which
denote the attitude, the mood, the intention of this
dialogue. Verbs which describe the expression of a look:
authoritative, attentive, distracted, scared; or others
whose meaning could be pharaphrased as: "his glance falls
on an object", or "it turns toward
something"
, and "he casts
his glance on someone". The verbs which denote a mode are
not used in the first person, they are used as nouns to
describe a process. Instead others refer to the experience
of seeing something, and are used in the first person.
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Being vision a dialogue, these verbs have a meaning which
often refer to the object seen or rather talked to. The
viewer does not have a specific identity, he is a
component of the scene. Consequently the notion of vision
as representation is unconceivable, and in fact we cannot
find in this period a verb which denotes the viewing
function of the eye. Eyes are the seat of expression and
not of sight.
In post-Homeric literature most of the verbs of
mode are dropped and other verbs begin to denote more
specifically the act of vision. The verb teorein which
develops out of the noun teoros , which meant "to be a
spectator", assumes the meaning of "to observe", showing
that the presence and the identity of the seeing subject
begins to be acknowledged more indipendently both from the
context and from the object of sight .
The notion of perception could not develop in
Homer's time also because of the lack of a unified concept
of soul or mind. Psyche does not mean soul but rather life
: it comes from psuchein (to breathe). Somehow related to
psiche, we find noos , the capacity of perceiving and
thinking images. Evidently there is no clear linguistic
distinction between mental images, perceptual images, and
4
objects , and consequently no precise awareness of the
process of representation itself.
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Similarly, the body is perceived as an agglomerate
of limbs but not yet as an organism. Each organ has its
own function, but the terms of the interaction are still
unclear. The eyes are both the organ of sight and sight
itself. Traces of this line of thought can be found later
in the Hippocratic and Galenic doctrine of the
"faculties".
This parcelization of consciousness is also found
in the absence of "internal conflicts" in Homeric heroes.
If the hero is undecided, it does not mean that he is
experiencing a conflict within his mind, but rather that
his psiche wants something but the hands or the feet want
something different. What we call
"thought"
was not
considered to be articulated within the psiche but rather
provoked by some external agents (gods) who could easily
"send" different impulses to different limbs.
The lack of the awareness of thought as an
internal process explains why Greek culture and language
in homeric period did not have any unifying notion such as
the logos . As we may expect, Homer's notion of
"knowledge"
was a result of a sympathetic dialogue between
the "individual" and the environment. From noos the
faculty of perceiving and producing images we find the
verb noiein , which means to comprehend , to get into .
Cognition is therefore intended to be a process of
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immedesimation. Like "comprehends" the like. The
Presocratics applied this notion both to perception "like
perceives the like" and to cognition in general. As
Empedocles puts it : "Knowledge pertains to the similar,
5
ignorance to the dissimilar" .
The notion of thought as produced by external
factors implies a strong reduction of the concept of
individual will and responsability . As Snell puts it:
When the Homeric hero, after duly weighing his
alternatives comes to a final conclusion, he feels
that his course is shaped by the gods.
Hesiod begins to develop the notion of causality
but not the one of decision. His Theogony is actually a
cosmogony in which in the form of a genealogical tree of
the family of gods he is trying to describe the order of
nature. His notion of genealogical cause is then
articulated by the Presocratics in terms of affinity and
attraction, even though with a less evident sexual
connotation .
This form of causation gives a picture of the
world as ruled by a patriarcal authority based on power
rather than law. Consequently, the notion of decision and
the correspondent inquiry about the causes of the matter
to be decided is virtually excluded. It is interesting to
note that this form of thought presented by Homer and
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Hesiod reflects quite closely the social structure of the
period in which it was developed. Such a structure was in
fact centered around the oikos , which was a kind of
extended household of the family (genos) of the local
lord. There was no written law and all authority was
concentrated in the patriarcal figure of the lord. Only
those who belonged to the oikos had some kind of legal
7
status . Even though in a less structured and
authoritative way, Homer's myths and Hesiod's Theogony
play a role analogous to the cosmological myths in ancient
Egypt and Babylon. One of the reasons of their lesser
authority is not to be found in the content of their text,
but rather in the fact that there was no central political
authority to endorse and raise them to a law-like status.
To Snell the notion of individuality develops in
the period between Homer and the Presocratics, and
precisely with the arcaic lyric which florished during
the early development of the polis .
The lyric introduces the notion of personal point
of view. Here the poet is both observer and judge of what
he sees. The individual is now a citizen and his being
responsable implies the awareness of the concept of
decision. In turn, this assumes the capability of making
g
judgements about causes (which need to be
"represented" somewhere).
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The lyrics do not refer to conflicts between
psiche and hands or feets like the ones described by
Homer: the conflicts are now internalized. With the
development of individual identity came also the unity of
the mind, which is the first stage toward the
conceivability of an entity like the logos.
Anacreon writes : "Again I love and I love not; I
rave, nor do I rave.", and Sappho talks about the
9
"bitter-sweet Eros." Consciousness begins to be less
"a thing" and more and equilibrium between opposites. The
contents of consciousness (like Sappho's Eros) are still
of divine origin, but, at the same time, they are
progressively becoming the psychological experience of
love. The concept of identity as equilibrium between
opposites is then extended from microcosm to macrocosm
(and vice versa) as in Empedocles' notion of cosmic
equilibrium between love and strife. Similarly, in the
Polis, "Zeus" begins to be used as a name for law.
2 - From witness to proof
We need now to consider the role both of analogy
and of the social context in the emancipation of
individual consciousness from mythopoeic thought.
Once the several psychic and cognitive activities
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are attributed to the workings of a unified and
indipendent mind, one can begin to think that also the
"outside" is controlled by a similar form of unified
rationality, which can also be understood. It is only when
people begin to question the divine cause of their
decisions and begin to develop a different form of law
that they also begin to think of a rationality immanent in
nature .
Being cosmology and theory of knowledge closely
related, we find that the Presocratics applied the notion
of logos (or related concepts) to both domains and
connected them through microcosm-macrocosm analogy. G.E.R.
Lloyd has analyzed the imagery used by Presocratics
in their cosmological theories, and has arranged it under
three categories: social and political images, vitalistic
notions, technological images. It is difficult (or
probably even irrelevant) to understand the precise
"logical"
status of these analogies, particularly in this
linguistic context in which working analogy and metaphor
are not yet separated. It seems that the notion of law as
order in the organism of the polis is applied to the order
of the organism of the cosmos. Anaximander, in a fragment
which probably deals with the law-like form of motion of
celestial bodies, says that:
For they pay the penalty and recompense to one
75
another for their jn,justice, according to the
assesment of time.
It seems that Parmenides thought of the
equilibrium betweem light and dark, day and night as a
13
contract between equals , and that Empedocles
described the relationship between love and strife (the
two agents which maintain the equilibrium between the four
elements) as an oath. Heraclitus says that:
the sun will not overstep his limits;
otherwise the Erynes, the servants of Justice,
will find him out.
These analogies between the polis and the cosmos
evidently work both ways. These cosmological patterns are
now developed by citizens who do not think of order just
as an authoritative and patriarcal notion like the
Egyptian maat . However the concept of a more "natural"
and less divine law is difficult to be articulated, and
some analogies with natural phenomena would certainly be
useful. The structure of the heavens can become (if
opportunely read) a model for a rationally justifiable
notion of law or logos. Similarly, contracts between
natural elements could replace the innate patriarchal and
genealogical causation like the one presented by
Hesiod . Interestingly enough the Greek term aitia
meant both cause and legal responsability .
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The overall process reminds of the justification
of earthly states throught cosmological myths we have seen
in ancient Egypt and Babylon, but we find instead a
drastic difference in the referent for the notion of order
and law. Once the "patriarchal paradigm" is dropped,
another more "artificial" referent for a different concept
of order and law needs to be found (or at least assumed
accordingly to a radically new form of common
17
sense). What needs to be developed is not a code
which articulates an already given form of authority, but
a constitution . In fact:
The period from the seventh to the fourth
century is one of unprecedented activity
throughout the Greek world, in the formulation,
discussion, revision and, at times, overthrow of
legal and constitutional codes.
This "program of
research" is not only limited to
the ethical or political context, on the contrary through
the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, between man,
state, and cosmos it is
"naturally"
extended to natural
K 19
philosophy
These arguments suggest that the identity of the
mind, the possibility of representing opposites in a form
of thought is not just a linguistic or intellectual
achievement. Instead, it is the result of an interaction
between Greek arcaic mentality and its social environment.
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It is evident that the polis and its related concepts of
law and decision based on contrasting arguments (order and
necessity) could not develop without the mental and
linguistic capability of representing such concepts.
However looking back at the many instances of social
conditioning of mentality it is unprobable that the
development of individual consciousness and of the related
notion of law/logos is simply the result of the "natural"
growth of the seed of Greek language as Snell (almost
mystically) seems to think. Consciousness is both a tool
and a result. Otherwise, we probably need to agree with
Popper's germane belief that the development of western
rationality and science "and there seems to be no
other" did start "with bold theories about the
world"20.
The shift from the immedesimation of a faculty
with a thing (like eyes with sight), to the dialectical
mediation of two opposites within the same entity,
introduces the concept of things as having (containing)
different qualities rather than the constitutive faculty
only. As Snell puts it:
The new thing was that properties, instead
than being parcelled out among various subjects,
were now-, concentrated upon one unique
figure .
This attitude is evidently refleted in Empedocles'
78
elements which each with different qualities are
distributed in different bodies in different proportions,
determing the specific characteristics of that body.
At this point the concept of analogy is no longer
between two objects in their fixed and irriducible
qualities, but rather between certain specific
characteristics of theirs. However, this does not mean
that abstract geometry could be conceivable yet. In fact,
it is possible to compare the "straightness" of two bodies
without dealing with their constitution, and it is also
possible to say that there is "something
straight"
about a
light ray comparing it to a stick, but there are no
linguistic instruments already available to represent an
abstraction such as "geometrical line".
The possibility of abstractness is closely related
not only to linguistic instruments but also to the
possibility of producing a very specific exemplar .
Actually, the Presocratics did not "produce" these
exemplars, but rather found them in other practices
(political, technological, etc.) and "translated" them
22
into a different theory and practice . Moreover, the
use of technological analogies (and artificial examples in
general) offered a more specific, reproducible and
sharable term of reference. In other terms, abstraction is
construction .
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However, the passage from mythical similes which
contained aspects of arcaic greek society and
consciousness to more specific analogies with
technological or juridico-political content, is not a
symptom of an abstract notion of intellectual development,
but rather of a profound change in the socio-intellectual
landscape from where these "pictures" were taken.
Some fragments of Empedocles allow to trace some
of the aspects of this intellectual and linguistic
development within the study of the process of vision. The
comparative analysis of his work with the one of the other
Presocratics suggests that this transition was ununiform
both in pace and direction. For instance Empedocles adopts
the form of the mythical homeric simile, but replaces its
content with a technological one. In a fragment he
presents the process of vision like:
As when a man who intends to go out on a
stormy night makes ready a lantern, a flame of
blazing fire, fitting to it panes to screen it
from every wind, and these scatter the breaths of
the winds that blow, while the light leaping out
[throught the thin walls of polished horn or a
thin tissue of linen] as much of it as it is
finer shines across the treshold with unfailing
beams: so then [when the eye was created] did the
primal fire, enclosed in membranes, trap the round
pupil in delicate tissues, which are pierced
through with marvellous passages and which keep
back the deep surrounding water while they le,^
through the fire as much of it as is finer.
Beside the Homeric style of the introduction, we
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understand that the subject matter is not the man who is
holding the lantern in the storm, but rather the analogy
between two technical processes which are "narrated" to
introduce his "sieve" theory of vision.
The absence of anthropomorf ic characters in these
analogies is the symptom of a precise linguistic concern.
Only when he gets to describe philia the force of
attraction between elements that is also responsible of
vision he cannot find an abstract concept already
available in Greek language, nor a mechanical example
which could convey his concept, and therefore he forcibly
goes back to an anthropomorphic image. He says that she
is. .
acknowledged as being inborn in the limbs of
mortals, and by her they have a gentle disposition
and achieve works of peace , -calling her by the
names of Joy and Aphrodite.
But he is tries this statement be understood as
pointing to an abstraction, in fact he continues by saying
that:
contemplate her with your mind, and do not sit
gazing with your eyes.
The two similes of the lantern and of Aphrodite as
philia show that beside the evident linguistic struggle
of conveying abstract notions the notion of
"truth" is no
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more thought of in terms of evidence of an image , but
rather as a result of an inquiry around an analogy.
Empedocles'
notion of explanation is basically a
reduction of a process to the "natural" behavior of the
elements involved in that process. In the case of vision
we find fire and water which are moved by philia through
the eye's pores.
The technical nature of the model is particularly
important because it directs the reduction of the process
to the behavior of its elements along familiar lines. More
importantly the fact that the model is man-made rather
than natural implies that it already entails a language .
Looking ahead at Kepler's theory of the retinal image
modeled around the behavior of the camera obscura, we may
detect a pattern of interaction between the development of
a theory and its exemplar or instrument which is both the
keeper (or the "image") of former results and the mediator
of new ones.
Evidently this process of reduction is not
coincident with the picture of the model. It is suggested
by it, but it needs to be "read" (rather than"seen") on
the model accordingly to a certain language.
The distinction between the representation of a
process and its reading became progressively clear
and one century later Plato pointed explicitely at the
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difference between image (i.e. verbal narrative with the
use of visual models) and demostrative account of a
process. The same critical attitude about visual models or
reports is shown few years later by Aristotle who both
proposed a method for witness' criticism and
attacked directly Empedocles' imagery on the grounds that
27
it was either unclear or arbitrary.
We can refer this new attitude also to the
development of rethoric and dialectic as instruments of
the political life of the polis.
Approximately at the time Plato drew the
distinction between image and demonstration we find that
Athenian jurisprudence was changing its notion of evidence
from personal witness (as it was in Homer) to written
documents.
To Homer, if somebody was
"exposed" it meant that
he was also "impressed" and therefore that he kept a
"picture" of the event. The practice of torture was based
on this convinction. The introduction of written documents
as legal evidence marked also the abolition of torture for
juridical purposes.
Few decades later, Euclid proposed geometry as a
precisely defined model which could be composed to fit a
wide range of objects or processes which could be
described in their static aspects. With Aristotle we also
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find enough awareness of both the internal nature of
thought and of perception as a mediative process (and not
just a "faculty") between soul and environment. This made
possible to apply the geometrical method of demonstrative
inquiry to the process of vision itself. This reduction of
vision to geometry was proposed by Euclid's Optics .
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Chapter 5 - GREEK THEORIES OF VISION
1 - Alcmaeon
The first account of the process of vision is of
the physician Alcmaeon of Croton (500? BC ) . Hippocrates
reports he maintained that:
Many are these membranes around the front part
of the viewing eye and they all are transparent.
By means of this transparency, light and
everything luminous is reflected, and through this
reflection we get to see.
By introducing a sympathetic similarity, Alcmaeon
tries to explain the occurrence of a visual sensation as
an effect of the formation of the image of an object on
the corneal lens. The process of vision is presented as an
unmediated "exposure", and the eye is compared to a mirror
whose surface needs to be humid to allow for the formation
of the image. In agreement with the doctrines of the Coos'
school of physicians, he considers the brain to be the
site of the soul and, by identifying the liquid around the
meninges with the liquid found around the eye, he connects
the eye and the soul through the optical nerves which he
takes to be hollow. The meninges' liquid is the symphatic
carrier both of the faculty of sight from the soul to the
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eye, and of the visual sensation back to the soul.
His training as a physician shown by his knowledge
of the anatomy of the eye and the brain is probably
one of the reasons which led him to approach the process
of vision from the "inside", focusing on the connection
between the soul and the eye rather than on the nature of
light, on the characteristics of the transparent medium,
or on the process of reflection of the object on the
3
corneal lens . The presence of a "medical paradigm"
behind his direction of research becomes more evident once
we consider that also Galen (seven centuries later)
adopted a similar form of explanation of the by replacing
Alcmeon's meningeal liquid with the Stoics' pneuma.
Alcmaeon 's emphasis on the role of the brain as
the starting point for his explanation of vision can be
better understood by placing it in the context of his
theory of knowledge. For instance he says that:
Concerning things unseen the gods have
certainty, whereas to us as men conjecture [only
is possible].
which suggests that even though vision is still directly
associated with knowledge like in Homer's notion of
witness there is a less skeptical attitude about the
possibility of getting to know what cannot be seen.
Alcmeon's attitude offers an early evidence of the
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transition from the notion of evidence as image to
evidence as inquiry .
He believes that human cognition is not just a
sympathetic exposure to the environment, which he instead
attributes to the animals. He thinks that the soul can
keep memories which if left quiet tend to solidify
becoming knowledge . This attitude derives also from
Alcmaeon's training as a physician, for he is used to deal
with internal diseases (which are processes he cannot see)
5
by drawing inductive inferences from experience .
Consequently he does not focuse on the process of
image formation because to him the brain and the
inferences he could draw from the memories there
"solidified' are a more important cognitive tool: they
allow him even to conjecture about the "unseen".
However, Alcmeon does not develop a more
articulated notion of
"accordance" between the sensitive
organ .-tnd the outside world. He brings the sensitive fluid
down from the soul to the eye, but then he relies on a
very literal form of sympathetic analogy which is the
mirror-like image. He probably assumes that the sensitive
liquid which "produces" the image can
"feel" it too. It
is only with Empedocles (490-430 BC ) that we find the first
attempt to explain the behavior of the sensitive organs as
a process of mediation rather than reflection .
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2 - Empedocles
In trying to mediate Parmenides and Heraclitus'
opposite positions about the changing and/or unchanging
nature of the physical world, Empedocles (490-430 BC )
starts a program which will be later developed by the
Atomists. He is concerned to find (or to define) some kind
of unchanging entities whose combination would account for
the changing aspects of nature. He finds them in the four
elements (fire, air, water, earth) which he assumes to be
pulled together by love and separated by strife.
He still explains the process of vision by linking
its parts by means of sympathetic affinities, but as we
have seen before these are articulated around the model
of the lantern. Cognition and perception which at this
point are still undifferentiated are both refered to
sympathy. In fact: "Knowledge pertains to the similar,
ignorance to the dissimilar" , and "Like perceives
like"
. To articulate this sympathetic link he first
takes blood (and not the brain) to be the seat of the
soul, and then assumes that blood contained all the same
four elements which constitute the world.
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With this sympathetic "exchange" of elements and
with the related notion of balance Empedocles is able to
develop a quite more complex explanation of perception.
He maintains that we do not hear simply because
the external sound makes the internal ear to vibrate, but
rather because our ear is already vibrating autonomously.
Perception ceases to be an "exposure" and becomes a
sympathetic accordance .
Similarly he explains some of the aspects of
vision in terms of an accordance between the "visual
power" (still a faculty) of the eye and the external
light. The connection is again a sympathetic one: light is
similar to fire ,which is akin to the visual fire
contained in the eyes (in fact we see sparks if we hit
9
them). The affinity is then reinforced by a further
correspondence between the water (as an element) in the
world and water (the corpus vitreum) inside the eye.
Like the lantern, the corneal lens has a series of
very small pores through which the visual fire goes out
and reaches the objects creating vision, and, as the wind
which could not get into the lantern and blow off the
fire, water cannot leak out being too thick for those too
small pores.
However, the description of Empedocle's theory of
vision is still uncertain. The quantity of fragments is
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limited and the later reports often reflect the personal
attitude of the commentators (Plato, Aristotele,
Theophrastus) rather than the original content of the
theory. As noted by J.I.Beare, it is not clear
whether the internal visual fire goes out and reaches the
objects or it is the emanation of external objects that
gets into the eye through the pores. Other authors
mediated the two positions too-literally by suggesting
that the outgoing visual fire and the incoming luminous
emanations meet somewhere between the eye and the object.
Empedocles' belief that every object had pores,
and that it emitted some kind of emanation
12
orinfluence , suggests that perception takes place
when the pores of the receiving subject fit the emanations
of the object. If so, the role of the eye's internal fire
would be to preset the pores of the corneal lens and to
establish a sympathetic connection with the external fire,
in a similar fashion to the assonance between an internal
and external vibration which he takes to be the cause of
hearing. This explanation credits Empedocles of having
introduced the concept of sense specificity .
Different organs have different pores and they
"perceive" different emanations, i.e. aspects, of the same
object, which means that Empedocles begins to be aware
that objects are not just a name or an image ,but a point
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of aggregation of different qualities.
This reading of Empedocles' theory of vision is
also shared by Theophrastus who interprets his position
as :
The pores of the eye are arranged
alternatively as those of fire and water. By
passage through the fiery pores we perceive the
white objects, whereas through the watery we
perceive the black objects^ Each sense perception
has to fit its end organ.
Even though the remark that: "each sense perception
has to fit its end organ" sounds too-teleological not to
be the result of Teophrastus' own interpretation, the
report is considered to be basically accurate. Empedocles
seems to take color as the object of perception, and that
the two different elements of the eye and the related
pores can operate some selection among them. It is
interesting to note that Empedocles considers only those
features of the objects that he can reduce to some
relationship with the two elements (fire and water) which
he takes to be the "carriers" of vision. Other aspects of
vision such as the evaluation of the distance of an object
or the recognition of its shape are not "seen". The
analysis of these problems was to be developed only later
by Democritus, who tried to explain different perceptions
by means of different geometrical configurations of the
-u
14
atoms reaching the eye
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The reading of Empedocles' theory of vision in
terms of a process of filtering of luminous emanations
coming from the external objects, contradicts quite
evidently the simile of the lantern where the visual fire
is described as going out of eye/lantern to illuminate the
street with "unfailing beams". Perhaps Empedocles thinks
that the visual fire goes out, reaches the object and is
15
then reflected back on the pupil which is humid
because of the internal water. The external fire-light may
have symphatetically joined the visual fire and "helped"
it to reach far away objects.
A possible mediation of the two apparently
16
contrasting readings can be developed by considering
once again the notion of balance.
Theophrastus says that Empedocles thought that:
The construction of the eyes, which are
composed of these elements, is not always equal.
In some eyes the fiery factor is more centrally,
in others more peripherally located. Therefore
some animals see better during the day, others
during the night.
The balance between internal fire and water
determines the quality of vision, and Theophrastus
confirms this by saying that:
Even the animals which have fire in excess are
dim sighted during the day since fire within the
eye has been further increased by the daylight;
this covers and occupies the passages of water.
The same thing happens by night to those animals
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which have water in, excess, because fire is now
overtaken by water.
This shows if we can trust Theophrastus that
Empedocles thought of visual fire and sunlight as one
fire. When sunlight is strong it gets into the eye after
being reflected on the objects by passing through its
pores, but at night as in the case of the lantern when
sunlight is absent there is less "pressure" and the visual
fire goes out trying unsuccesfully to reach the objects.
This reading may reconcile the two apparently opposite
accounts of vision presented by Empedocles. However, we
need to consider that some of his accounts that we take to
be paradoxical may be a residual result of the "multiple
approach" typical of mythopoeic thought.
This may be one of the reasons why Empedocles
does not seem to draw a clear distinction between sunlight
and other kinds of emanations from objects. The presence
of some mythopoeic attitudes in Empedocles' thought is
also suggested by his extension of perceptual features to
the whole body and in his tendency to read physical
causality as the effects of a living will. As Alexander of
Aphrodisia puts it:
Hempedocles thinks that iron is attracted
toward the magnet due to the effluvia that are
radiated by both of them also due to the fact that
the poruses of the magnet are symmetrical to the
effluvia radiated by the iron.
95
Beside the striking similarity between the
treatment of the behavior of the magnet and of the process
of vision, it is also evident that Empedocles was not
sensitive to the existence of different kind of
emanations. He maintains that it is the eye's water that
allows us to see dark objects and that the eye's fire is
responsible of the perception of light-coloured objects,
but, then, he explains the effects other kinds of
emanations which do not convey either
"darkness"
or
"clearness"
with the same model he utilizes for vision.
This contradiction suggests the opposite to be
true. He does not explain the effect of emanations as a
particular case of his theory of vision, but, vice-versa,
he explains vision by "personalizing" the treatment of
emanations with the addition for color sensitivity. This
seems to be supported by a fragment in which Aetius
maintains that Empedocles said that:
Often women fall in love with statues or
images and gixg birth to babies who look like
those images.
Image-related effects can be propagated by means
other than light. Light, love, and magnetism are all
emanations which can be (problematically) selected
by opportune affinities and pores of adequate sizes.
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Between the individual and the environment there
22is now a filter (literally a sieve ), but what is
mediated of the external emanation is its entrance and not
its effect (as shown by the incongruencies between
different kinds of emanations, sizes of pores, and related
effects) . The individual is no more just comprehended in
the environment as it was in Homer, but his consciousness
is still conceived as a filter and not as an active
interface between him and the environment.
3 - Democritus
Several aspects of Empedocles' philosophy and
theory of vision are then developed by Leucippus (440? BC )
and Democritus (460-360? BC ) who became the founders of
philosophical school of the Atomists. Probably also
influenced by Anaxagoras ' ( 500-432?BC ) notion of the
divisibility of the being, they approached the problem of
change by dividing
Empedocles' elements down to a
furtherly irreducible size. The One was replaced by an
infinite number of ones which are the atoms , and the
changing aspects of reality are explained in terms of
different and changing configurations of unchanging atoms.
97
The atoms do not have any quality except size and
shape. All the other qualities do not exist per se but
they are subjectively produced by the interaction of the
senses with the various configurations of atoms.
Differently from Alcmaeon who was a physician
primarily concerned with the cognitive functions of the
sense organs, Democritus seems to focuse on the problem of
the articulation of the being without compromising its
integrity- After having achieved this within his atomistic
theory, he moves to explain other processes included the
psychological ones in terms of atoms' behavior.
Unfortunately his works related to the theory of knowledge
like About the Mind , Perception , Colors ,
About the Different Arrangements and the Concept of Form
are now lost.
In his work on vision, he improves significantly
on
Empedocles' description of how the qualities of the
perceived object are modulated on the luminous emanations,
but he does not go beyond his understanding of the process
by which emanations are transformed into sensations.
Atoms move in all directions not out of will, but
rather driven by the collisions against each other. This
had been a crucial concept for Democritus and his
followers when they tried to account for the origin of the
cosmos moving from the assumption of the total lack of
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will in the atoms. He faces this problem again when he
tries to explain the behavior of living matter and the
process of human cognition. In fact he makes an exception
and introduces a special kind of atoms the
soul-atoms which have some degree of voluntary behavior.
Following the teachings of Coos' medical school, he takes
the brain to be the seat of the soul, but he also allows
for a certain number of soul-atoms to be dispersed in the
whole body. Even though the soul-atoms are discrete
elements, they have within the process of perception the
equivalent role of Empedocles' blood. They "intercept" the
emanations which pass through the pores. Plutarch reports
that Democritus:
explained dreams as the result of the
influences of eidola [images] which penetrate
through pores deeply into the body and then come
up [to-the brain] and produce vision during the
sleep.
This suggests that, like Empedocles, Democritus
takes perception to happen both through the body and the
sense organs. The important difference between the two is
that Democritus' emanations are quite more structured. The
eidola are precisely these structured emanations by which
he explains both visual perception and the imagery of
dreams. They are configurations of atoms which "maintain"
the shape of the object which casts them. Accordingly to
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Alexander of Aphrodisia (225? AD) Leucippus and
Democritus. . .
attributed sight to certain images of the same
size of the object, [eidola] which were
continually streaming2gf f the objects of sight and
impinging on the eye.
Other commentators such as Theophrastus say that
the eidola is a "front" of air pushed forward by the
outgoing stream of atoms. He calls this pattern of
25
compressed air deikela . The concept of deikela has
attracted the attention of contemporary authors like Van
Hoorn who has read in it the first instance of the
use of an intermediary medium instead of a material
emanation from the object. However, the difference is
illusory for the deikela need to be sustained, which means
that there needs to be a continuous flow of atoms from the
object to maintain it. The deikela seems to be a
side-effect of the eidola which being a stream of
material atoms pushes forward the air it encounters
between the object and the eye.
The eidola, being a pattern of emanation which
maintains the coherent shape of the emanating object,
offers a first solution to the problem of how vision could
bring more precise information about the object of sight,
beside its darkness, brightness, or constitutive elements.
Empedocles' problematic negotiation between visual fire
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and emanations from the object is here at least
nominally solved. Democritus' theory shows also a more
evident awareness of individual consciousness. The
introduction of soul-atoms as receptors shows that
perception is loosing its connotation of dialogue with the
environment.
However, there are problems. For instance, the
fact that soul-atoms have an ontological status and are
virtually unknowable, implies that we cannot get to know
how sensation is produced in their interaction with the
eidola. Moreover, the introduction of the eidola is a
quite elegant solution of the problem of the interaction
between light and on other kind of emanations, but
Democritus does not and probably cannot suggest how this
mediation may take place. In the available fragments we
read of eidola streaming from objects but there is no
clear indication of the role of sunlight in the process,
or how the materiality of light interacts, joins, or
reacts with the other material emanations and, finally,
ends up producing a coherent perception.
It seems that this series of problems encountered
and left unsolved by Democritus points to the limits of
his paradigm which when dealing with perception--can save
coherence only by dropping content and heuristic value.
For instance, Democritus takes the eidol-t to touch
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the pupil and that the image there created i.e. the image
reflected on the humid surface of the eye is then
perceived by the soul-atoms, which is exactly Alcmaeon *s
early position developed one hundred years earlier and
clearly reflecting a myhtopoeic attitude.
The solution was dated in Democritus' own time for
Aristotle (even though almost a contemporary of his)
attacks him also on this point:
Democritus. ... is right in his opinion that the
eye is of water; not however when he goes on
explaining seeing as mere mirroring. The mirroring
that takes place in an eye is due to the fact that
the eye is smooth, and it really has its seat not
in the eye which is seen , but in that which sees
. For the case is merely one of reflection.... It
is strange too, that it never occurred to him to
ask why, if his theory be true, the eye alone
sees, while none-of the other things in which are
reflected do so.
He develops his criticism of the corneal image in
other passages, by saying that sight is neither a kind of
"contact", nor the image on the eye, because, if we bring
the object in touch with the eye we do not see anything.
Other criticism pointed at the fact that if every
objects emanate their own material eidola in every
direction, how can it happen that they do not collide with
each other, but instead we perceive all the objects
distinctly? Others questioned the possibility that an
eidola, which is supposed to be of the same size of the
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body, could shrink to the point of being contained over
the pupil?
Even though some of this criticism develops from
an awareness of the geometrical aspects of vision which
28
became available only later , what is still
surprising is that Democritus who is credited by
Archimedes of some significant work on the
29
conies did not develop such an awareness himself.
The point becomes more obscure once we consider
that Democritus did not have only a good understanding of
geometry, but he actually used optics in his astronomical
and astrological work. In fact Vitruvius and Geminus wrote
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about his work in calendarial studies and astrology
and Ptolemy used some of
Democritus' astrological
v3l
work
We may understand the limits of Democritus
paradigm and propose a solution of these apparent
incongruities by considering the implications of another
passage by Aristotle:
Democritus is not correct in his view that, if
the space between the object and eye were pure
void*?an ant could be seen clearly in the
sky.
This suggests that Democritus even though well
equipped in geometry cannot not frame the process of
vision in geometrical terms because of his atomistic
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paradigm. To him, the behavior of light and the process of
formation of a coherent perceptual image needs to be faced
in terms of atoms' movement and not as a geometrical
transformation .
The example of the ant shows that he does not
think in terms of angle of vision, which is by considering
how the angle under which and object is seen tends to
diminish accordingly to the object's distance from the
viewer. Instead he faces the problem of the reduction of
the resolution of sight with the increase of distance in
terms of motion of atoms. We do not see distant objects
clearly because of the atoms of air between us and the ant
which are colliding with the eidola/deikela of the ant
making it to blurr. He does not talk about
distance and sizes but about collisions .
If an atom cannot be destroied, it means that it
can be seen from everywhere. The only reason it may not be
seen is that it has been deviated from its path toward the
eye. The adoption of the attitude later developed by
Euclid would have led him to consider that the
"visibility"
of an atom tends to zero if the distance
becomes very large. But this is exactly the kind of
problem he was trying to avoid by postulating that matter
33
is not infinitely divisible.
To Democritus, the approach to vision along a
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geometrical model would have been suicidal. He had to save
the atom.
This shows that at that time the materialistic and
the geometrical approach to vision collided
incommensurably on the nature of light. We will this
problem in several other ocasions within the work of those
authors who adopted Euclid's framework but continued to
question the relationship between the material nature and
the geometrical behavior of light. What Democritus avoided
was an early instance of the problem of correspondence
rules.
However, the problems of Democritus' theory of
vision do not emerge in every context. In fact under the
term "vision" we find different ranges of experience for
different purposes, and ultimately different kinds of
professional common-sense. For instance, Democritus'
remark that if space was pure void we were to see an ant
in the sky, could have made perfect sense to an astronomer
accustomed to observe stars whose relative size he could
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be approximated to a point . To observe a point
trying to track its movement is not like to study the
qualities of an object trying to understand how we get to
perceive those qualities. Again, to an astronomer who is
practically aware of the troubles produced by the
refraction of light through the atmosphere, the example of
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the ant was probably not useful but it surely would have
not contradicted his common-sense, while a painter working
at realistic theatrical scenarios would have probably
thought of it as laughable. This suggests that the choice
of a theory of vision is not only a matter of how
precisely it accounts for the qualities of the physical
world which are looked for by that community, but its
choice entails some assumption regarding what the concept
of quality is about.
The application of a geometrical model to vision
probably developed out of a notion of quality which is
somehow related to spatial coherence, and it is not casual
that was Euclid to introduced it. The progran which moves
from this assumption looks for a process which allows for
the transmission of a coherent image, which is for the
perception of an object and its own size and with the
proportions between its parts coherently reproduced.
Democritus holds a different notion of quality,
and to him coherence is refered to the structure in which
atoms are organized. There are few fragments which cast
some light on what Democritus may have had in mind.
Sextus Empiricus says that Democritus considered
the principle of like-attracts-like to be active both in
the domain of living beings and among the inanimate "..as
we can see with seeds in a sieve and pebbles on the
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sea-shore"
. To Democritus it is "natural" for
pebbles to be sorted by the waves on the beach in layers
each of a certain size, and it is also "natural" to seeds
to be sorted by a sieve in sets of similar size. The
interesting point is that this "naturality" is not
considered as a passive disposition. The sieve and the
waves are not presented as sorters . On the contrary, he
suggests that the sieve and the waves are just amplifying
the tendency to coherent organization inherent to pebbles,
seeds, and evidently to atoms.
It is a matter of "system of coordinates". To him,
the primary
"cause"
of the sorting process is the atoms'
own structure, and not the size of the sieve's holes. We
can now understand why he approaches the coherence of
visual perception not as a result of a "geometrical sieve"
but rather of the coherent cohesion of the atoms
constituting the eidola.
Even though Democritus claims that normal atoms
have a totally mechanistic behavior, when he gets to
explain perception, he attributes them several sympathetic
qualities which paradoxically make them "alive".
Probably this paradox is a result of his atomism
which not being rich enough to articulate explanations of
complex phenomena needs to re-introduce previously
dismissed sympathetic affinities to fill up the gaps. In a
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sense, the difference between atoms and soul-atoms seems
to be less sharp than what he probably wanted to, and
perceptual experience is presented more as the result of a
coherent (almost voluntary) structure of the eidola rather
than of the active and "thoughtful" behavior of soul
atoms.
There is a pattern of continuity among Empedocles1
simile of the eye as a lantern, or between his notion of
percepion as the filtering effect of the eye's pores, and
Democritus'
concept of sieve. The common attitude is to
compare perception to a static tool and not to an adaptive
process. This is obtained by emphasizing the role of the
organization of the "outside" rather than the process of
selection controlled by the "inside". If we take a step
ahead in time, we find Alhazen who thinks of perception as
a point-to-point relationship between the object of sight
and its internal image, but his notion of image-formation
(even though a much more sophisticated one) is still
sieve-like one. The refraction of the light-rays through
the several lenses of the eye is the crucial factor for
the formation of the perceptual image, instead he takes it
only as a mean to weaken out the
"spurious"
ones. The
filter is still a passive one.
It is only with Kepler that refraction is thought
to make all the possibly useful rays to converge into a
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coherent retinal image. Perception is no more a fixed and
sympathetic filter but an adaptive, active and
self-controlled process. It ceases to be a magic tool and
becomes a machinery, following the changing concept of
individual consciousness.
In the Hellenistic period, the influence of
Democritean optics was limited to the Epicureans only. The
interest in atomistic philosophy developed again only in
the Renaissance and gained interest through the
crucial developments in astronomical theory and the crisis
of Aristotelean physics. The new concerns for the concept
of force and the rejection of Aristotelean space made
Atomism and its "corpuscolar " theory of light to be
reconsidered. In fact Descartes in his Dioptrique tried to
integrate Euclid's "geometry" of light with Democritus'
atoms.
4 - Plato
Plato refuses the Atomists' articulation of the
being in terms of a parcelization of matter, and tries
instead to work around Parmenides' affirmation of the
unity of being by substituting it to a multeplicity of
ideas . The notion of being as ideas and not as matter
introduces the well-known dicotomy between real knowledge
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and sensorial experience.
Plato refuses Democritus' philosophy as a whole
and consequently looks back to Empedocles for a model for
theory of vision. Actually, he does not improve
significantly on Empedocles, and his relevant contribution
to the understanding of visual perception is rather to be
found in the way he connects it to a more complex theory
of knowledge- Nevertheless despite of his scarce interest
for the cognitive content of sense reports Plato dealt
with vision as a tool to link the everchanging a
corruptible earthly world to the realm of eternal ideas as
represented in the regularity of the cosmos.
The extent of Plato's borrowings from Empedocles
is particularly evident in the account of the process of
vision he gives in the Timaeus :
They arranged that all fire which had not the
property of burning, but gave out a gentle light,
should form the body of each day's light. The pure
fire within us that is akin to this they caused to
flow through the eyes, making the all eye-ball,
and particularly its central part, smooth and
close-textured so that it would keep in anything
of a coarser nature, and filter through only this
pure fire. So when there is daylight round the
visual stream, it falls on its like and coalesces
with it, forming a single uniform body in the line
of sight, along which the stream from within
strikes the external object. Because the stream
and daylight are similar, the whole so formed is
homogeneous, and the motions caused by the stream
coming into contact with an object or an object
coning into contact with the stream penetrate
right through the body and produce in the soul the
sensation we call sight.
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The crucial issue in the interpretation of this
passage is the meaning of "stream" and "contact", which is
actually quite more complex than what the modern
translation seems to suggest. For this purpose we need to
consider Plato's theory of vision in the context of his
theory of knowledge.
One of the reasons that probably made Plato to
assume the extromissionist position is that by introducing
the visual fire as an agent of cognition, he implicitely
presents perception as an active process. The relevance of
this becomes more clear once we understand that Plato
considers knowledge to be largely a-priori. Therefore the
only (weak) possibility to bridge the gap between the
chaotic earthly world and the domain of the eternal ideas
is by assuming perception to be somehow informed by the
same ideas it is trying to
"see" in the objects. Evidently
this can done more easily if vision was an active process
which "goes out and find things" accordingly to an
a-priori program. It is not surprising that we find
confused reports of Plato's theory of vision in terms of
"tentacles reaching out of the eyes".
Sensation has a controversial status:
it'
is a
faculty of the soul, but it takes place through a bodily
(and therefore fallacious) organ, thus reflecting the
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duality between ideas and corruptible world typical of
Plato's theory of knowledge.
Imagination (phantasia) is the faculty which
creates images (as forms) taking as a model the innate
ideas preserved in the soul. This a-priori images are then
"matched"
with the environment through the sense organ,
generally with approximate and/or erroneous results.
This implies that what can be seen is only what
can be recognized as fitting one of the ideas-forms
contained in the soul. The ideas in the soul are the link
of intelligibility between the individual and the
environment being the copies of the ideas on which the
Demiurge shaped the world. Their role within Plato's
theory of vision is comparable to the one of the
sympathetic affinity between the visual fire and the
external light in Empedocles'. In this sense we may say
that Empedocles' pores which "recognize" one element from
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another are functionally similar to the Platonic
ideas-related forms which through the sense
organ
"recognize" the objects which reflected that form.
These considerations introduce also the crucial but subtle
difference between image and form in Plato.
The comparison becomes more informative once we
consider that Plato's forms are seed-like items, and that,
similarly,
Empedocles'
elements were meant to be orderly
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principles and were often compared to seeds. This
emphasizes once more the essential link between theory of
knowledge and theory of vision, between the way both
"reality"
and its representation are explained.
This interaction is particularly evident in Plato
because of his notion of ideas as forms which introduces
the analogy between images, forms, and ideas, which
is ultimately between the body's eye and the mind's eye.
The relationship between light as sunlight and light and a
symphatic link between the corruptible and the eternal
world is well articulated in this passage of the Republic
[Socrates to Glaucon] then reflect; has
the ear or voice need of any third or additional
nature in order that the one may be able to ear
and the other to be heard?
Nothing of the sort.
But you see that without the addition of some
other nature there is no seeing or being seen?
Of what nature are you speaking?
Of what which3you term ligth, I replied.
True, he said
After having introduced the difference between
sight and the other senses because of the special status
he attributes to light, they both agree that it is
appropriate to the sun, the most noble among planets, to
be the one to emit light. Then they consider the
relationship between sun and sight :
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[Socrates] Neither sight nor the eye in which
resides is the sun?
[Glaucon] No.
Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the
most like the sun?
By far the most like.
And the power which the eye possesses is a
sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?
Exactly.
Why, you know, I said that the eyes when a
person directs them towards objects on which the
light of day is no longer shining, but the moon
and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind;
they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?
Very true .
But when they are directed towards objects on
which the sun shines, they see clearly and there
is sight in them?
Certainly.
And the soul is like the eye : when resting
upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul
perceives and understands and is radiant with
intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight
of becoming and perishing then she has opinion
only and goes blinking about , and is first of one
opinion and then of another and seems to have no
intelligence?^
Just so.
The dialogue goes on, and after few paragraphs Plato
introduces the well-known myth of the cave.
These passages show that there is an intricate
network of cross-references among the concepts he is
presenting. The sun makes vision possible, not only by
emanating light, but also by sending an effluence to the
eye and endows it with the visual power . Like Empedocles,
Plato first relates light to fire as an element, then he
sets a sympathetic analogy between the
"power"
of vision
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and fire by assuming that some kind fire is contained in
the eye. Therefore when the sun is shining, it emanates
light which illuminates the object of sight, and at the
same time by means of sympathy it "calls" the visual
fire out of the eye, and they then go together to "see"
the object. This coalescence is not material entity
because vision is not a sort of touch but rather a
matching process between the form created by the phantasia
and the form of the object. In a sense the light of the
sun and the visual fire are two converging beams with
concur to "enlighten" the object.
Vision has a priviledged status among the senses
exactly because it is the less mechanical and therefore
the most a-priori of the senses. Moreover, its medium is
light, which has a special status in Plato's theory of
knowledge. It is exactly this lack of mechanicity and its
inherent a-priori character what makes vision impossible
to be explained.
Here we have a coalescence of analogies. In the
same way light as an emanation of fire calls the visual
fire out of the body's eye, the light of truth emanates
evidence which calls up the mind's eye. As most of Plato's
metaphors, light is neither sunlight nor the light of
truth, but both . The other analogy between microcosm and
macrocosm which is encapsulated in this dialogue is the
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notion of visual fire as the "soul" (faculty) of the eye
because of its affinity to light, truth, and ideas.
The Timaeus offers further material to clarify the
relationship between vision and knowledge. Plato says that
regular orbits are the image of rational thought and that
the Demiurge....
gave each divine [heavenly body] two motions,
one uniform in the same place, as each always
thinks the same thoughts about the same things,
the other forward, as each is subject to the Same
and uniform
The regular motion of the stars is the image of
eternity. Regularity is also the image of rational
thought, hence eternity is also the image of rational,
perfect, thought. His cosmology too is an image of his
theory of ideas, and vision--being mediated by light is
the sympathetic connection between the cosmos, ideas, and
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men . Again, vision is not just either visual
sensation or a metaphor for knowledge but both . It
confirms its priviledged position among the other senses
because knowledge is represented in the heavenly sphere:
we can see it but we cannot reach it (mechanically).
We can now understand why Plato is the first to
point at the difference between image and proof. Proof to
him is the true image which is coincident with the form
and with the idea. The ideas preserved in the soul (as
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well as the related forms and images) are true, while the
images we perceive with the corruptible body about the
corruptible world are not proofs. Plato does not think of
images as copies: images are either true or false, and if
an image is true (i .e . coincident with an idea) the
question of "originality" is pointless.
In the Timaeus we also find that:
And in the second of the orbits from the
earth, god lit a light , which we call sun, to
provide a clear measure of the relative motions of
the eigth revolutions, and to enable the
appropriate living creatures
to gain knowledge of number fgQm the
uniform movements of the same ..for I reckon
that the supreme benefit of which sight is
responsible is that not a word of all we have said
about the universe could have been said if we had
not seen the stars and sun and heavens. As it is
the sight of day and night, the months and the
returning year, the equinoxes and solstices
caused the invention of numbers , given us the
notion of time
Plato expresses these regularities of the motion
of the heavenly bodies in terms of uniform circular
motions, and it is from the observation of these
regularities that human beings develop their sense of
numbers, time, and geometry.
Therefore Plato considers geometry to be entailed
in the plans of the Demiurge who organized the cosmos out
of chaotically dispersed matter. He does not apply
geometry to the study of astronomy, but he rather offers
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an ontological justification of geometry through his
cosmology. Geometry is a form, not a tool.
It is interesting at this point to ask why he does
not think of geometry as the "form" of vision
Probably it is a problem of "world view", and its origins
can be found once again in Plato's theory of knowledge.
If geometry is one of the forms the Demiurge took
as example while creating the world, it means that
geometry participates with the soul of the cosmos which is
permanent, immutable, and therefore static (as ideas are).
Geometrical forms are ; they do not become .
Now, to apply geometry to vision, it is not just
to apply geometry to the behavior of light rays, but
rather to apply it to visual cognition , and in the
context of Plato's theory of knowledge human cognition is
transitory and/or erroneous. It is a process of becoming,
not of being. Instead, geometry j^s a form of the being and
cannot be applied to the becoming.
This suggests that the application of a
geometrical model to natural phenomena is possible only
when the items that are going to be translated in that
model are reasonably "unloaded". Plato's notion of light
is far from being possibly treated within Optics. It has
too much content; from lighting to eternal truth and
justice. In a sense Plato's theory of knowledge makes even
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more acute those problems generated by the incorporation
of sunlight and "cognitive" emanations from objects we
already noticed with Empedocles and Democritus.
The notion of "reasonable load" of a model needs
to be considered in the context the model is developed
and/or applied. However, it is evident that the dismissal
of most of the cognitive aspects of vision was
particularly important in making Euclid's Optics
thinkable .
The concerns about the cognitive aspects of vision
was re-introduced after Euclid and "modulated" on the
geometrical model, but at that point cognition through
vision had already assumed a much different meaning than
the one attributed by Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato.
Probably one of the reasons of this change was the
geometricization of matter (reflected also in Plato's five
regular solids-elements) which introduced a notion of
space not as the measure of things but rather as their
structure . As Max Jammer puts it:
Although "Platonic matter" was sometimes held
to be a kind of body lacking all qualities
(Stoics, Plutarch, Hegel) or to be the mere
possibility of corporeality (Chalcidius,
Neoplatonists ) , critical analysis seems to show
that Plato intended to identify the world of
physical bodies with the world of geometrical
forms. A physical body is merely a part of space
limited by geometric surfaces containing nothing
but empty space Stereometric similarity
becomes the ordering principle in the formation of
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i. j- 48macroscopic bodies.
Euclid's Optics seems to develop this program. The
cognitive aspects of vision are not concerned with the
"essence"
of things or with the elements which constitute
them, but rather with their stereometric structure, with
their positions in space and with their spatial
relationships with the surrounding objects. Empedocles'
elemental sieve is replaced by a stereometric one.
Plato's theory of vision became particularly
influential for the early medieval inquiry on vision and
light, especially for those authors such as Grosseteste
who developed a metaphysics of light. Plotino's
Hellenistic reinterpretation of Plato with an emphasis on
light as an actual emanation of divine knowledge, as well
as the later integration of Platonism whitin Christianism
operated by Augustine contributed to the interest of
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medieval philosophers for Plato's theory of vision
5 - Aristotle
With Aristotle we find the beginning of the
divorce between theories of visual perception and
geometrical analysis of the behavior of light.
Aristotle tries to mediate the duality between
being and not-being, between unchanging and changing, by
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introducing the notion of potential being. With this
assumption, movement and change can be seen as a passage
from potentiality to actuality- Change is no more thought
of as chaos, but on the contrary it is seen as a form of
teleological transformation.
Consequently quite differently from Plato his
theory of knowledge attributes a relevant role to the
sensorial experience of the everchanging physical world.
The drastic distinction between the realm of ideas and
sensorial experience is dismissed. Light looses the
peculiar status it had in Plato and the study of its
behavior can be approached in empirical terms. For similar
reasons, sight does not maintain its metaphysical
connotation and can be treated as a kind of movement of
light rays which enter the eye producing the visual
sensation .
This change of attitude is evident in the De Sensu
where he attacks directly the earlier theories of vision,
particularly on the notion of visual fire and of light as
a form of fire:
The explanation in the Timaeus , that the
sight issuing from the eye is extinguished in the
darkness, is quite without point, for what can the
extinction of light mean? Heat and dryness are
annulled by damp or cold, as we see in the case of
the fire and flame in burning coals; but neither
of these is a characteristic of light. If they are
and we do not detect their presence owing to the
smallness of their amount, light would of
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necessity be extinguished in broad light too, when
it was wet, and darkness would increase in frosty
weather .
This criticism shows that Aristotle refuses to
explain vision in terms of elements' behavior, and in fact
he articulates his theory of perception with a clear
concern with both the notion of causality as entailed in
his potentiality-actuality duality, and with his concept
of space as a plenum.
He considers space to be a medium that has the
potentiality of being transparent; light is the actual
state of its transparency, and it entails visibility . The
object of sight once illuminated is the cause of the
shift of the state of the medium from potentiality to
actuality. The corpus vitreum inside the eye being
transparent is taken to be the receptor. Its transparency
is supposed to be connected with the one of the outer
medium. When the air shifts to transparency, the same
happens to the corpus vitreum inside the eye, and it is
through this chain of transparencies that vision takes
place .
From the eye, the visual sensation is then brought
to the soul which Aristotele like Empedocles thinks to
be around the heart. He takes visual sensation to reach
the brain through the optical nerves, and then to continue
toward the heart through the blood vessels which connect
122
it to the brain. He thinks the brain to be bloodless and
therefore senseless. It is:
a refrigerator of the natural hotness of the
body. The eye is an offspring of the brain because
it is cool.
The description of the sequence of transitions
from potentiality to actuality which finally produces
vision is particularly problematic because perception is
not just the movement or transformation of an object but
rather of the representation of the surrounding
environment. It is not easy to consider this process as
continuous, and difficulties emerge in the identification
of the causes, the form, and the matter of all the various
stages of the process.
Aristotle is perfectly aware of these difficulties
and, by pointing to the different aspects of the process,
he probably tries to frame it. For instance he claims
that:
perception consists in being moved and acted
upon, for it is held-to be a species of
qualitative change.
but also that:
manifestly the sensible object simply brings
the faculty of sense into active exercise: in this
transition, in fact, the sense is not acted upon
or qualitatively changed.
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Willem van Hoorn suggests that a mediation between
these two apparently paradoxical positions can be obtained
by considering that:
In general the term "actuality" has two
meanings in Aristotle: in one sense it refers to
the possession of something e.g. knowledge a
disposition and in the second sense it refers to
the exercise of .something, e .g. knowledge a
manifestation .
Which means that the eye sees (is in the actual
state of seeing) both because it is brought to see by the
presence of an object in front of it, and because it has a
disposition to see. We can rephrase it by saying that the
eye has the potentiality of seeing not in the sense that
an apple has the potentiality to fall from the tree.
In fact when the eye sees something, it does not
change or move as an apple which falls. When the object of
sight is gone, the eye is still the same while the apple
is in a different position (state).
This is why Aristotle says that the sense is acted
upon and it is not. He tries to explain this unusual form
of causation by de-materializing the cause itself, because
a material cause cannot produce an immaterial change. In
fact, the cause of vision is not the object qua object,
but rather its form. This also implies the adoption of an
unusual kind of potentiality: a potentiality that can
switch to actuality when
"touched" by a form, in a fashion
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that brings up again the well-known problem of the
substantiality of the aristotelean forms. Under the shape
of this hyper-sensitive potentiality he is tryng to
account for a kind of disposition which in many senses is
an actual activity. In other terms, he introduces the
notion of individuality under the shape of an a-priori
disposition to perception.
Differently from Empedocles and Democritus, he
rejects the notion of cognition in terms of material
emanations which stay (almost magically) for the object
which emanates them. To Aristotle the object (and the
cause) of perception is not matter but form and qualities.
Sympathy between elements, which was at the base of
earlier theories of vision, is replaced by Aristotle with
a correspondence between forms which also introduces the
notion of individual as a cognitive agent. This because
the faculty of the senses is a potentiality, which means
that senses can perceive what triggers them, but they
cannot sense themselves. Differently, the soul can become
aware of its own individuality not by thinking of itself
(because would be again a potentiality which is aware of
itself), but rather by being aware of a teleologically
lesser potentiality such as the senses. In a
proto-Cartesian fashion, we find Aristotle saying that:
and if to perceive that we perceive is to
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perceive that we exist.
This awareness is possible only because of
Aristotle's concept of cognitive being which is far away
from the homeric individual who was "exposed" to or
"impressed" by the environment. The consciousness of the
individual develops from him being able to compare and
criticize the sense reports. As he puts it clearly:
We posses a faculty or power accompanying all
the individual senses, in virtue of which power
one sees that he sees, or hears that he hears, or
in general perceives that he perceives. It is in
virtue of this common power that one does so; for
assuredly it is not by the special sense of seeing
that one sees that he sees.
This hierarchy of cognitive "powers" begins with
perception but can be found also within perception itself.
The a-priori power is placed on a higher cognitive level
than the materials it is suppose to process, in fact:
the sensitive subject... once generated
possesses perception exactly in the same sense we
possess knowledge. And to have actual perception
corresponds to the exercise of knowledge.
Evidently the initial problem is still the crucial
one. How can the transition from potentiality to actuality
be explained? What does it mean to say that the eye is
acted upon?
Aristotle explains that "to be acted
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upon" (paschein ) has different meanings:
Sometimes> it means a sort of destruction by
the contrary, somet ines it is rather a
preservation of what is poten tially existent by
what is actuailly ex istent and like it, so far as
the likeness holds of potentiality when compa red
with actuality- For it is by exercise of know ledge
that the possessor of knowledge becomes such in
actuality: arid this ei ther is not qualitative
Hence it is not right to say tha t
which thinks undergoes change when it thinks, any
more than tha
he builds.
it the bui Ider un>dergoes change when
Knowledge as well as vision is both caused from
the outside and developed from an internal seed. More than
a transformation we should probably talk about "dynamic
matching". In fact:
in one sense what is acted upon is acted upon
by what is like it, in another sense by what is
unlike it... that is to say, while being acted upon
it is unlike, after it has been acted upon it is
like the agent.
Therefore the percipiendum is unlike the sense,
while the perceptum is alike it. The problem left open is
how is it possible that only the form of the object could
be the cause of vision. The other examples he
proposes like the wax that receives the seal and is then
indistinguishable from the seal itself fail to convey a
significant analogy because they refer to a material
transformation which is instead dismissed by his account
of perception. He carefully avoids to present perception
as a physical imprinting (like Democritus'), but he
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describes it as an activity which is only triggered from
the outside and then developed internally
and with internal energy . This problem is probably also
the origin of the troublesome status of light in the
process of vision.
Aristotle then negates the process of thought to
be a form of change, because the presence of change
implies that something imperfect (not fully actualized) is
moving toward its final actualization. Thought is rather a
form of energeia which is the preservation of something
already perfect. It is a movement that (not being
material) does not require time. The faculty of vision is
an energeia too, which means that it is the preservation
of what already perfect. Evidently what is perfect is not
the form of the object of vision but rather the power of
the sense; in fact, the contrary would contradict
Aristotle's teleological hierarchy. This seems to confirm
that it is the perceptum that shapes the percioiendum and
not the opposite, as Aristotle suggested before.
All these apparently paradoxical statements of
the kind "it is, but it is not" suggest that the mediation
between the strongly a-prioristic disposition of the power
of the senses and the actualization of a particular visual
sensation cannot be explained ,but rather implied by the
teleological fitness of the senses with the physical
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world. Ultimately this is what allows Aristotle to escape
Plato's deadlock between the chaotic world of senses and
the realm of eternal ideas.
The actualization of vision is an awakening more
than an impression because the faculty of sight though
bound to the organ of sight has the capability of
perceiving all the possible forms of objects because it is
on a higher level of teleological hierarchy. It is a
metaform , so to speak.
The articulation of individual consciousness is
now evident, and it is mirrored by the hierarchical
organization of the items of knowledge which entails the
priviledged status of the human being. Such a hierarchy
was scarcely developed in Empedocles, and was instead
thought of in terms of consciousness of matter by
Democritus. What is outside the individual is no more
brought inside through a sympathic process, but it is
rather perceived by a teleologically-informed faculty of
perception. It is exactly by assuming that perception is
teleologically informed that Aristotle solves the problem
of the projection of a priori forms on the perceived
object. As a matter of fact, those forms are a-priori, but
they fit the objects without any need to
"trim" them down
because there is a teleological affinity (almost a
"brotherhood") among them.
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The relationship between what is seen and what is
known, or between perception and knowledge, is widely
articulated by Aristotle. His notion of "universal" is not
transcendental as in the case of Plato's ideas, but it is
developed with induction from sense reports. In turn,
cognition is often necessary to achieve a full reading of
perception because most of the senses can perceive
directly only the so-called common sensibles which are
motion, rest, number, figure, and size. Most of the other
qualities need to be know by inference from these basic
data as well as from experience . This is made possible
both by Aristotle's notion of perception as
perception of forms which de-emphasizes the materiality of
the object while stressing its different qua-lities, and
by the primary role attributed to common sense as the
structure of experience. For instance, we see gall as
yellow (directly) and we feel it as bitter (directly); but
the next time we see gall (directly), we do not need to
taste it again for we know it is bitter through an
indirect inference.
With Aristotle we begin to find the awareness of
the effects of common sense on the judgements we normally
make out of visual percepts. As noted by Feyerabend:
...the process by which universals are
"established" in the soul depends on particulars
and "low level
universals"
already imprinted in
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it. An idiosyncratic history of perception will
therefore lead to idiosyncratic perceptions later
on. Also the senses, being acquaitened with our
everyday surroundings, are liable to give
misleading reports of objects outside this domain.
This is proved by the appearance of the sun and
the moon; on earth large but distant objects in
familiar surroundings such as mountains are seen
as being large, but far away- The moon and the sun
however , "appear to measure one foot across even to
men who are ip-health, and know [their] real
measurements"
. The discrepancy is due to the
imagination which is "some kind of fi,
movement .... caused by actual sensations" but
"it may be false ... .especially when the sensible
object"
appears_in unusual conditions, such as
large distance and removed from the ,..,
supervision by the "controlling sense" . A
combination of unusual conditions and absence of
control thus leads to illusions; for example,
patternsfion the wall are sometimes seen as
animals.
Light has a crucial and problematic role in
Aristotle's theory of vision. As we considered earlier,
Aristotle criticises Democritus' notion of eidola by
saying that is not by putting the object directly on the
eye that we get to see it. We need instead a medium to
behave like a "cognitive distance", so that only the form
of the object (and not the object itself) is brought in
"contact" with the sense of vision. Light needs to be
selective (of the form) but transparent. It needs to
transport something without being the cause of anything.
We are again faced with a paradox of the kind "it is, but
it is not", and it is solved accordingly. Light cannot be
a body (because that would translate Aristotle's theory in
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Democritus1), nevertheless its role is indispensable,
which means that it cannot be "nothing". Aristotle answers
in the usual way, by saying that light is just actuality :
the actuality of the transparent. Now, one may ask what is
the transparent about, because Aristotle's space is a
plenum
Such a notion of light could be hardly applied to
a geometrical model, and in fact Aristotle did not. Later
Aristotelians, like Alexander of Aphrodisia, Themistus,
and Simplicius who became more sensitive to the
articulation of the process of vision offered by Euclid's
Optics , needed to replace Aristotle's notion of kinesis
(which is the transition from potentiality to actuality)
with the locomotion of the luminous form of the body to
the eye.
However, Aristotle seems to hold a different
notion of light when he deals with physical rather than
perceptual processes. Once light is considered outside
this critical chain of potentialities and actualities
which lead to vision, it can be approached qua geometrical
line. What remains unclear is whether or not these
approaches to the study of light were mutually
commensurable .
In his Physics Aristotle introduces the
relationship between different scientific disciplines and
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their subject matters and methods. Among them he touches
upon Optics and its use of geometry for the study of
light:
Physicists, astronomers, and mathematicians,
then, all have to deal with lines, figures and the
rest. But the mathematician is not concerned with
these concepts qua boundaries of natural bodies,
nor with their properties as manifested in such
bodies. Thereforgehe abstracts them from physical
conditions
What is abstracted is not the global form of the
object, but only certain qualities of its. It is a process
of modelization . Those "selected" qualities are processed
in a formalized context, and the results (even though
abstract) are applicable back to the objects. In fact, he
goes on with a criticism of Plato's notion of total and
therefore unworkable abstraction:
Now the exponents of the philosophy of
'Ideas'
also make abstractions, but in doing so they fall
unawares into error; for they abstract physical
entities, which
are not really susceptible to the process as mathem
atical entities are . And this would become
obvious if one should undertake to define
respectively the mathematical and the
'ideal'
entities, together with their properties; for the
concepts
' odd ', 'even ',' straight
',' curved
'
, will be
found to be indipendent of movementggand so too
with 'number *, 'line' , and 'figure'.
The opposition between Plato's total and
Aristotle's selective abstraction becomes more evident
when Aristotle introduces the application of geometry to
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physical matters
The point is further illustrated by those
sciences which are rather physical than
mathematical, though combining both disciplines,
such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy; for the
relations between them and geometry are, so to
speak, reciprocal; since the geometer deals with
physical lines, but not qua physical, whereas
optics deals with mathematical filines, but qua
physical not qua mathematical.
Aristotle justifies the possibility of geometrical
abstraction as a formalized articulation of common sense,
and not because (as in Plato) geometry was ontologically
entailed in the order of the cosmos. It is again common
sense that indicates the workable analogies, which is,
whether or not a geometrical model
"fits"
a physical
process. This implies that a natural phenomenon is not
equivalent to its geometrical model, but it can be
treated as such for certain purposes and if within a
certain discipline. Aristotle's concept of mathematical
and geometrical models shows the beginning of the notion
of correspondence rule.
To Aristotle, light could be dealt with qua
geometrical line, but probably visual perception could not
be studied qua a form of geometrical projection, therefore
he is interested in geometrical optics only within the
study of natural phenomena.
68 ,
C.B.Boyer has considered Aristotle's
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specific concern with the geometrical treatment of optical
problems such as the behavior of mirrors, or the
explanation of the rainbow. He maintains that Aristotle
was well aware of the law of reflection already outlined
by Plato in his Timaeus even though there is no evidence
of a quantitative formulation of such a law in his works.
In an interesting passage of his Problemata he also put
forward an analogy between mechanics and optics that was
going to be used again by Alhazen and later by Descartes
in his Dioprice :
Now every object rebounds at similar angles,
because it is travelling to the point to which it
is carried by the impetus which was imparted by
the person who threw it; and at that point it must
be travelling at an acute angle or at a right
angle. Since then the repelling object stops the
movement in a straight line, it stops alike the
moving object and its impetus. As then in a mirror
the image appears at the end of the line along
which the sight travels, so the opposite occurs in
moving objects, for they are repelled at an angle
of the same magnitudeas the angle at the apex (for
it must be observed that both the angle and the
impetus are changed), and in these circumstances
is clear thatgmoving objects must rebound at
similar angles.
It is interesting to note that here Aristotle
talks about "the line along which sight travels". This
unexpected platonism confirms what said earlier, which is
that once the process under scrutiny is not directly
related to visual cognition but rather to the behavior of
light, it does not matter in what direction light is
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travelling. The split between theories of vision and the
study of the behavior of light was later developed by the
Hellenistic "geometers" of vision.
The last consideration about Aristotle's notion of
light is in relation to his concept of multi-sphere space.
Behind the notion of light qua pure actuality, or light
qua geometrical line, there is a careful avoidance of the
materiality of light which would have been problematic
with his cosmology. If light had a material nature, how
can we see the stars if a material light was to go through
several spheres each constituted of different kinds of
matter?
A concern for the same problem can be detected in
his notion of light as energeia. As we have seen before,
energeia pertains to something that switches from
potentiality to actuality being already perfect. Energeia
does not imply any movement during this transition because
movement pertains only to what is perfecting itself
through actualization. The transition of light from
potentiality to actuality does not require any time and
does not imply any movement. It is this absence of
movement which save Aristotle a problematic explanation of
the cause of the movement of light through several
heterogeneous spheres.
However, this ad-hoc definition of light may have
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had a positive influence on the development of the
awareness of the refraction of light through different
media and/or cosmological spheres.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1 Hippocrates, De loc. in horn. 2[VI 278], and De earn.
17 [VIII 606].
2 His background accounts also for his description of hollow
optical nerves which could have been not a forceful arrange
ment of evidences to fit the model of explanation, but rather
a confusion between nerves ans blood vessels during dissect
ion. Alcmaeon 's mistake was widely transmitted to later phi
losophers also because of problems of interpretation of his
text. In fact he talks about "poroi" which have been read as
"pores", nerves, vessels. Also Aristotle in his account of
the connection between the sense organ and the soul seems to
fall into these problems.
3 Alcmaeon is sometimes considered to be a Pythagorean, and
his reference to the corneal image seems to confirm this.
The few fragments available report that the Pythagorean were
the first to introduce the theory of the visual fire contain
ed in the eye which reached out to perceive the object. The
visual fire was then reflected back to the eye to form the
mirror image on the cornea. Nevertheless this reading of
Alcmaeon 's theory seems to contradict other of his medical
works. For instance it seems that he though of the fire in
the eye not as a sensitive element but rather as an irrita
tion. For more information about Alcmeon's theory of vision
see: J.I.Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition ,
Oxford, 1906, pp. 11-13.
4 Fr.l, quoted in: B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind , Cam
bridge, Mass, 1953, p. 146. English translation of B.Snell,
Die Entdeckung des Geistes , Hamburg, 1948.
5 The beginning of induction is generally attributed to Hip
pocrates and his followers. The inductive method is clearly
presented in the Hippocratic treatise Tradition in Medicine
and the meticulous listings of metereological conditions,
symptoms and patterns of developments of illnesses as found
in the various books of Epidemics , show an evident concern
in orderly record to be used for inductive prognosis. But
from the reading of Epidemics is also difficult to evaluate
the specific achievements of the Hippocratic inductive method
because it does not seem that the physician was doing much
more than observing and recording. The frequency of deaths
is impressive, and the more fortunate endings of the ill
ness seem quite casual.
6 Teophrastus, 10, [B 107].
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7 J.I.Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition , Oxford,
1906, p. 14.
'
8 The influence of Pythagorean doctrines of harmony is evident
here. The soul is the harmony of the body and it also shares
some of the harmony of the cosmos which is then reflected in
the senses which are effective because "in tune" with the
world .
However, behind the introduction of the concept of balance
and accordance we can see the development of the "unity of
the mind". In fact, it is only through a development of
consciousness which allows for the representation of a dia
lectical process, that those concepts could be made think
able.
9 Teophrastus, De Sens. , 26 sg . [Dox . 345] .
10 The sympathetic chain between the outside and the inside
is already set by means of this correspondence between in
ternal and external fire and water. Moreover he describes
the creation of the eyes by saying that "Divine Aphrodite
[the personification of love] solidified the eyes from cer
tain elements and then fastened them [to the head] with
bolts of love . " (Fr .86, quoted in G.E.R.Lloyd, Polarity and
Analogy , Cambridge, 1966, p. 275) His verb "to
solidify"
refers to the salt which is dried by the sun . This is a
further support to the chain of sympathy because fire it
self took part in the creation of the organ of sight.
11 J.I.Beare, op.cit. , pp. 14-23.
12 This shows that vision was considered to be a particular
case of "influence". The doctrine of the influences is par
ticularly related to astrology, and in fact it is interest
ing to note that we can find astrological overtones in most
of the theories of vision up to Kepler. Even though astro
logy is generally criticized as a sort of evil for science,
it actually played an important role in the devlopment of
post-aristotelean science because it maintained alive the
notion of action at distance that except very particular
cases was negated by Aristotelean philosophy. In partic
ular, the development of the notion of force of attraction
that was so important for Kepler's astronomical model based
on non-circular motion was taken over from Gilbert's stud
ies on magnetism and applied to astronomy because of Kepler's
own interest in astrological sympathy. We need to remember
that the study of magnetism was kept alive exactly because
of non-scientific purposes, such as magic, astrology and
the speculations about perpetual motion. Mary Hesse dealt
with the relationship between the development of the con
cept of field of force and the theory of emanations in her
Forces & Fields , Totowa, NJ, 1965, particularly pp. 74-79.
The specific references to
"influences"
within the studies
of optics and vision can be easily found in Plato, Al-Kindi,
Grosseteste, R.Bacon, and Biagio Pelacani. Very often beside
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treatises of optics and vision we also find works such as Al-
Kindi's De Radiis Stellatis , or Grosseteste and Bacon's
Multiplicatio Specierum ,which specifically deal with aspects
of the theory of influences.
13 Teophrastus, On the Senses , trans. G.M.Stratton , London,
1917, p. 7
14 R.E.Siegel, "Theories of Vision and Color Perception of
Empedocles and Democritus; Some Similarities to the Modern
Approach", in Bullettin of the History of Medicine , 1959,
XXXIII, pp. 145-160.
15 We do not have evidences of this but we speculate that
this may be the case for the theory of the pupillary image
was adopted before him by Alcmaeon and after him by Democri
tus. It is not just a chronological relation when we consider
that there is a pattern of continuity between the theories
of Alcmaeon, Empedocles, and Democritus.
16 Fragments that support the "intromissionist" reading of
Empedocles1 theory are: Aristotle, De Sensu , 437b 9; Teo
phrastus, 18[Dox.500 sgg.]; Aetius, IV 13, 4 [Dox.403].
17 Teophrastus, op. cit , p. 8.
18 Teophrastus, ibid. , p. 8. Siegel, op.cit , p. 151, thinks
that behind this belief there is a precise empirical observ
ation. He claims that Empedocles being a physician "must
have observed that dark pigmented eyes have better vision
during the bright daylight, but eyes with a blue iris have
better performance at night." From blue-eyed to "which have
fire in excess" is explained by considering that in Greek
the color of blue eyes is denoted by"glaucos" which is gen
erally translated as "gleaming".
19 Alexander of Aphrodisia, Quaestiones , II 23 p. 72, 9.
20 Aetius, V 12,2 [Dox.423].
21 Both this fragment and the earlier one by Alexander, show
a clear patterm of relationship between the study of the pro
cess of vision and the one of "influences".
22 It is interesting to note that several philosophers who
adopted some kind of atomism, or who at least held the corpus-
colar nature of matter, use the
"exemplar"
of the sieve to
account for processes involving some kind of transformation
which could be seen as a selection. An example that comes to
mind here is Descartes' criticism of Galen's physiology by
replacing his "natural
faculties" with sieves.
23 Plutarch, Quaest. , conv.VIII 10,2 p 734F and 735A.
24 Leucippus, Frag. A 29-30. Quoted in D.C. Lindberg, Theories
of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler , Chicago, 1976, p. 2.
25 Teophrastus, On the Senses , Stratton's ed., p. 109-11 , says
that "For the reflection does not arise immediately on the
pupil. On the contrary the air between the eye and the object
of sight is compressed by the object and the visual organ,
and thus becomes imprinted since there is always an effluence
of some kind arising from everything. Thereupon this imprintel
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air, because it is solid and is of a hue contrasting with the
pupil, is reflected in the eyes,which are moist."
26 Willem van Hoorn, As Images Unwind , Amsterdam, 1972, p. 27,
27 Aristotle, De Sensu ,438a 5-12., trans. J.I.Beare, in The
Works of Aristotle , ed. W.D.Ross, Vol.3. Quoted in D.C.Lin-
berg, op. cit. , p. 3.
28 In fact we find that Aristotle while criticizing him (see
note 27) claims that "he seems to have attained to no clear
general theory of the mirroring and reflection of objects",
De sensu , 438a 9-10, trans. G.R.T.Ross, p. 51. Other trans
lations put more emphasis on the fact that the lack of a
theory of mirroring was not a fault of Democritus, but there
was no one available. The same description of the mirror's
behavior given by Plato in his Timaeus is only qualitative
and it is not clear at all whether or not he knew of the
quantitative form of the law of reflection.
29 Archimedes, de mechan. theor. ad Eratosth. meth. , [ed.
Heiberg, (Herm.), XLII, p. 245, 23].
30 Vitruvius, IX 5,4.; and Geminus, isag. , p. 218, 14.
31 Ptolemy, astron. apparit. epileg. , [there in the appendix]
p. 275, 1 .
32 Aristotle, On the soul , 419a 15, quoted in J.I.Beare, op.
cit , p. 27. 32.
33 Actually we find some perplexity about this problem also
in Euclid even though probably from a different perspective.
Euclid in fact holds that the visual rays moving from the
eye to be discrete .Even though he may introduce this because
it helps him to explain why distant object are seen less
clearly than near-by ones, by saying that they are reached
by a lesser number of rays, it also show that he still had
problems to deal with the notion of "density". To him it
was probably odd to conceive that an angle which at its
vertex has no "area", it then may cover an infinite space.
In a sense it sounds like that each
"line"
or ray not to be
immmaterial but expanding as a cone while getting far away
from the vertex. In this sense I think that Euclid's assump
tion of discrete visual rays reflects a concern with the
problem of the immateriality/materiality of the geometrical
line taken to be the model for the visual ray. Even though
Ptolemy emendated this point of Euclid's by introducing the
notion of pyramid of vision as a continuous
"solid" body,
the problem emerges again with Kepler. In his Ad Vitellionem
Paralipomena , Frankfurt, 1604, p. 9 he says that "Lucis motus
non est in tempore, sed in momento", which is that light's
speed is infinite, but he also says that it slows down while
moving away from the origin. He clearly does not talk about
the intensity of light, but he splits light as-a-ray from
light-as-a-surface . The ray of light is immaterial, it is
pure movement and it maintains infinite speed anytime and
anywhere, while light as "illumination" is a surface and
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therefore its speed decreases with the distance. He is clear
about this:"Lucis radius nihil est de luce ipsa ingrediente" ,
which is that the ray of light is not made up of light. In
a sense he explains the decreasing intensity of light with
the decrease of its speed as a surface . If we translate
"illumination"
with "visual rays per square inch" we are
again at Euclid's early problem and quite close to Demo
critus'
ant in the sky.
34 Ptolemy and Alhazen, even though basically assuming the
framework of Euclid's Optics they were also sensitive to
the problems of the diffusion of wealening of the resolution
of sight because of the medium in which lights propagates.
For instance Ptolemy in Optics Book II, sec. 49 says that:
"Et cum aspexerimus earn sine interpositione ,magis uidebitur
quam cum inter nos et illam fuerint alique res subtiles
quas uisus penetrat et aliquantum ei resistunt .
"
, (p. 36 of
L'Optique de Claude Ptolemee , ed A. Le jeune , Louvain , 1956),
Alhazen comments on the influence of the medium in Opticae
thesaurus , Liber 1, Prop. 41, but he seems to refer spec
ifically to refraction.
35 Sextus Empiricus, M. VII 117 f . , DK 68 B 164., quoted in
G.E.R.Lloyd, op.cit , p. 270.
36 An important contribution to this revival was the re-dis-
scovery by the humanist Poggio Bracciolini of a manuscript
of De rerum natura of the Epicurean Latin poet Lucretius.
Epicurus theory of vision was quite plainly borrowed from
Democritus, and Lucretius gives an extensive exposition of
it. The eidola is here presented as a thin skin emanating
from the bodies without being the body itself, like the skin
snakes drop once a year.
37 Plato, Timaeus ,45, trans. D.Lee , Hardmonsworth, 1965, p. 62.
38 By using "functionally similar" I am trying to compare
which are incommensuarble among them like Plato's form and
Empedocles'
elements, by pointing to the analogies between
their roles in their programs. I am not suggesting that by
doing this sort of comparative analysis we may detect the
problem which is dealt in different ways through different
programs, but rather that we can trace the development of
this incommensurability by tracing it from the common his
torical starting point.
39 Plato, Republic , VI, 507-508, trans.B.Jowett, Modern
Library, New York, 1982, p. 247.
40 Plato, ibid. , p. 248-249
41 Plato, Timaeus ,40, trans. D.Lee, Hardmonsworth, 1965,
p. 55.
42 A further connotation of light is in terms of "Justice".
Plato in fact considers the cosmos as a perfect model of
political and juridical rationality; therefore light does
not only mediate individual but also social and political
knowledge .
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43 Plato, Timaeus , 39 ff, p. 54.
44 Plato, Timaeus , 47 ff, p. 65.
45 This is also confirmed by the fact that Plato took geo
metrical forms to be innate in the soul.
46 In fact even though Plato's description of reflection in
the imaeus is not quantitative, it is reasonable to suppose
that the overall knowledge of geometry within the academia
was not scarce, at least from what we can grasp from Ari
stotle. Moreover Euclid's Optics is by far simpler than his
Elements , and anyway he worked only few decades later,which
means that Plato's disregard for geometrical optics cannot
be simply attributed to his scarce proficiency in geometry,
but rather to a different philosophical attitude.
47 Plato, Timaeus , 55 ff.
48 M. Jammer, Concepts of Space , Cambridge, Mass, 1954, p. 12.
49 Another typical influence of Plato's theory of vision on
the development of medieval optics was the distinction bet
ween lux and lumen ; between light as illumination and light
as emanation. This duality developed from the medieval in
terpretation of the difference between light as illumination
and fire as radiation or emanation that Plato inherited from
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CHAPTER 6 - HELLENISTIC THEORIES OF VISION
1 - Institutionalization of science:
systematicity and quantification
The proto-enciclopaedic program of Aristotle's
Lyceum, with an emphasis on method, on the ordering of
disciplines and subject matters, and on the historical
development of those disciplines, is then adopted and
institutionalized by Alexandria's Museum. Before then, in
Classical Greece, schools of philosophy were not official
institutions, and even the well-known medical school of
Coos seems to have been a guilt-like network of master
physicians and their pupils.
Patronage developed in Greece with the tyrants of
the Archaic period and survived in different forms till
the Roman conquest. Taxation was not carried out with a
precise and well articulated procedure even in the
Classical Period, but there was instead the implicit
obligation of the wealthier class to "take care" of
certain public expenses. It is probable that patronage was
one of the forms of this implicit taxation.
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Institutionalized patronage of systematic research
rather than of performing arts as represented by
Alexandria's Museum, shows a profound cultural and
political change between the Classical and the Hellenistic
Period.
At the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC . ,
his empire was partitioned among three of his generals,
and Egypt went to Ptolemy Soter. He did not introduce
major modifications in the political and administrative
structure of the country, but he rather fit himself in the
already existing role of the king. Probably advised by
Demetrius of Phaleron who was a former tyrant in Athens
(317-310 BC ) , a Peripatetic philosopher, and who helped
Theophrastus in obtaining the legal status for the
Lyceum Soter established the Museum as a center of
scholarship with an aristotelean orientation.
However, there are differences in the interests
pursued at the Museum and at the Lyceum, and they can be
partially referred to the different form of patronage
which endowed the two institutions.
The basic features of Egypt's economy during the
reign of the first of the Ptolemies were characterized by
the same extreme centralization we already found in the
pharaonic period, with the difference that now Alexandria
was the administrative and political center of the state.
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Commerce, industry, prices, banking, the distribution of
raw materials and finished products was controlled by the
state, and the king like the pharaoh before
him considered himself to be the actual owner of Egypt's
land. These policies were quite extraneous to the
political thought and economic attitudes of Classical
Greece .
The economic policy of the polis was generally
concerned only in securing the supply of products mainly
corn--indispensable for the safe survival of the
community. The remaining range of trading and
manufacturing activities was basically left uncontrolled.
It has been noted that the Greeks did not have a
precise awareness of economical processes and some of the
few resolutions taken at Athens in matter of foreign trade
often proved to be counter-productive. The very notion of
profit in terms of a systematic accumulation of capital
was developed in Athens just before the Hellenistic
period. Such a development was sharply criticized by both
Plato and Aristotle who saw in it the transition from the
homo politicus to the homo oeconomicus, or, in general, to
the "professional" who was to become one of the typical
figures of Hellenistic civilization.
However, this attitude about economic matters had
probably something to do with the notion of civic identity
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developed in the polis which at least in Athens rested
on the implicit assumption of the necessary role of metics
and slaves in trade and production. The analysis of
banking procedures of Classical Athens shows that there
was nothing capitalistic about trade. Harbours were busy,
but a large amount of the goods were in transit. What was
remarkable was the number rather than the value of
transactions. The Greek of the polis were more consumers
than producers, and in fact we cannot find evidences of
any accumulation of capital comparable to the ones of
ancient middle-eastern empires.
Hellenistic Egypt offers a totally different
landscape. The figure of the homo politicus never existed
there, and the Ptolemies had no interest in introducing
it. They instead concerned themselves in improving the
efficiency the old bureaucratic structure. The citizen did
not participate to the political life of state, whose
administration was instead totally managed by
professionals: from the strategoi (warfare specialists),
to the numerous engineers in charge of construction and
irrigation works, to the administrators of the royal
estates. The division of labour was articulated to the
point that certain jobs (like the peasant) became void of
any decisionality . He sown the quality and the quantity of
seed he was given but he was not even in charge of the
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field's irrigation, which was instead centrally managed by
2
an engineer .
Philadelphus the second of the
Ptolemies reformed the bureacratic structure of the state
and furtherly articulated the centralized control of the
economy, and introduced written administrative procedures
(entolai). The complexity of the cadaster and of the
land's management became impressive. Not only the land is
registered, but also how much seed was sown, how much
irrigation it got, how regular was the growth of the crops
at various periods, who was in charge of that parcel of
land in that season, etc. From the cadaster's data, the
annual amount of taxes (the so-called "role of
3
perception") was then computed.
From the records of a large estate we find that
also the planning of crops was centrally controlled. The
dioiketes Apollonius (ministry of finance of Ptolemy
Philadelphus) writes the oikomonos Zenon (manager of the
estate ) that :
the king has ordered us to sow the land twice.
As soon as you gather the crops, irrigate the soil
immediately by hand, or if that is impossible,
allow as many tollenos (shadoofs) as possible to
be operated and irrigate the land, but don't keep
the water on the fields longer than five days.
After irrigation sow the three-months wheat. Write
me when you have succeded in gathering the first
crops.
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The Ptolemies maintained alive, even though in a
more secular form, the ancient notion of maat which
legitimizes the absolute power of the king and of whom
received it from him . In fact, we find a dioiketes
saying to an oikonomos that: "No one has the right to do
what he wants, but all is regulated for the best."
which reminds of Weber's remarks about the notion of
identity in ancient Egypt. However, it is particularly
important to note the paradigmatic role of authority in
the ideology of the "managerial class". For instance it is
7
highly improbable that "the king has ordered"
Apollonius to "sow the land twice", but it is rather
Apollonius that takes the king into the picture as a
"postulate" to justify his decision, knowing that it will
be an effective move.
This and other analogous evidences suggest that
the mental framework peculiar to the social context who
supported the institutionalization of science in the
Hellenistic period was closer to the one of ancient Egypt
or Mesopotamia rather than to the one of the Greek polis.
This organization of economy together with the
Ptolemaic financial and monetary policy primarily
concerned with the accumulation of precious metals in the
Royal Bank, allowed for a concentration of funds and for
the possibility of patronage on a scale previously unknown
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to the Greeks.
However, it would probably be a mistake to take
the Museum to be a "research center" effectively engaged
with problems of relevance to the sponsor. On the
contrary, we can hardly think of it as a productive
investment. Nevertheless, the Museum's "enciclopaedic"
program reflected some of the features of the widespread
specialization and division of labour typical of
Hellenistic Egypt, or that the methodicity and
systematicity of Aristotle's program was perfectly fitting
that socio-political context.
Strabo says that:
The Mouseion is part of the royal quarter and
it has a cloister and an arcade and a large house
in which is provided the common meal of the men of
learning who share the Mouseion. And this
community has common funds, and a priest in charge
of the Mouseion, who was appointed previously by
the king but now by Caesar.
Therefore like its Greek models the Museum had a
legal status similar to a temple run by a brotherhood of
the muses and was endowed by royal funds which were
probably indipendently managed and free from taxation. The
Museum was a peculiar institution because of its
exceptional fundings, however, according to Rostovtzeff,
the tendency to form and support groups and collegiate
institutions was a typical feature of the Hellenistic
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culture. Professionalism, and the consequent
corporativism, was the common denominator among
associations of people working in the administration of
the state, in the army, in the navy, the other
associations of "technitai" (physicians, lawyers,
musicians, poets, etc.) and collegiate institutions like
9
the Museum. Even though Radet and Ramsay suggested
that the roots of these associations can be traced to the
pre-hellenistic guilds which developed in certain Greek
cities, it is evident that this tendency was particularly
enhanced by the presence of different ethnical communities
(politeumata ) in Alexandria (Egyptians, Jews, Greeks)
which naturally tended to maintain their cultural
identities (like the Greeks with the Gymnasia) and often
even their own laws and magistrates (as with the Jews).
This configuration was also particularly useful to the
Ptolemies because it led to a fragmentation of the social
body along professional and corporative lines, which
helped for its own political control by de-emphasizing
broader political concerns. This process both contributed
and reflected what Rostovtzeff calls the transition
between the Greek homo politicus to the Hellenistic homo
domesticus, oeconomicus, and technicus . The
orientation of religion, literature, and philosophy
reflected quite accurately this cultural and political
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change .
With the development of this pattern of
professional communities, which extends also within the
scientific environment, the notion of "paradigm" becomes
more visible. At this point a community of
scholars-scientists is not simply defined by its
intellectual orientation but also by it being supported
as a community by an institutionalized form of patronage.
However, the available historical evidences are too poor
to allow for an articulated analyis of the process of
institutionalization of scientific activity. For instance,
the information about the actual activity of the Museum
are so scarce that, except in few cases, we cannot
reconstruct what was the form of association between
numerous scholars and scientists like Euclid, Archimedes,
Erathostenes, Galen, Ptolemy, Hero, and Marinus, with the
Museum.
However even though on a smaller scale also the
other Hellenistic monarchies showed a similar attitude to
patronage and institutionalization of culture as confirmed
by abundant evidences of migrations of scholars. This
suggests that it is reasonable to talk about a wide-spread
hellenistic mentality, even in the intellectual domain.
The impact of the hellenistic emphasis on
systematicity can be easily found in
Hipparchus1
new
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quantitative astronomy, which focuses on different
problems and adopts different methods than Eudoxus'
pre-Hellenistic astronomy- Pliny points to the novelty of
Hipparchus'
enciclopaedic catalogation of stars by
stressing that:
he dared to do something that would be rash
even for a god, namely to number the stars for his
successors and to check off the constellations by
name .
Hipparchus' work incorporates also another concern
typical of hellenistic science, which is quantification .
Beside Neugebauer 's thesis about Hipparchus' development
of the astrolabe, there are reliable evidences that he
also introduced the dioptra and begun to take observations
which Ptolemy regarded as the first reliable ones in Greek
astronomy. His concern for the accuracy of the instruments
is not just the result of his interest in "keeping up with
technology" because, once we consider that the astronomers
before him were using the gnomon and the sundial, it
becomes evident that his work was establishing a totally
different approach to the study of astronomy.
The interest for quantification and prediction was
a minor one in Greek astronomy, as we have noticed by the
scarce precision of
Athens' calendar. This is also
confirmed by considering the form of explanation Eudoxus'
was seeking for with his sophisticated geometrical system
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for astronomy. A.Aaboe has noticed that his "hippopede"
introduced to account for the retrograde motion of the
planets was evidently only a nominal solution because the
motions of Venus and Mars were blatantly left unsolved. To
him, the evidence of this problem suggests something about
Eudoxus' real concerns. In fact:
I wish to emphasize this point strongly
because I believe it reveals that the purpose of
these models was to serve as a qualitative
description of planetary motion.
which is quite different from Hipparchus' concerns
because: "It appears that what Hipparchus was engaged in
was to adapt geometrical astronomical models of a certain
13
kind to new purposes." , and prediction was one of
these new purposes.
The origin of this new concern may be also
referred to the development of astrology in the
Hellenistic period, and in fact both Hipparchus and
Ptolemy wrote on the subject. However, this different
approach to the study of astronomy can be also referred to
1
other contextual influences.
Hellenistic astronomy is generally considered to
be the evolution of the circular-motion paradigm
introduced by Plato's school, but it also entails a
strong, even though less visible, feature of Babylonian
astronomy. In fact, the interest in systematic stars'
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cataloging and of astronomical forecast was also developed
out of the importation of data (and attitudes) of
Babylonian astronomy during the Hellenistic period. This
incorporation is not causal, but it reflects a certain
congruence between the Babylonian and Hellenistic
approaches to the systematic study of natural phenomena,
which in turn refers to the similarly instutionalized
status of the scientific communities in those two
contexts.
Another example of the impact of the "Hellenistic
paradigm"
can be found in the study of geography.
Hipparchus and Ptolemy did not share only the
interest in astronomy and astrology, but also in
mathematical geography. The introduction of mathematical
geography and its clear differentiation from chorography
(historical-ethnographical geography) as emphasized by
Ptolemy in his Geography points directly to the fact that
also the description of space is becoming systematic. It
is not only in the use and in the concerns behind
geographical studies (commerce, warfare, state
administration), but also in their
"form" that we can
recognize the Hellenistic paradigm. Geography became a
syntax of space, a form of geometrical projection of the
earth on a plane, an accurate and reliable (bureacratic )
procedure. In fact as ptolemy himself indicated
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by following the method , you do not need to be an artist
to draw a map anymore :
Chorography needs an artist and no one
represents it rightly unless he is an artist.
Geography does not call for the same requirements,
as any one, by means of lines and plain notations
can fix positions and draw general outlines.
As a summary: the Hellenistic context in which the
notion of demonstration was articulated and included in
the method of physical science, was characterized by the
widespread development of professional communities and by
the institutionalization of science. Even though the
administrative structure of Hellenistic monarchies was not
very different from the ancient middle-eastern empires,
many of the communities within the social body could hold
different identities and interests. This because from the
clash of cultures which took place in the Hellenistic
period, the existence of an omni-comprehensive and
homogeneizing system of beliefs came to an end. The
weakening of a "state
paradigm" in a social structure
which unlike the one of Classical Greece was highly
bureaucratized , may have reinforced the role of
professional paradigms whose development could have been
facilitated by the presence of standardized and systematic
operational procedures typical of a bureaucratic
environment. The concept of demonstration and its need for
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a commonly shared set of initial assumptions, found the
proper context for its full articulation in the structure
of the professional communities. It is this same context
which supported the enciclopaedic attitude found in
Hipparchus'
work, in Euclid's Elements and Optics , or in
Ptolemy's Almagest , Optics ,and Geographia .
2 - Deduction, demonstration, and geometry
The earliest form of deductive reasoning in Greek
philosophy is generally attributed to Parmenides. His
arguments move from drastic assumptions about the being or
not being of certain items and are then deductively
propagated. The "demonstration" is generally obtained in a
negative from, which is, by showing that a certain
reasoning brings to a contradiction of the fundamental
assumptions and consequently its complementary is taken to
be true. Zeno and Melissus developed this for of reasoning
into the well-known paradoxes whose avoidance played a
relevant role in the development of later Greek
philosophy. Those paradoxes indicated that the definitions
of the premisses of the
"language-game"
were essential for
the construction of a formally correct reasoning and at
the same time they also showed that a correct reasoning
could also be content-free (or content-less).
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The impact of these experiences is also found in
the work of Aristotle who (even though concerned in
empirical research) defined certain concepts of his (like
space) precisely not to be caught in Eleatic-style
paradoxes. This concern for formal coherence sometimes
took him to conceive "explanations" that were nominal and
with scarce empirical content.
The difficulties about the distinction between
correct, effective, and convincing reasoning were well
known to the Greeks, and became more so with the full
development of rhetoric in the mid-fourth century BC.
However, this awareness took different shapes and focused
on different aspects of the chain of reasoning. Archimedes
felt the need for a precise legitimization of his results
by a deductive demonstration, but he also realized the
limits of formal reasoning as an heuristic tool. In his
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famous letter to Erathostenes he claims that he
often developed his conclusions by using mechanical
analogies (he actually
"constructed" his theories) and
that only later he proved them geometrically.
The application of a geometrical model to physical
problems, as in
Archimedes' work on statics, Euclid's
Optics , and Ptolemaic astronomy, tries to transfer the
accuracy of an axiomatic deductive reasoning to the
analysis of natural phenomena, but it also adds further
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problems. Beside the difficulties for the identification
of the initial assumptions, it is also presented the
problem of the introduction of the correspondence rules
between the abstract geometrical model and the actual but
geometrized process. However, it is exactly the
introduction of a precise form of modelization what
developed the awareness of the problem of the
correspondence rules. This was clearly recognized by
Aristotle who claimed that not all the initial assumptions
can be referred to the "genus" of the subject-matter, but
some of them, like the notion of geometrical point and
line are "external" to that genus. In other terms the
model is not the thing represented by that model.
Evidently the two problems of the production of
axioms (both objects and rules) and the indication of the
correspondence rules are closely related in several ways.
From the consideration of the historical development of
geometrical optics, we see that at first there is a
tendency of the axiomatic model to suggest strongly a
certain modelization of the physical phenomena (in
Euclid's Optics , what is
"saved" is the model rather than
the phenomena), then , with the further articulation of
the explanation of the phenomenon, a modification (either
explicit or implicit) of the initial assumptions takes
place. The empirical content of the explanation is
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sometimes found in terms of "pressure" on the
correspondence rules, which may then trigger a revision of
the premisses of the model. The history of axiomatic
geometry before and after Euclid suggests that there are
quite relevant variations in the level of accepted
implicitness in the workings of the axiomatic structure.
However, such implicitness does not necessarily means
"richness of content" for, instead, it could be caused by
lack of articulation of the process. The determination of
the border between the two is extremely complex, and a
formal approach needs to be integrated with a historical
analysis of the content and structure of the common sense
of that community.
The evidences of the historical evolution of the
notion of demonstration within Greek thought indicate that
there was quite a wide spread concern for the
determination of the foundation of demonstrative
reasoning, but that the the solutions proposed at
different times were quite different and probably even
incommensurable. Even the reliability of geometrical
demonstrations was not a given. In fact Plato in the
Phaedo has Simmias to say that:
I am well aware that accounts that base their
proofs on what is probable are impostors: unless
one is on one's guard against them, they deceive
one very badly, in geometry and in everything
else .
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instance the one of Prop.l) cannot be understood by
referring to the initial assumptions, but it rather needs
to be inserted into a "narrative" which includes explicit
but "unofficial" psychological, physical, and
u T 1 t ,50physiological elements
Another important case of ambiguous interaction
between geometrical and psychological notions can be found
in Definition 4 where he claims that "Things seen under a
larger angle appear larger, under a smaller angle appear
smaller, and under equal angles appear equal". This
definition became the subject-matter of frequent arguments
up to Kepler; Al-Kindi tried to prove it while other
authors thought of it as either unclear or imcomplete.
From a geometrical point of view, its status is unclear
because it takes in considerations angles but not
distances. It does not tell us how to understand whether
we are looking at a large but distant object or a small
but near one. Evidently it implies the presence of some
kind of process of recognition of psychological nature. In
fact if we can recognize what we are looking at, we can
also figure out its distance because we already know its
size. Instead, if we are not familiar with that object we
need at least to recognize something around it, so that we
can compute its proper size by considering its spatial
relationships with the other object we already know.
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Moreover, the term of reference for the
computation of distance out of angles, does not need to be
recognized as an item which is contemplated among the
initials assumptions. On the contrary it could be any kind
of
"accident"
which happens to be out there, suggetsing
that the application of the axiomatic model depends upon
some "splinter of content" which cannot be formalized
within it.
The problem of the angle-to-distance relationship
entailed by the fourth definition has been crucial to all
theories and practices in which the definition of the
scale was a relevant but difficult matter. We already
pointed at
Thales' need for the third point to be able to
use his method of remote sensing, but the more difficult
problems in computing distances out of angle were met in
astronomy where the scarce familiarity with the observed
objects was emphasizing the problems entailed by the
fourth axiom. In fact it is Copernicus who suggests how
the beliefs about what is observed may influence
considerably how distances are computed through Euclid's
theory -
No one doubts that the sphere of the fixed
stars is the most distant of the visible things.
As for the order of the planets, the early
Philosophers wished to determine it from the
magnitude of their revolutions. They adduce the
fact that of objects objects moving with equal
speed, those farther distant seem to move more
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slowly (as is proved in Euclid's Optics ). They
think that the moon describes her oath in the
shortest time because, being nearest to the Earth,
she revolves in the smallest circle. Farthest they
place Saturn, who in the longest time describes
the greatest circuit.
Here Copernicus is referring to Proposition 57
which is proved through Definition 4, and suggests that
both the application of such a proposition and the
acceptance of its results is based on the assumption that
those objects are "moving with equal speed". In other
terms, the scale is defined by
"recognizing" the uniform
motion of the planets.
Another difficulty in the application of
Definition 4 can be found in the writing of the
Renaissance's architects who were trying to map the space
over a plane with a system of perspective which could
entail the computation of scale.
However, the limitations of Euclid's theory need
to be checked against its aims. If we consider the content
of the 61 propositions, it emerges that his primary
concern is in matching the geometrical relations of
objects as perceived with the same relations among the
same objects in the physical world, and in doing so he
touches on perceptual illusions or idiosyncrasies (an
interest shared by many Hellenistic authors) like for
instance the case of parallel lines which are instead
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perceived as converging at the infinite. Nevertheless, he
is not concerned in what these objects are about or how
they behave, but rather with their stereometric
properties, in how these objects occupy and are placed in
space (as we can see from his interest in binocular or
stereoscopic vision).
Most of the propositions included in the Optics
are problemata rather than theoremata, but with different
degrees of generality- Some of them generally the initial
ones are almost theorems of vision, while others are the
evident formalization of actual problems of the surveying
practice, like Propositions 19-20-21-22, in which he
articulates
Thales' methods of measurement at distance. It
is precisely the heterogeneous nature of the material
included in the propositions what suggests that the Optics
does for the application of geometry to problems of
measurement at distance what the Elements does for
geometry and arithmetic, which is, that it reorganizes
older and newer results of much different origin by trying
to integrate them into a model which tries to be
axiomatic.
In the same way the axiomatic lacunae of the
Elements were neutralized once in the context of the
"straightedge and compass paradigm",
the various ambiguities found in the Optics need to be
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checked not against the older Greek theories of vision,
but rather against the professional paradigm of the
technical astronomers and land surveyors. The practice,
the problems, and the procedures developed around the use
of the gnomon, the sundial, the mekhet and the dioptra was
the "peg and rope" of the Optics .
Therefore, the application of a deductive model to
physical and psychological process makes the
identification of the axioms more complex. The increased
difficulties are not just a function of the number of
items which are described and included in the initial
assumptions, but rather of their content and qualities .
These problems result in an emphasis on the role
of a kind of tacit knowledge which is developed by the
members of the community not just by reading the axioms
and
"understanding" them, but rather by going through a
long process of training in which the use of instruments
and the belief in the
"truthfulness"
of their output play
a relevant role.
5 - Ptolemy: optics and astronomical observations
Ptolemy's work in optics offers a case study for
tracing the historical
modification of a theory once it is
transfered between two different professional communities.
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We will try to follow this process by considering certain
differences between Euclid and Ptolemy's theory of vision,
and by referring them back to the differences between the
geometer and the astronomer's paradigms.
Ptolemy's Optics has reached us only in an
incomplete and often unsatisfactory late twelfth century
Latin translation from the Arab by Eugene of Sicily. The
first book which introduced the axioms and dealt with the
difference between light and visual rays is now lost, but
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it has been partially reconstructed by A.Lejeune
from the remaining text and from later sources. The second
book deals with monocular and binocular vision, the third
and fourth with reflection, and the fifth with refraction.
Lejeune excludes any doubt about the authorship of the
work.
Because of his professional concern in astronomy,
Ptolemy could not deal with the process of vision just on
theoretical terms, as Plato and Aristotle had done before
him, nor he could just
"geometrize" it leaving most of the
content out, as Euclid had done. Instead, he needed to
rely on a theory of visual perception which could account
for the content of a wide range of experiences, supplying
him with a tool to evaluate astronomical observations. In
fact with the exception of
Archimedes' brief remarks
53
about the problems in using the dioptra Ptolemy's
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work in optics represents the first example of a
scientist's systematic concern with the evaluation and
criticism of the limits of his method of observation.
He accepts Euclid's basic framework, but tries to
articulated it into a more complex theory of vision which
is, at least nominally, placed in the broader context of
the whole system of perception. He looks back at the
Aristotelean notion of sense-specificity and, after having
considered that different senses responds to different
qualities of the objects, he recognizes that a global
perception can take place only through the mediation of
different sense reports mediated by common sense. This
re-evaluation of common sense is symptomatic of an
empirical paradigm as the one of the astronomer, and it
also shows an attempt to find a coherent explanations to a
series of perceptual experiences which cannot be accounted
for by a geometrical model.
He considers the problem of sense-specificity
trying also to identify the object of the process of
vision. He is not satisfied with Euclid's assumption that
the eye is directly sensitive to angles and lines and he
tries to identify what is that which behaves as a
geometrical line and can be perceived through vision.
He assumes color and not spatial relations to be
the object of vision. Space is not a primary quality of
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the object, but it is rather perceived as the "form" of
color. He is professionally commited to the stereometric
investigation of space, but his space is not populated by
empty solids like Plato's. To him, color is not created by
light or by our sense of vision, but it is an objective
quality of the objects. He tries to demonstrate it with an
argument ad absurdum: if colour was created by light it
means that an object placed in a fixed position in
relation to a light source would always maintain the same
color, but the change of color of the camaleon or of
somebody's face proves the contrary.
This concept of color is also what allows him to
establish a relation between the visual ray and light
(again along aristotelean lines). He probably already
knows that light and visual rays have the same geometrical
behavior out of his professional use of the dioptra. He
probably noticed that both light and visual rays pass
through its pinnholes with a similar pattern of behavior,
however, he does not take this to mean that they are the
same "thing". This because, being aware of the uneveness
of the visual field, he cannot identify light with the
visual rays. He separates the two as:
quo [visus et^lumen] differunt in virtutibus
et motibus eorum
but if we read (with Lejeune) "virtutibus" as
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referring to potentiality and "motibus" as referring to a
passage to actuality , we see that Ptolemy does not relate
them by means of sympathy (as in Empedocles or Plato), but
rather by an Aristotelean matter-form relationship.
Lejeune introduces Ptolemy's notion of the relationship
between color and light as:
Ce son deux especes d'un meme genre: le
lumineux. Au contact la lumiere se coleur et le
coleur s'illumine. L'une passe a l'espece de
1 'autre et reciproquement.
And Ptolemy presents the differences and
affinities between light and visual rays in a very similar
way:
comm
"ut [visus ey lumen J sibi
communicent"
, or
unicat sibi
ipsi"
which Lejeune paraphrases as:
La lumiere se communique en quelque sorte a
elle-meme, pusque5le coleur n'est qu'une autre
sort de lumineux.
Therefore the potentiality-actuality relationship
formerly applied to color and light is now extended
(somehow more sympathetically) to light and visual ray.
The three fundamental objects of vision; light, visual
ray, and color are mutually and homogeneously related.
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They are all aspects of the luminous which reminds
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of Aristotle's relation between light and the actuality of
the transparent, and of the stoics' pneuma . The
relationship Ptolemy sets up among these objects may be
correctly criticized because of its nominality, however it
allows him to recognize the difference between light and
visual ray and at the same time to apply the same
geometrical model to both of them because of their common
mode of propagation.
The emphasis on light and color brings him to
assume that different degrees of illumination correspond
to different degrees of visibility . From this
consideration, he develops a notion of visual ray quite
different from Euclid's. If the latter thought that
clarity of vision was proportional to the number of
discrete rays which reached the object, and that there
could be no visual sensation if the object was small
enough to fall between two visual rays, Ptolemy instead
introduces a concept of a continuous flux of visual rays
which could not be separated by each other. With this
hypothesis he avoids one of the geometrical incongruences
of Euclid's, and also introduces perceptual content in the
geometrical description of vision.
The limits of perception are not determined by a
geometrical "gap", but by a treshold of perceptual
sensitivity which even though reached when the angle of
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vision becomes extremely small it is also dependent upon
other non-geometrical factors. Here we may detect the
influence of the astronomical paradigm.
Ptolemy was well aware of the problems created by
atmospheric refraction, and in fact we do not find in the
Almagest instances of crucial astronomical observations
taken when the celestial bodies were close to the
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horizon refraction. He was also well aware of the
apparent "pulsing" of the luminosity of stars, and
therefore he could not believe that visibility was just a
matter of minimum angle. In the Almagest probably after
having considered the psychological and physiological
effect of stress on the astronomer's concentration after a
long program of observations he also expresses doubts
about the constancy of the performance of eye-sight
It is from the awareness of this range of problems that he
tried to investigate the mutual relation of the medium and
the physiology and psychology of vision around a
geometrical model.
/-
1
We know from Damianus that Ptolemy did not
accept the rectilinear propagation of light or visual ray
as a postulate, but proved it with an instrument whose
description reminds quite precisely of the dioptra'. With
this physicist-like approach, Ptolemy assumed that it is
not sufficient for the object to be connected graphically
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to the eye with geometrical a line to produce visual
sensation, but the visual ray need to touch upon and to be
stopped by the object.
The awareness of the effects of refraction
together with his notion of different degrees of
visibility, makes him to consider the role of the medium
placed between the eye and the object. He talks quite
precisely about "accumulatio and congregatio
[radiorum]"
, which does not mean as in
Democritus that visual rays tend to maintain their
structure because of some natural tendency (like the
pebbles on the shore), but rather that they are initially
denser and that later they get confused and
dispersed by the interaction with the medium. The process
is mechanical rather than vitalistic. Ptolemy's visual
rays are quite close to force-vector or projectiles and do
not resemble at all Plato or
Empedocles' "tentacular"
visual fire.
The interesting difference of his position from
the older ones is the much increased number of descrivable
causes which visibility can be referred to. In order we
find: illumination, the refraction in the medium, the
threshold of perceptual sensitivity, and, finally, the
position of the object within the visual field.
It is from the analysis of the uneveness of the
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clarity of vision over its field that Ptolemy introduces
another important improvement upon Euclid. In fact he
assumes that because of the diffusion of visual rays
through the medium and because of their pattern of
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propagation, the visual cone has not an uniform
behavior, but a priviledged direction, which is the one of
its axis. The rays far away from the axis are
"debilitated"65.
This conclusion allows him to improve also on
geometrical grounds. Euclid did not give any precise
referent for judgements such as "high", "low", "left", or
"right"
rays under which the object was perceived, because
the cone was not considered as having any specific
orientation. Differently, with Ptolemy, the axis of the
cone is the referent for all the other angular
measurements. His description of the process can be
paraphrased as:
The visual cone perceives the position of the
object in terms of the position of its vertex and
axis, and through the angular distances (relatives
to both the vertex and the axis) begween all the
rays which impinge upon the object.
Which is quite more precise than Euclid's "Things seen
67
under higher rays appear
higher."
It is interesting to note that it is precisely the
consideration of physiological issues like the uneveness
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of the visual field what takes him to improve on the
geometrical aspects of the theory; and that it is the
analysis of physical problems such as the difference
between light and visual ray, or the study of the
propagation of light and its interaction with the medium,
what allows him to improve on Euclid's axiomatic structure
by showing that certain postulates were not such, and that
other definitions were far from clear.
The other significant difference between Euclid
and Ptolemy is about the perception of distance. The
psychological content implicitly entailed by Euclid's
fourth definition ("things which are seen under a larger
angle appear larger...") is explicitely admitted by
Ptolemy (probably out of his awareness of the problematic
evaluation of astronomical distances).
The problem is originated by the fact that the eye
can tell the angle under which an object is perceived but
not the lenght of the visual ray which touches it. Ptolemy
admits that the determination of the distance is a matter
of judgement rather than proof, but he tries to show that
the subjective component inherent to such a process is
mediated by common sense. In fact, an object can be
perceived also by the other senses, and the different
sensations are then organized (in an Aristotelean fashion)
bv common sense, which finally determines the spatial
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position of the object. He is clear about the fact that
there is some active process of adjustement which develops
out of experience ("ex consuetudine fit") like the one
which allows for the perception of moving objects. The
role of this process of adjustement becomes particularly
important in mediating the apparent displacement of
objects in space as produced by binocular vision.
Ptolemy is professionally concerned with the
problem of the perception of distance, and his theory of
the axis of the visual cone makes him even more aware of
it. In Euclid's case, the determination of the object in
space was done through the perception of its contour,
however, being no priviledged direction of visual rays,
there was no system of reference upon which to take
angular distances which could yeld information about the
surface relief of such an object. Instead Ptolemy realizes
that by means of the binocular parallax he could find the
"triangulum distantiae
mensorium"
, but he does not
articulate the point satisfactorily probably also because
the amount of that parallax is insignificant for the
solution of his problems, which is, the determination of
astronomical distances. In fact he treats the problem of
the insufficient amount of binocular parallax as another
instance of scarce perceptual sensitivity which falls
below the treshold of the minima sensibilia
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His examples are evidently drawn from the problems
of his profession: equal but very small angles can be
taken to be different, and different angles can be taken
to be equivalent; or that under very small angles the
perception of relief disappears and we see the moon and
the sun as flat disks even though they have a convex
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surface . These considerations of observations under
minimal angles suggests that he could not have believed
the sphere of the fixed stars to have an uniform diameter,
but that it was perceived as such through an illusion of
visual perception-
Other considerations about the relationship
between observed angles and distances are found in the
Almagest where he stresses that an intrinsically difficult
problem like the evaluation of distance from angle can be
made even more critical by the effect of refraction:
..the same angular distances appear greater to
the eye near the horizon, and less near the
zenith, and so for this reason it is clear that
they can be measured sometimes as greater and
sometimes7as less than the real angular
distance .
Moreover planets cannot be perceived by means of
other senses but vision, therefore the evaluation of
distance relies on a form of common sense which is not of
"sensorial" but rather theory-related. The earlier quote
from Copernicus is a good example of the problems which
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If geometry does not move from "sound"
assumptions, it may easily become a sophisticated form of
deceptive reasoning under the appearance of "scientific"
reliability.
The point here is not the consideration of
"deception through geometry", but rather to suggest that
the reliability of deductive reasoning needs to be
considered in its historical development and not through
modernizing eyeglasses. In fact the same role of Euclid's
Elements has often been de-contextualized while looking
for a historical watershed between pre-rational and
rational thought. More recent works have instead tried to
approach Euclid's notion of deductive reasoning within its
own historical development.
For instance G.E. R.Lloyd suggests that:
..his Elements are not merely an axiomatic,
but also an explicitly hypothetical system, in
this sense at least that it was one was one based
on postulates and common opinions which include
propositions that he must have known to have been
questioned7or denied by other Greek
thinkers.
A.Seidenberg while analysing the structure of the
Elements claims that:
If Book I was supposed to have been founded
axiomatically, we can only conclude that this was
mostly ineptly done. On the other hand, it is
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clear that the Book itself is masterfully
conceived. The author, beginning with Proposition
1, wastes no words, goes directly to his goal,
keeps to essentials, and does not allow himself to
get sidetracked.
I.Mueller compares the modern axiomatic method as
proposed in Hilbert's Grundlagen with the structure of
Euclid's Elements disseminated with implicit assumptions
and, after having introduced the structural interpretation
of modern geometry, says:
I will be contrasting the Greek use of the
axiomatic method with the modern one and arguing
that Greek mathematics, should not be interpreted
in terms of structure.
It is now important to consider more in detail the
historical development of axiomatic method before Euclid.
3 - Plato, Aristotle, and Euclid
Even though we find the first instance of
deductive reasoning in Parmenides, the concern for the
identification of the reliable premises for that kind of
reasoning can be considered to be both a direct result and
a reaction to the development of the "art of
speaking"
which developed particularly in fifth-century Athens.
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Aristotle says that rhetoric was primarily
focusing on the production of correct and convincing
speeches in law-courts, public assemblies and ceremonies.
However, it is probable that debates occurred also in many
other contexts, and that this resulted in a generalized
21
criticism of traditional values
Even though Plato's criticism of the
rhetoreticians, and of the Sophists in particular, seems
to be misrepresentative of their thought and concerns, it
is evident that there was quite a production of convincing
rather than correct arguments within the political and
social activities of the polis. From here the
(problematic) concern to draw a line between the probable
and the true, and for the transformation of the art of
speaking into a method of reasoning.
In the Republic Plato opposes dialectic to
rhetoric, the first looks for truth the second for
victory. The dialectician needs to manage the dialogue
properly, he needs to answer the questions clearly and to
the point, and cannot ask questions which implicitly
suggest the answer. By being "synoptic", which is by being
able to relate similarities and differences between the
arguments developed in the dialogue, the dialectician may
get to the recognize
"idea" which entails the explanation
of the matter dealt with. Plato does not think of the
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axiomatic method to be the best remedy against the
unrigorous reasoning of the rhetoreticians. However, he
admits its consistency:
You are aware that students of geometry,
arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the
odd and the even and the figures and three kinds
of angles and the like in their several branches
of science; these are their hypotheses, which they
and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore
they do not deign to give any account of them
either to themselves or others; but they begin
with them, and go on until they arrive at last,
and in a consistent manner, at their
conclusions?
He compares the axiomatic method with the one of
the dialectician which leads to:
that other sort of knowledge which reason
herself attains by the power of dialectic; using
the hypotheses not as first principles, but only
as hypotheses that is to say, as steps and points
of departure into a world which is above
hypotheses, in order that she may soar^eyond them
to the first principle of the whole...
To him, the axioms are only the beginning and not
the justification of the rest of the reasoning. If the
dialectician is able to grasp the idea, he will also find
the explanation of his own initial hypotheses, which
instead Aristotle takes to be undemonstrable . From this
difference between the axiomatic and dialectic method
Plato draws the conclusion that:
..the habit which is concerned with geometry
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and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would
term understanding and not reason, as being
intermediate between opinion and reason.
Aristotle instead approaches the problem with a
quite different attitude. He is primarily concerned in
identifying a set of hypotheses which can be assumed
without demonstration and from which a deductive chain of
reasoning can be later developed.
The different attitudes of Plato and Aristotle
about the status of these hypotheses can evidently be
traced back to their theories of knowledge. Plato does not
take common sense to have any serious cognitive content,
therefore he cannot admit the reliability of hypotheses
which are inductively developed out of common sense. As
indicated from the passages of the Republic , his notion
of demonstration is not conceived as the construction of a
deductive argument, but rather as a leap into the realm of
ideas from a set of considerations "sinoptically "
organized. To him there cannot be any fixed notion except
the ideas.
Aristotle instead has a different consideration of
common sense and therefore tries to build on it.
He draws a clear distinction between demonstration
25
and dialectics in his Topics where he says that the
demonstrative syllogism is based on true premises, while
the dialectical syllogism moves from generally accepted
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notions. The crucial and much criticized aspect of
Aristotle's method of deductive reasoning as articulated
in the Prior and Posterior Analytics is precisely the
identification of the true premises of deduction. In a
more or less explicit way he proposes two methods. The
first one moves from perception. As we read in the last
chapter of the Posterior Analytics :
Now we have said earlier that it is not
possible to understand through demonstration if we
are not aware of the primitive, immediate,
principles. But as to knowledge of the immediates,
one might puzzle both whether it is the same or
not the same whether there is or it is not
understanding of each, or rather understanding of
the one and some other kind of thing of the
other and also whether the states are not present
in us but come about with us, or whether they are
present in us but they escape notice.
Well, if we have them, it is absurd; for it
results that we have pieces of knowledge more
certain than demonstrationand yet this escapes
notice. But if we get them without having them
earlier, how might we become familiar with them
and learn them from no pre-existing knowledge? For
that is impossible, as we have said in the case of
demonstration too. It is evidently impossible,
then, both for us to have them to come about in us
when we are ignorant and have no such a state at
all. Necessarily, therefore, we have some capacity
, but do not have one of a type which will be^-more
valuable than these in respect of certainty.
Interestingly enough, we find again the notion of
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capacity which we already encountered at the basis
of Aristotle's theory of vision in the form of a faculty
or energeia; as an already perfect potentiality which
could account for perception without requiring any
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movement or physical modification of the organ of sense.
In fact he continues as:
And this evidently belongs to all animals; for
they have a connate judgemental capacity, which is
called perception. And if perception is present in
them, in some animals retention of the precept
comes about, in others it does not come about. Now
for those in which it does not come about, either
wholly or with regard to that for which
[retention] does not come about in them, there is
no knowledge outside perceiving; but for some
perceivers, it is possible to grasp it in their
minds. And when many such things have come about,
then a difference comes about, so that some come
to have an account from the retention of such
things, and others do not.
So from perception there comes memory, as we
call it, and from memory experience; for memories
that are many in number form a single experience.
And from experience, or from the whole universal
that has come to rest in the mind [there comes] a
principle of skill and understanding.
It is that notion of common sense we already found
as the agent of coordination of the inputs of the
different senses what gathers the several perceptions of
the same category in a cluster from which (in time) the
universal emerges
not as something different but as something of the same kin
d but stronger . In fact:
..as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one
man makes a stand another does and then another,
until a position of strenght is reached. And' the
mind is such as to be capable of undergoing
this.
He then extends this process of clustering and
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reinforcement to induction . In this way he is able to
offer an explanation of the inductive process which
produces universals out of particulars without admitting
any leap or discontinuity in kind between the input and
the output. This also rests on his initial assumption
about the faculty of the senses as an already perfected
potentiality- In fact, this faculty is innately able to
"see"
universals and to produce perceptions which are weak
(but not approximated) copies of them. In fact:
..there is a primitive universal in the mind
(for though one perceives the particular,
perception is of the universal e.g. of man but
not of Callias the man); again a stand is made in
these, until what has no parts and is universal
stands e.g. such and such animal [stands], until
animal does, and this [a stand is made] in the
same way. Thus it is clear that it is necessary to
us to become familiar with the primitives by
induction; for perception too instils the
universals in this way.
Plato's leap in the quality of knowledge between
opinion and truth is replaced by Aristotle with an
addition in time of "quantities" of the same kind of
knowledge. It is through this form of additive induction
that we develop some of the correct premises for deductive
reasoning .
However, not all the sciences move from the same
initial hypotheses, even though they share a basic core of
them. The identification of the additive hypotheses of the
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particular sciences develops from a critical analysis of
the generally accepted opinions about that science. As he
31
says in the Topics , it is in this process that the
importance of the form of dialectical reasoning become
evident. It is this second range of hypotheses to
introduce the paradigmatic components of the process of
demonstration .
Aristotle identifies the three kinds of initial
assumptions as definitions , axioms , and postulates
32
, which are then adopted with some modification by
Euclid in his Elements as definitions , postulates , and
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common opinions . The interpretation of these
differences is of crucial importance, but unfortunately it
is made problematic by the lack of evidence about Euclid's
direct opinions about them.
Aristotle's axioms and Euclid's common notions
include self-evident truths like "if equals are subtracted
from equals the remainder is equal", which apply to most
sciences. There are then other principles which have the
status of an axiom which are peculiar to the
subject-matter ("genus") of a particular science:
By first principles in each genus I mean those
those the truth of which is not possible to prove.
What is denoted by the first [terms] and those
derived from them is assumed; but as regard to the
existence , this must be assumed for the
principles but proved for the rest. Thus what a
unit is, what the stright [line] is, or what a
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triangle is [must be assumed]; and the existence
of the unit and of magnitude-must also be assumed,
but the rest must be proved.
Here Aristotle draws a difficult distinction
between certain characteristics of the genus which are
included among the definitions. Some of them describe a
thing while others imply that the thing described is
actually existing. To "be such and such" and to "exist"
mean something different, and in fact Euclid treats the
first as a definition and the second as a postulate, but
not as a common notion. This because the actual existence
of a geometrical line is not so as self-evident as the
fact that if equal are subtracted from the remainder is
again equal. Postulates are in a sense more artificial
that common notions but they are nevertheless necessary.
The nature of this necessity will be clearer later.
Not all the initial assumptions fit commonsense
with the same easiness, and it is not clear whether or not
they can all be derived inductively or dialectically from
it. The problem becomes more evident when Aristotle
introduces the difference between hypothesis and
postulate, because in this case he distinguishes between
assumptions grounded in common sense and others accepted
through the respect for the teacher's authority. In fact:
Now anything that the teacher assumes, though
it is a matter of proof, without proving it
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himself, is a hypothesis if the thing assumed is
believed by the learner, and it is moreover a
hypothesis, not absolutely but relatively to the
particular pupil; but if the same thing is assumed
when the learner either has no opinion on the
subject or3^s of contrary opionion, it is a
postulate .
Aristotle by saying that the assumption the pupil
accepts under the authority of the teacher is "matter of
demonstration" tries to avoid the charge of arbitrariness
in the choice of the initial assumptions, but he does not
really show how all these items external to common sense
can actually be "matter of demonstration". This point can
be better understood by considering again the difference
between "being something" and "existing" as introduced by
Aristotle and adopted by Euclid in dealing with
definitions.
Aristotle says that definitions are self-evident
characteristics of the subject matter of a particular
science, like for instance line and point in the case of
geometry. By saying that the definition of a thing does
not imply its existence, he tries to draw a line between
mental and external items, a distinction confirmed by his
assumption that not all speeches are hypotheses about
something real. However,
demonstration needs a "medium"
because something needs to be written or drawn to be
proved. This probably does not apply to modern mathematics
but it surely does to Euclid's Elements and Optics where.
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as recently noted by Mueller and Theisen , the
"recognition"
of the validity of the proof is often
closely related to the contextualized reading of the
figures. Aristotle tries to minimize this "realism" of the
demonstration by de-emphasizing the actual importance of
the drawing and saying that:
..the geometer does not conclude anything from
there being this line which he himself has
described , but [from] _ft
what is made clear through them .
But even though the demonstration lies not in the
pattern of lines on the paper but in the correspondent
mental process, such a figure remains necessary. From here
he is obbliged to assume that the definitions of certain
items such as line, points etc. are different from the
other nominal ones, because they do not just say what a
certain item is about but that it also exists . In other
terms, by the fact that the notion of demonstration is
developed accordingly to Aristotle's teleological concept
relating items to their real causes, it takes the shape of
a genealogical tree, or rather a particular branch of the
genus of the subject matter.
The demonstration is a shift from the potentiality
to the actuality of a geometrical figure and of the
concept it refers to. It is the actual construction
(synthesis) of a branch of geometry, therefore he needs
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not only to describe the "bricks" for that construction,
but also to postulate their actual existence. This same
concern is found in Euclid who first introduces the line
and the point among the definitions, and then he also
postulates the possibility of actually drawing those
figures, so to be able to build up the demonstration.
The problem is to understand where the nominal
definitions come from, or how somebody may develop them.
In Aristotle they have a limbo-like status, for they gain
actual existence only once inserted into the synthetic
genealogical tree of demonstration. As Trendelenburg says:
The nominal definitions of geometry have only
a provisional significance and are superseded as
soon as they are made genetic by means of
construction
This situation seems to point back at the
implications of Archimedes' method, whic maintained that
things are first understood in reality by means of some
kind of analogy, and are then formally proved with a
geometrical demonstration. This suggests that Aristotle's
definitions are real items which have been found,
embalmed, and then shelved, waiting to be revived by the
process of demonstration. They are nominalized rather than
nominal .
This ambiguous distinction between nominal and
real definition probably refers to the more general
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problem of Aristotelean philosophy about the real or
nominal status of the universals, and points once again to
the difficulties pertaining the formation of concepts out
of perception and experience.
The structure of Euclid's Elements has been found
to be quite different from modern axiomatic geometry, and
one of the main difference is the relevant "structural"
role played in the first by the notion of construction.
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A.Seidenberg suggested that the process
which led to the identification of some of Euclid's
postulates was not an abstract induction from a number of
perceptions, but rather the use of peg and cord for the
solution of geometrical problems. Seidenberg grounds his
hypothesis on the consideration that several ancient
sources refer to the early use of geometry in the
measurents necessary for the construction of temples and
altars. Such a measurement was a ritual itself and the peg
and ropes used for that were
"official" instruments. But
whether the first task of the geometer was the outlining
of a temple's area or the delimitation of a field, it is
quite probable (and I think confirmed by the very
structure of the Elements ), that it was the use of peg
and cord that defined the range of possible constructions
and therefore of demonstrations. Peg and cord were part of
the "exemplar".
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It is also clear that it was the set of implicit
assumptions developed from the paradigmatic use of these
instruments that filled the many lacunae of the axiomatic
structure of the Elements . In fact, once you know that
certain transformations can be done only in the way your
(and the all community's) instruments allow you to, there
is no need to describe how these transformation should be
carried on. In fact Mueller has noted that:
The emphasis on construction in Greek geometry
is connected with the absence of absolute
existence assertions like the second part of
Hilbert's axiom 1,3 which asserts the existence of
three non collinear points. In the geometry of the
Elements the existence of one object is always
inferred from the existence of another by means of
a construction.
In other terms Euclid's notion of existence of
geometrical objects is analogous to the possibility of
their construction with straightedge and compass.
Going back to the problem of the initial
assumptions, these last consideration point to the fact
that the use of an instrument for the solution of a
problem is what mediates the process of abstraction which
leads to the generalization of that problem. In other
terms the notion of abstraction seems to be also a
specialized form of experience mediated by the instrument
used in that experience. The instrument being closely
connected with the problem faced with it becomes part of
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the exemplar, similarly to the use of lists in Babylonian
astronomy, or to Kepler's study of the camera obscura in
relation to his theory of vision.
The presence of a suddivision in Euclid's Elements
between theoremata and problemata (theorems and
problems), together with a scarce concern about the notion
of generalization could be related to the same reasons. In
fact the propositions end either with QED ("which was
required to be proved") or with QEF ("which was required
to be done") and it is probable going back to what we
have already considered about Babylonian and Egyptian
mathematics that the problemata were a form of proof
still closely related to the solution of a problem through
actual construction or drawing of the figure. What links
the problemata to the more abstract construction of the
theoremata, is still the emphasis on the procedure. In the
theoremata, the procedure follows the same rules but now
it "invents" figures rather than reproducing the schema of
a practical problem (it
"produces"
rather than
"re-produces"). It is the paradigmatic belief that the
procedure can be repeated, that the instrument can be
applied on and on to the same solution
of the same problem
that makes the consideration of
the problem of
generalization to be superfluous. The problem of
generalization becomes a problem of "computability
"
.
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Therefore the notion of demonstration is
paradigmatic but not arbitrary. It is a notion that cannot
be developed by an individual qua individual but qua
member of a professional community- This because the
process of demonstration does not need to be passively
"accepted" but it rather needs to be understood and then
performed through a precise professional training. The
institutionalization of science and the formation of
professional communities offered the proper context for
this development.
4 - Euclid's Optics
Euclid worked in Alexandria during the reign of
Ptolemy Soter (305-285 BC), and, even though he is
primarily known for his Elements , he also wrote on
astronomy, music, conies, optics and catoprics.
Unfortunately, most of these works are lost or available
only in recensions from other
authors.
T.L.Heath suggests that he studied geometry in
Athens with Plato's pupils, and it is probably there that
he became familiar with the earlier works in the elements
of geometry. Earlier
Elements are generally attributed to
Hippocrates of Chios (450?-400? BC ) and, in a much more
articulated form, to Theudius of Miletus, who wrote the
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geometrical textbook for Plato's Academy.
This may justify Proclus' claims that he was a
42
Platonist . Nevertheless his concern with method
refers directly to Aristotle's work and in a strong sense
Euclid can be taken to be the developer of the geometrical
approach to optics which we briefly considered in
Aristotle's Physics .
The Optics is generally considered to be a genuine
work of Euclid even though doubts have been raised in the
past about the lesser rigor of its demonstrations once
compared with the ones of the Elements . The existence of
Theon's recension of both Euclid's Optics and Catoprics
which often happened to be attributed to the same
Euclid supported the doubts about the authorship of the
v 43work.
The importance of the Optics is not to be found
only in the fact that it constitutes the first axiomatic
and demonstrative study of the process of vision, but also
in the deep influence it played in the later development
of the theory of vision. It represents both a
methodological discontinuity with the former approaches
and it constitutes the basic framework on which Ptolemy,
Alhazen, Bacon, Witelo, Peckam, Pelacani and finally
Kepler developed their theories. The study of Renaissance
texts on perspective shows that Euclid's Optics was
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carefully studied and that the solution of the problem of
the accurate computation of scale of objects at different
distance (the law of "rimpicciolimento" ) was often
referred to Proposition 9 ("Equal and parallel magnitudes
located at different distances from the eye do not appear
proportional to their distances from the eye").
Moving from a short passage of Vitruvius which
reports Democritus' interest in problems of perspective in
relation to theatrical backdrops and from Geminus '( first
century BC ) consideration of scenography as a branch of
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optics, it has been suggested that Euclid's work is
not just the source of Renaissance perspective, but its
very development grew out of analogous interests in the
Greek world.
Following the requirements of Aristotle's method,
Euclid presents only those aspects of the
"genus"
of
optics which differ from the
"genus"
of geometry. In fact
the definitions included in the Optics are not
all-inclusive because Euclid takes for granted that the
reader is already familiar with all the apparatus of
definitions, axioms, and common notions of the Elements .
The Optics begins with nine (sometimes seven) oroi or
. .
45
definitions :
1. Straight lines drawn from the eye proceed in
space over great distances.
2. The figure contained under the visual rays is
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a cone having its vertex in the eye but its
base at the limits of the object viewed.
3. Those objects are seen upon which sight falls
and those are not seen upon which sight does
not fall.
4. Things which are seen under a larger angle
appear larger, under a smaller angle appear
smaller, and under equal angle appear equal.
5. Things seen under higher rays appear higher,
and things seen under lower rays appear lower.
6. Similarly, things seen under rays more on the
right appear more to the right, and things
more on the left appear more to the left.
7. Things seen under many angles are seen more
clearly.
8. All visual rays have the same speed.
9. An object is not visible under every angle
whatsoever .
The first two definitions entails the basic
structure of Euclid's model. Visual rays are originated
(either irradiated or just "drawn") from the eye. The
pattern of these rays is a cone in which the object of
sight is "framed". Vision is primary referred to the
pattern of angles among the various rays which
"touch" the
various part of the object. For the first time vision is
not the
"understanding"
of the object, but the
determination of its placement in space through a form of
remote sensing based on the computation of angular
distances.
The Optics lacks of the apparatus of postulates
and common notions which are
instead present in the
Elements . This is not only because Euclid refers
implicitly to the one of the Elements , but primarily
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because some of the definitions of the Optics are actually
common notions or postulates.
It is probable that the problematic distinctions
among initial assumptions proposed by Aristotle could not
be maintained once the subjects matter of those
assumptions are of very different nature and their
relationship to the "genus" is extremely complex. In fact,
together with physical hypotheses like (1) we find other
assumptions like (4) which has a definite psychological
content.
Once the geometrical model is applied to a
physical process, it is not only the problem of
correspondence rules to emerge, because the very
assumptions of the deductive reasoning need to include
some items which will make possible the management of
those rules of correspondence. Probably Euclid was faced
by the necessity of extending the number of
"headings"
under which to categorize the various assumptions, and
instead he solves the problem by gathering all of them
under the same category- For instance (1) would probably
be both a definition and a common notion because it
implies the existence of what it describes, (2) is
certainly also a postulate because the thing which is
described and whose existence is assumed is a
counter-intuitive notion. Some of the other definitions
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iscannot fit any of Aristotle's categories of assumption;
because of their content. For instance, how can the verb
"to appear" be part of and axiomatic system?. This
difficulties have been more or less explicitly recognized
46
by the translators. For instance Cohen and Drabkin
point to the fact that in the context of the Optics the
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oroi are both definitions and assumptions; Theisen
48
calls them directly "assumptions"; and P-Ver Eecke
says that "Ces definitions (oroi) sont plutot des
hypotheses ou des postulats".
Evidently Euclid tries to deal, as far as he can,
with geometrical matters only, but he cannot explain the
whole process of vision geometrically, and he is obbliged
to insert several items of ambiguous content among his
assumptions. However, the difficulties are not only in
what he considers, but also in the problems he avoids to
limit the inconsistencies of his model.
For instance, he does not consider the
"lines"
which proceed from the eye to be material, and the Greek
verb used to describe their behavior is prospiptosi
which means "to draw to meet", which is exactly the verb
he uses in the first postulate of the
Elements when he
assumes the physical existence of the geometrical line.
Similarly, we do not find any consideration of the medium
in which this propagation takes place, for it was probably
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compared to a blank papyrus on which those lines could be
drawn. He also introduces the verb "to appear" within the
definitions, but he does not give a geometrical
interpretation of the workings of the eye, which is simply
taken to be the "point" from which the lines which create
"appearances"
are radiated.
However, we cannot just say that Euclid approached
the study of vision geometrically and operated the
necessary reductions. In fact several of the problems of
his model do not derive from the drasticity but rather
from the contradictoriness of those reductions.
For instance, his primary concern with the
geometrical aspects of vision takes him to consider the
rectilinear propagation of light as a definition. By
treating it as a purely geometrical object, he avoids the
experimental confirmation of this hypothesis, which
instead was carefully sought by Ptolemy, Alkindi, and
Alhazen throught he study of the behavior of the shadows
and of the camera obscura. Things get more complex when he
applies his concept of matter-less visual ray to the
actual process of vision, because at this point he needs
to negociate the evidence that vision is not evenly sharp
on the whole visual field and that the intensity of light
decreases with the distance from the source. The
matter-less visual ray fits his notion of continuous and
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infinitely bisectible angle given in the Elements , but
such a notion of angle would not easily account for both
the experience of vision and the reduction of the
intensity of light through diffusion. Consequently, in
Proposition 1 he claims that "Nothing that is seen is seen
at once in its entirety" and goes on explaining it saying
that visual rays are discrete and that they scan the
object like the beam of a tv monitor. In a sense he has
"atomized" his matter-less visual ray against its own
assumptions in the Optics and Elements to be able to
produce a
"geometrical"
explanation of a physical and
physiological process. Moreover by inserting the notion of
scansion which is not exactly a geometrical one, he brings
in also the concept of time. To make sense of this
kinematic component he cannot freeze, he paradoxically
gets to explain it with a psychological argument
like :".. .since the rays are carried rapidly [over the
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object] it seems to be seen all at once".
This example which can be easily replicated by
considering other propositions shows that the limits of
Euclid's Optics are not to be found also in the fact that
he cannot maintain the internal consistency of his model
if he wants to save its content. Not only he
"contextualizes" the status of the geometrical objects in
an adaptive manner, but his demonstrations (like for
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emerge in those contexts, and the analysis of Ptolemy's
work in astronomy offers further material about how the
process of the evaluation of instrumental reports is
influenced by those beliefs rooted in specific form of
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professional common sense
It has been noted that his commitment to the
epicyclic paradigm influenced his treatment of
astronomical observations, but also his Optics contains
materials for similar considerations. For instance, once
he realizes the uneveness of the visual field, he tries t
determine the pattern of his distribution experimentally,
but he reads those results through his and Euclid's
assumption that visual rays propagate in a conical
pattern. He ends up concluding that the visual field
extends
45' in each direction around the axis of the
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cone . This assumption makes him blind not only to
the variation of latitudinal and longitudinal width of the
field of vision, but also to the fact that the
"base"
of
the cone of vision is far from flat because of the effect
of distance on the resolutive power of the eye. Lejeune
seems to have identified the problem when he says that:
Ptolemee s'imaginait donee mesurer une
grandeur constante et ne songeait nu^lement a
varier les conditions d 'experience .
The same adaptive evaluation of experimental
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evidences can be found in his study of the law of
refraction. He attempted a systematic series of
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tests , but it has been suggested that he could not
have observed what he claims he did. As noted by Lloyd
..when he presents what he claims as the
results of detailed experiments to determine the
amounts of refraction from air to water, from air
to glass and from water to glass, these results
have clearly already been adjusted to tally with
the underlying theory .... Here , then the
observations have been interpreted before they are
recorded.
Beside the elegant but quite doubtful quantitative
treatment of refraction (which Ptolemy's himself does not
seem to have trusted if he did not make any systematic
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correction in his Almagest ), he seems to have had
some qualitative awareness of the implications of
refraction for the internal workings of the eye. Probably
moving from
Archimedes' doubts about the fact that the
apex of the cone of vision could be identified on the
pupil, and from some sort of approximate physiological
knowledge, Ptolemy realized that the different density of
the parts of the eye had something to do with the process
of vision. However, he did not try to negociate the
anatomy of the eye with the process of vision, but he
rather tried to reduce the problems which could be
generated by refraction.
The notion of central and normal ray is a
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recurrent one in Ptolemy and this has probably something
to do with (or at least it fits) his concern with
refraction. In fact, by assuming the apex of the visual
cone to be coincident with the center of curvature of the
cornea, he assumed that all the visual rays were normal to
its surface, and therefore refraction could not take place
in them.
It is also quite evident that he treats both
refraction and other aspects of vision in mechanical
terms. For instance not only the visual ray needs to be
"stopped" by the object to be able to produce vision, but
the central ray of the visual cone is the "strongest"
because it "hits" the object along a normal direction.
Similarly, refraction weakens off the rays that are not
normal to the line of contact of the two different media,
in the same way that the lateral rays of the visual cone
(the ones not normal to the base of the cone) are weaker
and further weakened by the interaction with the medium.
Evidently to Ptolemy refraction is a special kind of wear
which is particularly effective on the weaker,
non-central, or non-normal rays.
He also adopts mechanical analogies to explain the
concept of illumination which he compares to the notion of
concentration of forces. Visual rays are treated as
force-vectors as in his explanation of the "stronger"
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sharpness of binocular vision which he attributes to the
double concentration of visual rays on the object of
sight. However he does not make use of these mechanical
analogies when he tries to explain other aspects of
binocular vision. In fact, after dismissing Euclid's
hypothesis that the visual reports of the two eyes are
just "added" in an unspecified manner, he clearly admits
the existence of the apparent displacement of the object's
position in space and claims that the unification of the
two visual fields takes place also through psychological
processes. Even though his explanation of what this
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"addition" is about is quite unsatisfactory , it
implies the recognition that what we perceive to be the
place of the object in space is actually a psychological
construction. Psychology is no more either a bumper-like
and unstructured process which mediates what cannot be
accounted geometrically, or, worse, the cause of errors
and deceptive illusions. Illusions are slowly becoming
accepted as the standard.
Ptolemy is probably the first to introduce a
systematic and experimental attitude into the study of
optics and vision, even though as we have seen, his
interpretation of those experimental reports is quite
problematic. We have noticed that his interest for optics
moved out of his professional commitment to astronomy, and
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that in the Almagest he was often acknowledging
observational problems related either to the instruments'
or to eye-sight's inaccuracy- In the same way Plato and
Aristotle treated vision as part of their theories of
knowledge, Ptolemy considered it as the observations'
evaluation section of his astronomy.
The continuous interaction between the problems he
faced in astronomy and optics shows that despite the fact
optics had its own axioms, it was not an indipendent
science. The form and the results of his experiments in
optics confirms this interaction. For instance Lejeune has
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noted that the results of his experimental
investigation on the shape and extension of the field of
vision are perfectly matched in the Almagest by his
considerations of astronomical visibility. However, the
most interesting example comes from the consideration of
how the instruments he was using as an astronomer guided
the investigation about important aspects of his theory of
optics.
Archimedes offers an earlier example of how the
use and the reflections about the behavior of the
instrument, may trigger a criticism of the very bases on
which such an instrument could be used. In fact by using
the dioptra which was going to become a classical
instrument for Hipparchus, Ptolemy, and Heron he
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questioned the fact the eye could be considered as a point
by assuming the vertex of the cone of vision to be on the
surface of the cornea. It is by studying the behavior of
the instrument that he got to the conclusion that if we
are able to "see" the output of that instrument, it means
that the workings of the eye are more complex than what
supposed .
The use of the diotra seems to have left some
traces within Ptolemy's work too. Lejeune, after having
tried to identify the instruments he used in his
experiments, concludes that:
II est vraisemblable qu'il faisait egalement
constater qu'un objet n'est visible au travers des
deux pinnules d'une dioptre qu'a la condition de
se trouver sur la droite passant par celles-ci.
C'est le principe meme de son procede de mesure
des angles d'incidence et de reflexion, procede en
tous pointSoRarallele a celui utilise pour la
refraction .
The fact that Ptolemy took his dioptra as the
exemplar which could mediate the investigation of the
fundamental aspects of optics is confirmed by a
pseudo-euclidean work on catoprics generally attributed to
Theon, whose first definition says that:
Soit suppose que le rayon visual est une
droite dont toutes les parties medianes se butent
a des limites.
which Lejeune translates slightly differently as
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Le rayon visuel est une droite dont tousgle
points intermediaires masquent Is extremites
which shows more clearly that the two pinnholes placed on
the same viewing device of the dioptra were already used
as the basic "paradigmatic" instruments for the
experimental demonstration of the rectilinear propagation
of light.
This last example confirms the paradigmatic nature
of axiomatic systems, for we see that both the choice and
the content of the initial assumptions is also mediated by
the professional practice developed around the use of the
instrument.
In other terms the dioptra was to Ptolemy what the
straightedge and compass was to Euclid, what the camera
obscura was to Kepler, or going back to the
Presocratics what the lantern was to Empedocles.
6 - Galen: anatomy and geometry
Galen (129?-199 AD) was almost a contemporary to
Ptolemy but assumed a totally different approach to the
explanation of the process of vision, for he moved from
the physiological and anatomical analysis of the organs of
vision and tried to integrated it with a geometrical
model .
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His system of physiology incorporates several
concept of Stoic philosophy, and one of them, the pneuma ,
is of crucial importance for the understanding of his
analysis of the process of vision.
The philosophy of the Stoics cannot be considered
as a homogenous system, nevertheless they maintained quite
a broad agreement about the notion of pneuma. The Stoics
introduced a hierarchy among the elements of the cosmos:
air and fire were considered to be the active, earth and
water the passive ones. The pneuma is precisely a mixture
of air and fire which gives form and keeps together the
other two elements. The Aristotelean continuum is made
83
active. The innovation is important for it allows a
new range of possible solution of the problem of movement
which was crucial in Aristotle's theory of vision. The
pneuma participates of both in animate and inanimate
bodies; it is a quite sophisticated development of the
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sympathetic relations among elements proposed by
Empedocles. The important novelty is the kind of
relationships among bodies which are made possible by
their common
"pneumatic" nature.
To the Stoics, everything in the cosmos is kept
together in a dynamic equilibrium produced by the tension
produced by the pneuma. In a sense, they articulated and
extended the well-known homeric notion of psiche as breath
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to the whole cosmos through a microcosm-macrocosm analogy.
, 85
S.Sambursky gets to the point of comparing the
pneuma probably by isolating its "modern" aspects to the
modern notion of field of forces. This form of dynamic
equilibrium, of cohesive tension, introduces a notion of
space in which movement can be propagated as a wave on a
tense string. This characteristic of pneumatic space is
potentially interesting in relation to the the duality
between perception as produced by the "touch" of material
emanations or as change of state in the luminous medium
and in the visual "faculty".
Chrysippus introduces the first important feature
of the pneuma for the process of vision when he says that:
The structure of matter is simply air, for
bodies are bound together by air. Likewise all
that is bound together in a material structure
derives its quality from the binding air which in
iron is called hardness, in stone thickness, and
in silver whiteness.
There is a shift from the Atomistic notion of
configuration to the Stoic concept of synthesis : here it
is the pneuma to give forms to substances through
synthesis, and for the same reason once used as the
medium of vision it can also
"perceive" them. The pneuma
is everywhere and especially in the air which, for this
reason, becomes a tense
medium. As Aetius puts it:
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The Stoics say that the air is not composed of
particles, but that it is a continuum which
contains no empty space. If struck by a puff of
breath it sets up circular waves which advance in
a straight line to infinity, until all the
surrounding air is affected just as a pool is
affected by a stone which strikes it. But whereas
in this case the mguement is circular, the air
moves spherically.
It is precisely this concept of wave-motion that
characterizes most of the stoic theory of perception which
will be later adopted and modified by Galen. Through this
notion they try to solve both to the duality between
material movement and change of state, and to the two-way
perceptual transmission that we have found in Empedocles,
Plato, Euclid, and Ptolemy. This because a wave, once
struck an obstacle, moves back to the origin. The
disturbing problem is that this model works much better in
a pool than in an unlimited space. However, the
observation of a "standing wave" in a limited
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environment , could offer a model for that
combination of stilness and activity, for that tensional
motion
(tonike0 kinesis), which was an appealing potential
solution of a series of problems. The use of the pneuma
for the explanation of psychological and physiological
processes was particularly interesting because the domain
of those processes (the human body) was actually limited.
Most of the Stoics (but not Galen) took the heart
to be the seat of the hegemonikon , the "ruling part of
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the soul", and maintained that there was a two-way
communication between the sense organs and the hegemonikon
based on this tensional motion. In this way perception as
Aristotle was trying to prove with his notion of the
"actualization of the already
perfect"
could be
considered not as a material modification, but as a change
of state. Chrysippus has been credited of saying that:
In the same way as a spider in the centre of
the web holds in its feet all the beginnings of
the threads, in order to feel by close contact if
an insect strikes the web, and where , so does the
ruling part of the soul, situated in the middle of
the heart, check on the beginnings of the senses,
in order toQperceive their messages from close
proximity.
This notion of tense matrix was then quite
interestingly applied by Chrysippus to the problem of the
nature of perceptual "impressions". Cleanthes another
Stoic held that an impression was a material imprint like
the one of a seal on the wax, but Chrysippus opposed him
claiming that:
It is by no means absurd that the same body be
submitted at one and at the same time to a very
large number of modifications. In the same way as
air, when many sounds are uttered, is submitted to
innumerable and different strokes and holds at
once many modifications, so
the hegemonikon
undergoes an equivalent experience when
presentations are formed by it in various
ways.
Chrysippus' fragment reminds also of the pool in
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which different perturbations of the water surface
maintain a pattern of interference from which in each
point of the pool the pattern of those perturbations can
be computed. This introduces the quite innovative
hypothesis that different impressions can be differently
modulated at the same time on the same portion of medium.
Impressions are not things which occupy a space, but a
state of the psychic pneuma. Implicitely the temporal
factor is introduced into the picture. The Stoics applied
the "pool-model" also to inanimate bodies, in fact Philo
says that pneuma:
...begins in the center of the body and
extendes outwards to its boundaries, and after
touching the outermost surface it turns back till
it arrives at the same place from which it
started .
Therefore the pneuma is not just a cohesive
tension, but a wave-like one.
With these premises, the explanation of the
process of perception by means of this tensional motion is
quite automatic. Both the explanation of hearing and sight
is evidently approached in terms of waves diffused in the
air, but in the case of vision the determination of what
this waves are about is by no means easy. It is at this
point that this interesting model shows its limits.
However the wave-model does not necessarily
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exclude the geometrical treatment of the process. We have
seen that Chrysippus thought of the propagation of waves
in the spider-web to be able to contain the information
about the direction of the "perturbation", and something
similar could probably have been applied to the
propagation of a "visual wave" which hits an obstacle and
comes back as in a radar. Moreover the pattern of wave
propagation is perfectly coherent with Euclid's results
because the direction of wave-motion is perpendicular to
its front. However, probably also because of a series of
philosophical difficulties that the Stoics raised about
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geometry , the integration of the two approaches was
never satisfactorily achieved, and their pneumatic theory
of vision did not go beyond a nominal and sympathetic
explanation of the process. We are told that:
According to Chrysippus.. sight is due to the
light between the observer and the object observed
conically. The cone forms in the air, with its
apex in the eye of the observer and its base in
the object observed. In this way the signal is
transmitted to the observer by means ofg|tressed
air, just as [by feeling] with a stick.
This adaptation of Euclid's model to a pneumatic
medium did not satisfy all the Stoics either, and in fact
Galen dismissed the comparison with the stick by claiming
that a stick (even though it offered a good example
of two-way communication) is not sensitive to color. What
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Galen will maintain is the basic concept of
sensitivization of air by means of the pneuma.
In fact the Stoics thought that visual perception
took place after the pneuma was sent from the hegemonikon
to the eyes ,where the surrounding air was put in a state
of tension by the contact with the pneuma-f illed eyes.
Vision is not just a matter of light, because air needs to
be sensitized and made ready to trasmit by means pneumatic
tensional motion. However, the problem of the relationship
sunlight-pneuma is not of difficult solution (at least
nominally), because sunlight is a kind of fire which, in
turn, is a component of the same pneuma. Alexander of
Aphrodisia wrote the Stoics maintained that:
The illuminated air becomes more powerful
because of the mixture [with fire] and can
propagate the sensation through pressure whereas
as darkqair is slack and cannot be stressed by
vision .
Galen philosophy of physiology contains several
features of the Stoicism. He first encountered it in his
early training in philosophy before becoming
professionally involved in medicine, and once he moved to
Rome he probably continued to operate in an intellectual
environment which was strongly sympathetic with Stoic
philosophy.
But, more importantly, Stoicism fit quite
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coherently his physiological paradigm. For instance his
theory of the four humors which he took over from
Hippocratic medicine contained a deterministic
connotation which found many point of contact with the
Stoics' own determinism, which was a consequence of the
conparticipation of the pneuma with the whole cosmos.
However the major reason of Galen interest with Stoic
philosophy is to be found in the range of physiological
explanations made possible by the adoption of the notion
pneuma. For instance, beside the interesting explanation
of nervous transmission, the dynamic equilibrium peculiar
to pneuma allowed Galen to offer a coherent analysis of
the crucial physiological problem of muscular
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motion
Galen's theory of vision develops primarily from
the careful consideration of the anatomy of the organ of
vision, whose interpretation is strongly influenced both
by his pneumatic philosophy and by
his commitment to a
teleological interpretation of the structure of human
body. However his notion of teleology is much less
philosophical than Aristotle's. It seems
thatprobably
out of his experience as
gladiators'
physician in
Pergamum, and as military
physician with Marcus
Aurelius he considered usefulness primarily in terms of
safety and
protection of vital organs from external
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injuries. These concerns can be traced also in the
interpretation of the eye's anatomy, but they do not play
a primary role here as they do in other parts of his
physiological system.
Galen dealt with vision in his On Vision (now
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lost), in De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis , and
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in On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body . At
the end of Tenth Book [The Eyes] of the
On the Usefulness., he tries an unsuccessfull negotiation
of his pneumatic theory with Euclid and Ptolemy's theories
of geometrical optics.
Galen held different opinions than the Stoics'
about the nature, kinds and distribution of the pneuma in
the human body. He thought that the vital pneuma (zotikon
pneuma) is absorbed from the outer air primarily through
respiration and is delivered through blood vessels to the
brain. Once there, it becomes cerebral pneuma (psychikon
pneuma), which is the essential active component of all
the perceptual processes. With this description of the
transformation of the pneuma, he explicitely dismisses the
Stoics' belief that the heart was the seat of the soul,
which he instead like
Alcmaeonplaces in the brain. He
also opposes the Stoics by maintaing that the cerebral
pneuma was not subdivided in other more specialized
pneumas (visual, auditory, etc.) as instead held by
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Chrysippus. Galen explains sense-specificity in an almost
Aristotelean fashion by maintaining that the sensitivity
to different qualities of the objects was not referred to
different qualities of sensitive pneuma, but rather to the
interaction between a single kind of pneuma with different
structures of sense organs. However, he equally modifies
Aristotle's hypothesis that conscious percepion took place
in the sense-organs: to him in fact, sense-organs are just
specialized "terminals". The production of conscious
sensation takes place in the brain as effect of the
"returning
wave"
of the pneuma from the sense-organs.
Nevertheless, by explaining sense-specificity, he
re-introduces strong sympathetical analogies which remind
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of Empedocles . In fact, talking about the
sensitivity of different senses he claims that:
They are not however all altered by every
perceptible thing; rather the bright luminous
sense instrument is altered by colors, the airlike
instrument by sounds, the vaporous instrument by
odors, and in a word, like is perceptible by like
It is not the pneuma but the sense-organ to be
specialized. However, this emphasis on the material
structure of the organ (which is clearly a result of
Galen's primary concern with physiology), re-introduces
the problem of the
"modification" of such an organ during
the process of perception. Chrysippus had found an elegant
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but nominal solution and Galen, re-introducing anatomical
reality in the picture, brings the same old problem up
again. Probably because of his "anatomical paradigm",
Galen considered perception and thought to be somehow more
imprint-like than what Chrisippus had previuously
suggested:
In substance the encephalon is very like the
nerves, of which it was meant to be the source,
except that it was softer, and this was proper for
a part that was to receive all sensations, form
all images, and apprehend all ideas. For a
substance easily altered is most suitable for such
actions and affections, and a soft substance is
always more easily altered than one that is
harder .
The notion of perceptual impression is now
presented as an ambiguous mediation between a change in
the status of the medium of perception and an imprint in
the cerebral medium. Galen tries to solve Aristotle's
ambiguous explanation of perception in terms of the
non-material modification of an already perfect faculty of
perception, by substituting Aristotle's perfect and
extremely sensitive innate faculty of perception with an
extremely soft and
sensitive nervous substance which is
closely but unclearly
related to the cerebral pneuma.
But like Aristotle he falls in a similar difficulty. In
fact in the same way Aristotle could not easily dismiss
the materiality of the cause of perception, Galen cannot
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avoid to treat pneuma as a material entity of which,
however, he does not offer any further description. His
physiology, despite the relevant empirical content, is
still largely metaphysical.
Galen takes the bright and transparent to be the
sensitive component of the organ of vision and identifies
it with the crystalline lens (also in accordance to his
professional experience of cataracts). The object of
vision is not just the position of the bodies and their
shape, but, primarily, their color. It is color which can
effect the transparent, in a fashion quite similar to what
already proposed by Aristotle.
From here Galen's criticism of
Chrysippus'
concept
of vision in terms of the touch of a stick-like, extremely
thin, cilinder of air made tense by the presence of visual
pneuma. In Galen's theory, instead, it is the cerebral
pneuma what makes the lens to be sensitive and the air to
be tense. Such pneuma is brought from the brain to the
eyes through the optical nerve which...
is a part of the brain, like a branch or
offshot of a tree, and the member to which the
part is attached receives the power from the part
into the whole of itself and thus becomes capable
of discerning the things that touch it. Something
similar happens also in the case of the air that
surrouns it. When it has been illuminated by the
sun, it is already an instrument of vision of the
same description as the pneuma arriving from the
brain; but until it is illuminated it does not
turn into a sympathetic instrument in accordance
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with the change effected by the outflow of the
pneuma into it. The Stoics, then, must not say
that we see by means of the surrounding air as
with a walking-stick.
The role of sunlight in the process of the
sensitization of the air in the presence of pneuma,
reminds both of Aristotle notion of the diaphanus and of
Plato's coalescence of visual fire and sunlight. The
aristotelean connotation seems however to be stronger:
sunlight is considered as a dynamis , a "sensory power",
something similar to Aristotle's energeia . It makes
another energeia (which is pneumatized air) to switch to
actuality. When air is illuminated it becomes an
instrument of vision like pneuma itself.
The other problem which Galen tries to minimize is
the relationship between pneuma and air. They are
evidently related, but a better articulation of such a
relation would obblige him to define better the nature of
pneuma. In fact he often uses different terms than "air",
like when he outlines the process by which pneuma is able
to sensitize the space between the eye and the object:
It appears likely that the pneuma arriving in
the eye [from the brain] unites itself instantly
with the surrounding [periechonti] and alters it,
accordingly to its own nature, but itQdoes not
extend itself over a great distance.
104 .
In other passages he seems to solve the
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problem through another sympathetic analogy, by saying
that air is a continuous element constituted by contiguous
particles of different size. What is responsible for the
transmission of visual perception is the most subtle parts
of air, which seems to match sympathetically the subtlety
of the cerebral pneuma which he takes to be the most
air-like. However he does not offer a more precise
explanation of the actual relation between these two
"subtleties".
However, the origin of most of these problems
cannot be referred to Galen's articulation only. It is
Chrysippus' notion of tensional motion that looses a good
part of its actual interest once it is moved from nominal
to factual explanations of natural phenomena. Nevertheless
it is true that Galen's major contributions to the theory
of vision are to be found in the emphasis on the anatomy
of the eye, rather than in his coherent arrangement of the
philosophical aspects of those problems.
The evaluation of the actual contribution of
Galen's accurate study of the anatomy of the eye to the
development of more comprehensive theories of vision is
not an easy task. It is evident that his anatomy was very
functional for medical and surgical problems, but it is
also clear that his a-priori interpretation of the
anatomical evidences (not unsimilar to Ptolemy's treatment
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of experimental reports) did not help him to develop a
consistent theory of vision. His phisiology of the eye
needed in fact to be revolutionized by F. Platter in 1583
to make the idea of retinal image possible.
Galen sets up a close anatomical analogy between
the eye and the brain (probably justifying it with the
excellence of sight among the other senses) and develops
it by assumimg a one-to-one relationship between the
membranes which surround the brain and the eye. The eyes
are two round offshots of the brain, and therefore the
retina, being the most internal membrane of the eye is
taken to be an actual part of the brain. Its being in
direct contact with the lens guarantees an immediate
transmission of visual sensation to the brain; in fact:
In appearance the retina is indeed like a net,
but not like a membrane at all, neither in color
nor in substance. One would surely believe, if one
detached it and rolled it together, that one had
before oneself a detached portion of the brain.
Its chief function, that for which it was sent
down by the brain, is to perceive the alterations
which occur in the crystalline bocjly^lens] and to
communicate these [to the brain].
Galen assumes that the eye needed more pneuma than
the other sense organs and therefore
"sees"
a channel in
the optical nerves probably inferring it from the small
depression visible in the eye at the point the optical
nerve "opens
up" and flattens into the retina. However he
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is not the first to "see" them, because the traditional
belief that optical nerves were "poroi" goes back even to
Alcmaeon, who needed to bring down "water" from the brain
to keep the eyes humid and sensitive.
His lack of understanding of the role of
refraction in having the external image to converge in an
internal one (in the case of the retinal image), led him
to explain the actual process of visual sensation with a
more sophisticated version of the notion of mirror image.
Actually he does not take the pupil to be the mirror as
Alcmaeon or Democritus did, in fact the image is perceived
by the crystalline lens, but we are not told how that
process may take place beside through the usual
sympathetic analogies. The same hypothesis about the role
of the lens is primarily developed and maintained through
a precise interpretation of anatomical evidences which he
also base on a related preparation of the specimen to be
dissected. R.Siegel has followed the instruction given by
Galen for the dissection of the eye and has noticed that:
The flat ciliary body is a disk-like vascular
structure which occupies in the intact eye the
space between the sclera and the posterior part of
the iris.... The ciliary body is attached with its
outer margin to the retina. ..to which it is
connected by innumerable fibers. During
preparation of the specimen the connections
between ciliary body and lens remained intact ,
but those to the retina were torn , since the
retina remained inside the eyeball covering the
choroid membrane ... .The radially arranged black
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spokes of the ciliary body form a very beautiful
pattern and seemed to Galen as a convincing
demonstration of the functional connections
between retina and lens. It was Galen's mistake to
infer a fugfi^ional relation from these anatomical
relations.
However it was quite natural to Galen because of
his commitment to a teleological view to see those
functional relations. Moreover, the lens was bright and
clear and therefore its choice as the sensitive part of
the eye was also fitting the pneumatic components of his
paradigm.
The impression is that Galen arrived at the
analysis of the process of vision with a precise system of
physiology already well articulated, and that he applied
it in the least contradictory way to his anatomical
knowledge of the eye, referring the explanation of the
crucial points to the undeterminate nature of the pneuma.
In fact it is difficult not to relate his findings about
the pores of the optical nerves with the more famous pores
in the intraventricular septum of the heart, and suggests
that his concern in saving his phisiological paradigm
played a continuous and important role in his
interpretation of anatomical evidences.
However we also need to remember that most of the
eye diseases known to Galen were external ones with the
exception of the cataract, and that his explanation of
vision does not contradict the exoerience of his
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professional practice. On the contrary, the crucial role
of the lens in his theory of vision reflects the awareness
of the dangerous consequences of its diseases.
In the last part of the Tenth Book of
On the Usefulness , Galen approaches quite
reluctantly apparently only because ordered by a god the
geometrical aspects of vision:
I have explained nearly everything pertaining
to the eyes with the exception of one point which
I intended to omit lest many of my readers be
annoyed with the obscurity of the explanations and
the lenght of the treatment. For since it
necessarily involves the theory of geometry and
most people pretending to some education not only
are ignorant of this but also avoid those who do
understand and are annoyed by them, I thought it
better to ornit the matter altogether. But
afterward I dreamed that I was being censured
because I was unjust to the most godlike of the
instruments and was behaving impiously toward the
Creator in leaving unexplained a great work of his
providence for animals, and so I felt impelled to
take up again whatnI had omitted and add it to the
end of this book.
He stresses even more clearly the adversity of the
community of the physicians to mathematical and
geometrical demonstrations by saying that:
..if it depended on me , I would omit
demonstrations requiring astronomy, geometry,
music, or any other logical discipline, lest my
books should be held in utter detestation by
physicians. For truly on countless occasions
throughout my life I have had this experience:
persons for a time talk pleasantly with me because
of my work among the sick but when they learn
later on that I am also trained in mathematics,
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they avoid me for tJaggiriost part and are at all
glad to be with me.
These premises are significant to understand
Galen's attitude in dealing with the geometrical aspect of
vision. Even though he displays a full understanding of
geometrical matters, it appears evident that it is not in
geometrical terms that he had thought of vision. However,
probably out of the awareness of the popularity of
geometrical optics at the time, he tries to offer a
geometrical interpretation of his pneumatic theory of
vision .
In trying to negotiate the two approaches he
introduces major modification in his former
theory primarily in regard with the transmission of
visual impression to the optical nerve but the final
results seem to have lost part of the (nominal) coherence
of the pneumatic approach without having added much to the
already available geometrical theories of vision. The main
reason of this lack of synthesis can be found in the
scarce understanding of the role of refraction in the
process of image formation, for this was the only way to
integrate the physiological and geometrical aspects of
vision .
Ptolemy's theory of vision has in fact shown that,
without having a full understanding of the anatomy of the
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eye, he probably failed to see the application of the law
of refraction (which he had somehow grasped) to the
physiological behavior of the eye. This brought him to
look at psychological explanations following Aristotle's
notion of common sense to fill the gap between the
experience of vision and its possible description in
geometrical terms. On the contrary Galen was
professionally uninterested in geometrical and
psychological matters; instead he looked for explanations
in terms of physiological interpretation of anatomical
evidences. The physiological and geometrical components
needed to be matched, but evidently the paradigms of the
various scientific communities dealing with vision did not
allow for the interaction among different approaches and
concerns. In fact Kepler studied and understood the
process of image formatiom in the camera obscura, but it
was Felix Platter's discovery of the photosensitivity of
the retina what allowed him to see the application of the
behavior of the camera obscura to the process of vision.
At first, Galen faces the problem of the
integration of the pneuma with the geometrical line; a
problem which reminds of Aristotle's unresolved troubles
in applying geometry to the diaphanous, and eventually to
the study vision. As noted earlier, the problem was not of
direction of propagation, because the direction of
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propagation of the wave-like tensional motion of the
pneuma was rectilinear. The problem was instead about the
nature of the ray, about how the pneuma could be reduced
to such a geometrical object. The problem was made more
complex by the empirical/realistic attitude of Stoic
philosophy which tended to question the abstractness of
geometrical forms. We have seen that Ptolemy probably out
of his professional necessity of applying geometry to a
variety of physical objects made a clear distinction
between the model and the process: what was geometrical
about the sunlight and the visual rays was their mode of
propagation and few other qualities. This is evident when
he treats both light and visual flow with the same
formalism making clear at the same time that they are
quite different objects.
But the pneuma is a more complex object,
especially because of its wave-like propagation, and even
though its direction is rectilinear, Galen probably felt
that the reduction of a
"wave" to a geometrical line to be
a too adventurous one. In the same way he substituted
"air" with "surrounding" to avoid the problem of defining
the relationship between that object and pneuma, he
replaced "visual ray" with "visual impression" ("gramma"
with "opsis"), and assumed that it was the opsis what
travelled along a geometrical line.
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However, the problem is only temporarily avoided
for it comes up again when he tries to describe how visual
perception can be referred to the geometrical behavior of
the opsis.
Even though he assumes with Ptolemy the nature of
the visual flow to be continuous (the only solution which
could be possibly coherent with the continuous nature of
the pneuma) he cannot maintain his former explanation of
visual perception based on the pneuma. Once he accepts the
assumptions of the geometrical tradition of Euclid and
Ptolemy, he also accepts the fact that the eye is
considered to be the vertex of a visual cone or pyramid.
Therefore, the sensitive element cannot be an extended and
(then) geometrically uncharacterized surface like the
crystalline lens. For the same reasons, the object of
perception cannot be anymore a perturbation of the air
which is pneumatically reflected in the eye in terms of a
modification of the transparent lens. The two systems seem
to be incommensurable, and in fact without the
understanding of the process of refraction inside the
eye they are actually so.
Galen is well aware of these difficulties, and in
fact dismisses most of his explanations of the pneumatic
behavior of the eye. He cannot mediate the two approache
and therefore assumes a drastic geometrization of vision,
s
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which he then literally extends to anatomy and physiology.
Through a newly functional reading of the anatomy of the
eye, he assumes that the central opsis (probably a
Ptolemaic influence) could pass straight through the lens
and get into the optical nerve which he takes to be on the
axis of the pupil. Actually the beginning of the optical
nerve is quite out of axis and it is scarcely believable
that such an anatomical evidence would have escaped Galen.
However, he then continues the drastic geometrization of
anatomy even in the path of the optical nerves, which he
takes to be practically rectilinear. Evidently he
dismisses his former hypothesis about the sensitive lens:
now the point is to have the visual impression to travel
straight up to the brain, where pneuma or not it could
be somehow "felt". However he does not say how a single
"ray"
could entail the information of the whole field of
. . 109
vision .
The presence of the chiasma , the crossing point
between the two optical nerves immediately after they come
out of the brain, offered him a chance for a further
geometrical interpretation of the propagation of the
visual sensation throught the system eyes/optical
nerves/brain. In fact he reads this "X"-like pattern as
two geometrical lines which intersecate each other, which
(according to the Book XI of Euclid's Elements ) implies
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that they lay on the same plane. From this he is able to
recognize that:
The pupil, the root of the eye, from which the
nerves begin to spread [into the retina] and,
thirdly, the junction of the two optic nerves
entering the anterior brain lie in a straight
line. They proceed on the same plane to form the
eyes in, the correct position that neither pupil is
higher.
Strangely enough, this personalized reading of
anatomy helps him to explain binocular vision. In fact he
assumes double-vision to take place when
the pupils of the two eyes diverge vertically rather than
laterally. With this assumption, the axes of the eyes, the
two optical nerves, and the chiasma laying all on the same
plane looks really teleological (or rather provvidential ) .
However, at this point, his functional reading of
anatomy does not seem to be simply the result of a
professionally-conditioned mental framework, because from
the rethoric (and sometimes arrogance) of Galen's text it
becomes evident that he was aware of hiding the weakness
of his interpretation behind the facade of geometrical
"complexities". In fact:
...Now if there is anyone who does not
understand what I have said, he clearly does not
know even the elements of geometry. It would be a
long task if I were to write demonstrations of
such things, and indeed a person would not
understand these either unless he has studied a
great deal beforehand You must, then, learn
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the demonstration from Euclid and when you have
learned it, come back to me and I will show you in
an animal these two straight lines, the channels
from the encephalon.
The attitude reminds of Aristotle curse-like
criticism of those who would doubt about the
indemonstrability of axioms:
The axiom is the most firmly established of
all principles. It is ignorance alone that could
lead any one to try to prove the axioms.... If any
one thought he could prove them, he could at once
be refuted; if he did not attempt to say anything,
it would be ridiculous to argue,with him: he would
be no better than a vegetable.
It's a matter of professionality .
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Cambridge, 1977, pp. 169-200. and O.B.Sheynin , "Mathematical
Treatment of Astronomical Observations", in Archive for His
tory of Exact Sciences , Vol.11, No. 2/3, 1973, pp. 97-126.
73 See A. Lejeune, op. cit. , pp. 41-51.
74 A. Lejeune, ibid. , p. 51.
75 See both A. Lejeune, ibid. , and G.E.R.Lloyd, op.cit. .
76 G.E.R.Lloyd, ibid. , p. 151.
77 G.E.R.Lloyd, ibid. , p. 134.
78 A. Lejeune, op.cit. , pp. 165-169.
79 A. Lejeune, ibid. , p. 45.
80 A. Lejeune, ibid. , p. 40.
81 Euclide, L'Optique et la Catoprique , trans. P.Ver Eecke,
Paris, 1959, p. 99.
82 A. Lejeune, op.cit. , p. 41.
83 Stoic philosopy is not usually considered for it contrib
utions to the development of science. However S.Sambursky,
in his The Physical World of the Greeks , New York, 1956,
and Physics of the Stoics , London, 1959, has attempted a
revaluation of the importance of the contributions to the
Stoics to the later developments of science. In particular
he emphasizes the conceptual novelties inherent to the con
cept of pneuma.
84 The strong concern with astrology developed out of the
Stoics' determinism can be traced back also to the sympathet
ic nature of the concept of pneuma. The pneuma is in fact
dispersed all through the cosmos like a drop of wine in the
sea: which means that everything shares something with every
thing else. This in turn suggests that everything is influenc-
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ed by everything. The Stoics found several empirical evidences
of their determinism especially in the relationship between
terrestrial and celestial bodies, like for instance between
the moon's motion and the tides. This sympathetic connotation
of the pneuma is then found in the Stoics' theories of vision.
In fact in the same way that Empedocles was explaining vision
in terms of emanations of the elements of the object of sight
which could be "felt" by the correspondent elements (or elem
ent-related pores) in the organ of sense, the Stoics used the
pneuma which is the common nature of all objects as a sympa
thetic link between consciousness and the environment. The re
lation between optics and the theory of emanations which was
developed by the Presocratics, continues in a more articulated
form, with the Stoics.
35 S.Sambursky, The Physical World of the Greeks , p. 135. He
claims that "This tension ( tonos ) . . . . is the most significant
distinguishing quality of the pneuma, by force of which it
becomes an entity not altogether unlike the concept of a
physical field in contemporary
science." However M.Hesse in
her Forces and fields , Totowa, NJ, 1965, pp. 75-77, puts
much less emphasis on the analogy.
86 Plutarch, de Stoic, repugn. , 1053F, qouted in S.Sambursky,
ibid. p. 136.
87 Aet., IV, 19, 4 (Arnim, II, 425), qouted in: S.Sambursky,
Physics of the Stoics , p. 23.
88 S.Sambursky, The Physical World of the Greeks , p. 139.
89 Chalcid., Ad Timaeum , 220 (Arnim, II, 879), quoted in: S.
Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics , p. 24.
90 Diels, 64 B 2., qouted in S.Sambursky, ibid. , p. 26.
91 Philo, Quod deus sit immut. , 35 (Arnim, II, 458), quoted
in S.Sambursky, ibid. , p. 31.
92 R.Siegel in his Galen on Sense Perception , New York, 1970,
p. 39 says that "There is an indication in the Ancient Litera
ture that the Stoics considered the Theorem of infinite thin
ness in order to find a compromise between the concepts of
pneuma and light rays". In fact Stoicism was basically an em
piricist philosophy which hid problems to accept the abstract
status geometrical objects such as lines and angles.
Further information can be found indirectly in I.Mueller,
"Geometry and Scepticism", in J.Barnes, J.Brunschwig , eds.
Science and Speculation , Cambridge, 1982, pp. 69-96.
93 Diog. VII 157 (A II 867), quoted in S.Sambursky, The Phys
ical World of the Greeks , p. 138.
94 This model is re-presented much later in
Descartes' Diop-
trigue and Treatise of Man .
95 Alex. Aphr . , De anima , 131, 32., quoted in S.Sambursky,
Physics of the Stoics , p. 28.
96 Galen in fact, probably applying the pneumatic notion of
tensional motion to more practical cases, proposes the dif
ference between static and dynamic equilibrium. For instance
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a man swimming against the current at the same speed of the
flow of the water, looks still to somebody standing on the
shore, but such a stillness, such an equilibrium is unlike
the one of a object left undisturbed and therefore still.
From this he says that the stillness of a limb like an arm
needs to be considered like the one of the swimmer; the arm
is still because it is kept still through an equilibrium of
opposite forces.
97 De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis , in Opera Omnia ,
Kuhn ed. , Vol . 5.
98 Galen, On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body , trans.
M.Tallmadge May, Ithaca, 1968. Especially the Tenth Book,
[The Eyes], pp. 463-503. Other sparse remarks in the Eight
Book, [The Neck, Head, Encephalon, and Senses], pp. 384-423.
99 "Like perceives like" is precisely found in a fragment by
Empedocles. See Chapts.3,4 of this thesis. The correspond
ence is not casual because Galen's analogies between the
structure of the sense-organs and the qualities of the ob
ject of sensation are actually sympathetic. The notion of
pneuma as it has been considered earlier contributes to
the adoption of those analogies.
100 Galen, On the Usefulness.. , p. 402.
101 Galen, ibid. , p. 398.
102 Galen, De Placitis 7. 7, trans. De Lacy; cf. Opera Omnia ,
ed.Kuhn, 5:642. , quoted in D.C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision
from Al-Kindi to Kepler , Chicago, 1976, p. 11.
103 Galen, in Kuhn ,Vol . 5, p. 617, quoted in R.Siegel, op.cit. ,
p. 77.
104 R.Siegel, ibid. , p. 78.
105 Galen, On the Usefulness.. , trans. Shastid, pp.
8591-
8592 (modified); Kuhn, Vol.3, p. 762, quoted in R.Siegel,
ibid. , p. 56.
52-53.106 R.Siegel, ibid. , pp
107 Galen, On the Usefulness.
490-491.
108
109
110
111
112
Galen, ibid. , p. 502.
R.Siegel, op.cit. , p. 39.
R.Siegel/ ibid. , p. 99.
Galen, On the Usefulness..
trans. M.Tallmadge May, p.
p. 498-499.
Aristotle, Metaphysics , T006all-15, quoted in T.S.Heath,
The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements , Cambridge, 1908,
p. 121.
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